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ABSTRACT 
This study is designed to explore and examine the 
various aspects of West Bank couples attitudes, beliefs and 
childbearing behaviour with regard to family size 
formation. Within the general framework, the study aims to 
investigate the various aspects such as household 
characteristics, marriage issues, determinants of 
childbearing behaviour, desired family size, ideal family 
size, gender preference, couples communication with regard 
to decision making process, and the relation between 
desired and actual family size. Moreover, this study aims 
to investigate and examine the effect of socio-economic, 
cultural and demographic variables on couples preferences 
and attitudes. 
It is believed that in order to understand the 
couples attitudes, beliefs and behaviour, one should first 
understand the background which created such attitudes and 
beliefs. As a result, this study begins with a general 
overview of the West Bank population. Moreover, this study 
will shed light on the political situation which has a 
significant effect on demographic change in the region. In 
addition, it will examine the influence of Arab culture, 
being an Islamic one, on: 
a) the role of women in the family and society 
b) family structure and social system 
c) child-parental relationships 
d) couples interpersonal relationships 
xxiii 
e) couples relations within their family 
f) preferred number and gender of children 
g) extent of contraceptive use and family planning 
The data for the research were gathered by 
interviewing a sample of 999 couples (husbands and wives) 
using a questionnaire method. The data were gathered from 
different environments so as to include urban and rural 
areas and refugee camps within the district of Nablus. 
As for the statistical techniques used for analysing 
the data, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSSX) was employed. Various statistical measures such as 
means, correlations, chi-square tests, probabilities and 
multivariate discriminant analysis were performed in order 
to examine associations between the various variables. 
Some of the outcomes emerging from the analysis 
include: 
1) The political factor has played a major role in shaping 
the West Bank population from the beginning of this 
century. 
2) On average, West Bank families prefer an early age at 
marriage for females, while age at marriage for males 
has increased gradually as a direct result of education. 
3) Children's economic contribution to their families is 
very meager. Thus, the costs and benefits of having 
children are not considered to be crucial factor in 
determining West Bank couples childbearing behaviour. 
4) On average, husbands have more traditional attitudes 
towards the number and gender of children than their wives. 
XXIV 
on the other hand, wives are more willing to use 
contraceptives. 
5) West Bank couples, especially husbands, have a strong 
male preference, especially for the first child. 
6) In general, the average ideal family size is less than 
the average desired family size and total fertility rate. 
7) With respect to desired family size, an "after the 
event" rationalisation effect is evident, especially among 
couples who have completed their family size. 
8) A couples relationship and level of communication with 
each other have a significant effect on decision making 
with regard to family size preference and contraceptive 
use. 
9) The findings reveal significant differences in couples 
attitudes towards fertility preference. Variables such as 
place of residence, age, educational level and women's 
employment appeared to have the largest discriminant power 
in explaining couples attitudes to fertility preferences. 
Apart from these major findings, the study also 
includes suggestions and recommendations for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FERTILITY PREFERENCES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
1.1 Introduction 
Individual perceptions, motivations and decision- 
making processes concerning fertility preferences have 
been the subject of an increasing number of investigations. 
One reason for this has been the realisation of the 
importance of the subject in explaining fertility 
behaviour in developing countries. In turn explanation of 
fertility behaviour has. come to be seen as a critical 
prerequisite to introducing effective family planning 
programmes. Greater use of fertility regulation has 
promoted a closer association between fertility preferences 
and actual behaviour, thus reducing the gap between 
couples' attitudes and preferences on the one hand and 
actual family size on the other. Therefore, personal 
desires may have become an important factor in shaping 
future trends in fertility. 
This chapter aims to discuss some theoretical issues 
relating to fertility behaviour. It aims to investigate 
the concept of fertility preference, and to review relevant 
literature with regard to fertility behaviour in developing 
countries. The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
It begins with a discussion of the main components that 
determine fertility behaviour. This discussion will be 
followed by an investigation of the concept of desired 
family size as a measure of demand for children. This 
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chapter will also investigate the major factors and 
circumstances that determine and influence couples' 
preferences with regard to issues such as decision-making 
on family size and child gender preference. Lastly this 
chapter aims to discuss the effect of socio-economic 
variables on couples' desires. These variables include 
family income, education and female employment. 
1.2 Disciplinary perspectives on fertility 
Demography may be broadly defined as the statistical 
description and analysis of population. More specifically, 
it is a discipline that aims at ascertaining the number, 
structure and distribution of people in a given area, and 
examining the process that produces change in population 
size and character over time. In order to do this it is 
necessary to study the age and sex composition of a 
population, birth and death rates and the mathematical 
relationships which exist between the demographic processes 
operating within the population. 
Fertility analysis forms only one part, albeit a 
major one, of demography. Fertility and population growth 
are such major elements in the process that they would 
excite scholarly interest even if the policy implications 
of fertility were obscure (Farooq and Simmons, 1985). 
Given the applied nature of fertility studies relative to 
development planning, it has not only been demographers but 
also population geographers, social statisticians, 
sociologists, economists and planners who have devoted 
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attention to the topic. Fertility studies have therefore 
been informed by expertise from a wide range of disciplines 
(Wrong, 1968). 
Population study and fertility analysis in particular 
is unavoidably an interdisciplinary field. As Hauser and 
Duncan (1959) have asserted, it is not and can not be 
understanding within a single theoretical framework. For 
example, Kingsley Davis (1949) indicated that fertility 
behaviour is to a great extent socially determined relating 
to familial and social norms. Davis argues that whenever a 
demographer pushes his inquiry to the point of asking why 
demographic processes take the form that they do, the 
answer is found in the social field. 
Economists on the other hand have analysed fertility 
from another different and have often treated children as 
comparable to commodities (Becker, 1960; Schultz, 1973). 
Other economists have taken into consideration the decision 
making process (Leibenstein, 1974; Easterlin, 1983) and the 
economics of family decisions. 
Anthropologists analysing fertility change have 
emphasised the cultural point of view and have suggested 
that greater attention should be paid to cultural factors 
and their influences in producing a fertility transition. 
The contribution of geographers in fertility studies 
are relatively few, by contrast with their involvement in 
other aspects of population geography (Coward, 1986). By 
tradition geographers have made their greatest 
contributions in the study of: - 
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1. The relationship between population and the environment 
in which they live. 
2. The changing spatial pattern of population distribution 
and movements. 
3. Problems of population growth and its impact on human 
society, the environment and the world's resources 
(Woods, 1986). 
One reason for the small contribution by geographers 
to fertility studies has simply been the lack of detailed 
spatial data sets, especially in the developing countries. 
It might have been expected, however, that the 
contributions of geographers might have been more 
substantial following the publication of the results of the 
world fertility survey in the 1970s and 1980s (Woods, 
1986). 
1.3 Theoretical issues 
1.3.1 Development and fertility 
The relationship between population growth and socio 
economic development are exceedingly complex. In recent 
decades life expectancy has improved in most countries as 
have per capita income, literacy rates and the proportion 
of population receiving adequate levels of formal 
education. The precise inter-relationship between these 
variables is, however, hard to establish. 
Inkeles (1969) has argued that the development 
process was expected to result in a shift in people's 
attitudes to family size and fertility control. This would 
occur as a result of changing access to education, 
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increased urbanisation and increased awareness and 
availability of health and medical institutions. These 
effects are ordered by changing social structures 
involving: - 
1. The increasing independence of couples from the 
authority of their relatives and in particular from 
parental authority. 
2. A growing belief in the ability, via scientific and 
medical knowledge, of means of controlling fertility 
behaviour, rather than simply viewing childbearing as 
determined by fate. 
3. Greater openness to new ideas such as family planning. 
4. Increased aspirations by couples concerning their 
future and that of their children. 
Some of these links between the developmental process 
and the determinants of fertility behaviour have been 
explored by (Easterlin, 1975; 1983). 
In some cases, social developments have not kept pace 
with or corresponded to economic developments. For 
example, Tabbarah (1982) has shown that the nature of Arab 
development created a major gap between the social and 
economic indicators of development in the region. "Oil 
wealth" in many Arab states resulted in the Gross National 
Product per capita of these states increasing dramatically 
in the 1970s and 1980s. There was, however, no equivalent 
social development. While capital was available to improve 
medical facilities (and thus to help bring down death 
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rates), social attitudes towards fertility did not change 
at the same pace. As a result most of the Arab world 
experienced very rapid population growth (from the high 
birth rates and low death rates). In addition, the failure 
of fertility rates to decline was difficult to explain in 
terms of existing demographic theories, given the gap 
between Arab rates and those in other countries with 
similar levels of GNP per capita (Fargues, 1989). 
1.3.2 Family planning and development 
The international population conference held in 
Mexico in 1984 emphasised the importance of socio economic 
development as a pre-requisite to the reduction of levels 
of population growth (Gould and Lawntin, 1986). This was 
in marked contrast with the earlier perception of the links 
between family planning and development (for example, the 
views expressed at the Bucharest population conference of 
1974). Thus in the 1980s there was a shift in emphasis 
with the success of family planning having been seen as a 
consequence rather than a determinant of development. 
It is important, therefore, to recognise from the 
outset that there is no such thing as a blueprint for 
family planning. Policies on family planning need to be 
sensitive not only to cltural variations in attitudes to 
fertility behaviour, but also to be attuned to the level of 
socio-economic development of a sociey at a particular 
point in time. Tabbarah (1971) for example has suggested 
that there are at least four stages in a society's 
development of attitudes to fertility behaviour and family 
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planning. The first stage is where the desire for children 
is relatively high because of prevailing social and 
economic conditions and where the maximum attainable number 
of children is relatively low as a result of both high 
child mortality and the low fecundity of women as a result 
of the poor levels of nutrition and health care. At this 
stage a large proportion of couples are unable to attain 
their desired family size. Therefore, couples often 
express their desired family size in terms of "as many as 
possible". At this stage public knowledge of methods of 
fertility regulation is rather limited. 
In the second stage the desired number of children 
remains large and comes closer to the actual number. This 
change reflects the improved health of both parents (higher 
fecundity) and children (decline in child mortality rate). 
Couples can attain their reproductive goals with a 
proportion exceeding their desired family size. 
In the third stage the desired number of children 
begins to drop below the levels attainable under conditions 
of natural fertility, because of the large number of 
couples recognising the need for some level of fertility 
control. During this stage, however, lags in the decline 
of fertility tend to appear because of the lack of 
awareness or access to family planning programmes and 
inadequate knowledge of the use of contraceptive measures. 
The fourth stage is characterised by the position of 
more developed countries, where the desired number of 
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children is relatively low and easy to achieve, because of 
a matching of abilities to control fertility with the 
desire to have relatively few children. 
It is important to note that the population of any 
given country at a given point cannot always be easily 
classified as belonging to one of the four aforementioned 
stages of demographic development, since a political state 
may be made of several different population units at 
different stages of development. 
The main point in reviewing Tabbarah's (1971) model 
here is simply to illustrate the changing relationship 
which should exist between family planning programmes and 
levels of development. Family planning only becomes of 
relevance in demographic development once society as a 
whole has reached certain levels of awareness and has set 
itself certain goals. As socio-economic development 
progresses, as the 1984 Mexico Conference has emphasised, 
the demand for fertility reduction will occur. At this 
stage family planning programmes have a major role in 
facilitating the transitional phase (Tabbarah's stage 3) as 
societies move towards a lower fertility regime. 
1.3.1 Theories of fertility change 
1.3.3.1 Transition theory: Throughout human history high 
fertility has been the rule in almost all societies. 
Fertility began to fall, in some western countries, during 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In this century 
the decline in mortality has spread throughout Europe to 
most countries. This increased the gap between fertility 
8 
and mortality levels and caused rapid population growth in 
the developing countries (Freedman, 1961; Caldwell, 1967). 
The decline in fertility has been extensively 
classified, categorised and analysed. Thompson (1929) 
described the combined mortality and fertility decline as a 
demographic transition. Transition theory generalised the 
historical pattern of population growth in Western 
Countries, assuming that all countries would follow this 
same pattern. 
Notestein (1945) classified the transition into three 
phases: the first phase was characterised by high levels 
of fertility and mortality rates (pre-transitional 
societies). Such societies are prevented from disappearing 
only by social and religious norms which give great 
emphasis to the virtue of high fertility. Davis and Blake 
(1956) argued that individuals had little interest in 
reducing fertility because family structure makes children 
more valuable to the extended family. 
In contemporary industrial countries (developed 
countries) fertility and mortality rates are both low, 
representing Notestein's third phase. In between is the 
demographic transition (phase 2), where mortality decline 
is not accompanied by a reduction in fertility levels 
(Demeny, 1974; Notestein, 1945; Coale, 1973). Some 
researchers have expanded the transition theory to five 
phases (Blacker, 1947). 
Transition theory, although popular amongst 
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demographers as a descriptive model, has been strongly 
criticised for a variety of reasons. 
1. It was developed in order to explain fertility trends 
in societies with low fertility rather than to 
demonstrate other factors causing fertility decline. 
2. It lacks explanatory power in relation to the 
mechanisms producing changes in fertility and therefore 
is a poor basis for making predictions. 
3. It ignores the interactions between demography and 
social change (Caldwell and Ruzicka, 1978), since it 
considers fertility behaviour as economically rational 
in the industrial world but not in pre-industrial 
societies. Sahlins (1974) has claimed that fertility 
in pre-industrial societies is socially rational, 
since these societies are characterised by social 
rather than economic priorities. 
1.3.3.2 Economic theories of fertility change 
Economists have an interest in the relationship 
between population growth and economic transformations. 
Review of the macro-economic analysis of population often 
commences with the work undertaken by Malthus 200 years 
ago. Malthus assumed that the major determinant of 
fertility was the age at marriage. When the economic 
conditions of young people were favourable, he believed 
that they would marry relatively early, while when the 
economic conditions were less advantageous the age at 
marriage would rise and fertility would decline. Thus, 
Malthus concluded that there should be a positive 
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relationship between family size and income and the only 
hope of reducing population growth on a voluntary basis was 
for a "voluntary" delay of marriage (Simmons, 1985). 
Malthus also argued that man's capacity to increase his 
means of subsistence was much less than his capacity to 
multiply; he suggests that the human population could 
increase on a geometrical progression whereas the means of 
subsistance only increased arithmetically. 
Many academics have subsequently examined Malthus' 
idea, especially with reference to periods of population 
crisis, such as have been experienced recently in the Sahel 
where some have attempted to relate situations of human 
disaster to the Malthusian "traps" of vice, war and misery 
(Woods, 1989). Historical experience has not, however, 
been generally compatible with Malthusian logic. Famine 
for example has been shown to be much more of a poverty 
problem than a population problem (Jowett, 1987). 
Certainly Malthus' predictions for the English population 
of the 18th century were ill-founded. Rising living 
standards associated with the industrial revolution did not 
lead to a sustained rise in average family size, as 
Malthusian logic would have predicted, but to quite the 
inverse situation. Childbearing decisions appear, in a 
situation of sustained economic growth, to have been 
related to other social and economic decisions by couples 
regarding their household economy and lifestyle. 
Most recent economic work on fertility change is 
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derived from studies by Leibenstein (1974) and Becker 
(1960) who applied economic theories of consumer behaviour 
to childbearing decisions. The theory of consumer 
behaviour views the individual as trying to maximise 
satisfaction given a range of commodities, prices and 
personal tastes. In this context, children are considered 
as a special kind of commodity, and fertility 
is 
interpreted as a response to consumer demand for children 
relative to other goods. 
Economic theory of this kind has its limitations, 
especially in developing countries where the concept of 
desired family size and decision making are ill formed and 
the correlation between desired and actual family size is 
not strong (Easterlin, 1980). Economic theory can also be 
criticised since the concept of taste is often treated as a 
constant variable. In practice this concept is still 
ambiguous and needs more detailed exploration. Economic 
theory clearly shows that variations in desired family size 
is not only a reflection of income, but of many economic 
and non-economic variables. 
1.3.3.1 Caldwell's theory 
Caldwell (1967) has attempted to explain fertility 
change in relation to changes in family structure and the 
family system. Caldwell and Caldwell (1977) assumed that 
fertility is high in some regions because of the social 
context which makes high fertility socially and 
economically advantageous. They argued therefore that the 
chief decision makers not only see social advantage but 
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also economic advantage in high fertility. 
Caldwell adopted the approach of wealth flow theory, 
in order to investigate this in more detail. This assumed 
that fertility behaviour was economically rational in all 
societies in terms of the perceived economic ends of that 
society. Fertility will change only if those in control of 
decision making find it advantageous to them (Caldwell, 
1967). The wealth flows between children and their parents 
and vice-versa is considered the main mechanism of fertilty 
change (Caldwell, 1982). In societies with stable high 
fertility, the economic advantage derived from high 
fertility is explained by a net flow of "wealth" over a 
life time from the younger generation to the older one. 
The term "wealth" covers a wider range of economic, social, 
psychological and political issues. For instance, it 
includes productive labour, security in old age, and all 
kinds of services, potential help, gifts, remittances, 
physical protection and political support. On the 
formation of the nuclear family Caldwell shifts the 
analysis from the study of external influences to 
interactions inside the family. Some of Caldwell's 
assumptions may never be completely proved and need careful 
testing. Nevertheless his ideas are useful and should be 
accepted as a basis for further theoretical development, as 
well as provide a yardstick against which field research 
results can be measured (Maani, 1990). 
From the discussion which has been presented above of 
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the different approaches which have been adapted to the 
analysis of fertility change, it is clear that there is a 
need for further research in order to understand fertility 
behaviour and the factors lying behind fertility change. 
By studying parents preferences and their attitudes to 
fertility behaviour in relation to social, economic and 
cultural dimensions, this thesis hopes to advance the 
explanation of fertility change in developing countries. 
1.4 Determinants of fertility behaviour 
Fertility behaviour is viewed as a function of the 
interaction of three main components: 
1. The "demand" for children, refers to the number of 
surviving children which couples would like to have 
through their reproductive span. 
2. The "natural supply' of children (potential output) or 
natural fertility level (Henry, 1961) refers to the 
number of surviving children a couple would have if 
they did not deliberately limit fertility. 
3. Fertility regulation refers to the mechanisms used to 
control the relationships between "natural supply" and 
"demand". 
Parents tend to make decisions about their desire for 
further children in relation to the number of surviving 
children rather than in relation to the total number of 
births. 
In pre-transition societies it is commonly assumed 
that fertility regulation was absent, and that the demand 
for children was unlimited. If this was the case, 
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fertility levels could only be determined by natural 
fertility (in other words by natural supply factors). 
Bongaarts and Menken (1983) argued that most of the world's 
population experienced natural fertility regimes before the 
onset of the fertility transition. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that in some traditional societies, the number 
of surviving children is close to the levels under 
conditions of natural fertility (Bongaarts, 1978). 
Natural fertility and the probability of children 
surviving have a direct effect on fertility levels. 
Natural fertility as defined by Davis and Blake (1956) is a 
function of a set of both behavioural and biological 
intermediate variables that include post-partum 
infecundibility, waiting time for conception, intra 
uterinate mortality, permanent sterility and age at 
marriage. In most developing counries, there is a lack of 
adequate and reliable data on the intermediate variables, 
especially the biological ones, because of the sensitivity 
of respondents to answering questions on these topics. 
Therefore, the effect of these variables, in most cases, 
has to be estimated indirectly (see Bongaarts and Menken, 
1983). 
Socio-economic characteristics and structure, 
cultural norms and environmental conditions work together 
to indirectly influence fertility levels through their 
direct effect of the intermediate of "proximate" variables. 
For example, women's education and work has a direct effect 
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on breast feeding and age at marriage. They ultimately 
influence natural fertility by reducing the chances of 
pregnancy (Hoffman, 1975). Many studies have found 
negative relationships between breast feeding and 
education, urbanisation, women's work and household income 
(Butz and Davanzo, 1981; Jain et al., 1970). On the other 
hand, child survival varies with mother's age, parity, 
income, health awareness, disease levels and nutritional 
standards within the society. 
Demand for children remains the central issue in 
explaining fertility changes. For demand to have some 
effect on fertility, couples must have some means for 
making their preferences more effective and avoiding 
unwanted children by using efficient contraceptives. 
Changing demand has been considered as the key factor in 
shifting fertility from high to low levels (the fertility 
transition). 
Infant and child mortality has some influence on 
future demand for surviving children, e. g. several studies 
show that losing one child may lead couples to desire 
additional births. The desire may also be influenced by 
the sex and birth order of the child who has died (Heer, 
1983). The reduction of child mortality levels is 
therefore a major aspect of the demographic transition. 
Beside the demand for children (total number), 
couples desires may be affected by their gender 
preferences, their views on spacing between births and the 
level of education, which they desire for their children 
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(Dhindsa, 1986). For instance couples may prefer to have 
more children than their stated desired number if they are 
unsatisfied with the gender of their children. 
Demand for children may be influenced by the direct 
costs involved and by the perceived benefits of children. 
The evaluation of costs and benefits differ from one 
society to another, or even within a given society, 
depending on socio-economic structures, cultural variables 
and individual characteristics. Caldwell (1983) has argued 
that the value of children in the early part of the 
transition is quite different from their subsequent value. 
The values of having children are not easily measured 
because they are a direct result of the complex 
interactions of a large number of social, economic, 
cultural and psychological factors (Meade and Singh, 1973). 
Child costs and benefits (net value) involve social as well 
as economic criteria, since economic ends cannot be 
divorced from social ends (Caldwell, 1983). It is not 
surprising that numerous different approaches and methods 
have been proposed to measure the value of children (e. g. 
Westoff, 1981; Simmons, 1971; Caldwell, 1983). 
Mueller (1976) attempted to examine fertility 
differences in relation to childrens costs and benefits in 
Botswana has found that children cost much more than they 
contribute to their family's income, even in rural areas. 
Caldwell (1982) has criticised her findings and her 
approach which build on economic considerations only. 
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Motivations to have large families include the desire 
to increase family labour, concern about security in old 
age and about continuity of the family name, the role of 
children in strengthening a couple's relationship and 
significantly the personal satisfaction felt from having 
children (Meade and Singh, 1973). Motivations vary quite 
considerably according to socio-economic developmental 
level, social class and cultural background (Arnold et al., 
1975; Bulatao, 1981). 
In most developing countries which are characterised 
by high fertility levels, cultural factors mean that 
children are seen to be of more value than in western 
nations. Caldwell (1982) has argued that in this context, 
couples almost always want their children to be more 
educated that in the past, so as to ensure that their 
children will achieve professional jobs, and in order to 
get status and financial benefits in the long run. As a 
result, children become more costly relative to the short 
run financial benefits. Consequently, the quality of 
children becomes more important to couples than their 
quantity. In addition higher education may lead to 
changing perceptions by the children themselves towards 
cultural norms (Cochrane, 1983). 
Despite the reduced support by children of their 
parents, parents expect their children to support them in 
their old age, especially when parents are uncertain about 
their own ability to be self supporting (Nuget, 1985; Cain, 
1981). This reason may explain the strong motivations for 
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high fertility which parents sustain, despite the 
decreasing financial benefits of having children. 
Economists have argued that demand for children can 
be determined by the interplay between tastes for children 
and constraints on the couple, such as income and time 
availability (Becker, 1960; Willis, 1973). The 
determinants of fertility behaviour of course include a 
wide range of social, cultural, economic and psychological 
factors. Bulatao and Lee (1983) have suggested a model to 
represent the inter-relationships among these basic 
components and other variables (see Figure 1.1). 
1.5 Fertility regulation 
Demand and supply for children jointly determine 
motivation for fertility regulation. Once supply reaches 
or exceeds the desired number, therefore, couples are 
motivated to some degree to control their fertility. 
Whether they do so or not is another issue (Hermalin, 
1983). It is to be expected that motivation to regulate 
fertility will be positively associated with the gap 
between supply and demand. In fact couples may practice 
family planning before reaching their desired family size 
in order to increase the birth interval (Mauldin and 
Berelson, 1978). 
Motivation alone, is not an adequate reason to use 
contraceptives (Hermalin, 1983) but methods of fertility 
regulation, their availability and cost all should be taken 
into consideration. Fertility regulations involves a range 
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time involved, but also in other terms. For example, there 
may be costs arising from violating existing social norms 
and religious teaching, health costs (the degree of risk of 
using certain methods), and psychological costs. These 
costs will be a function of personal characteristics and an 
individuals social standing. Figure 1.2 shows a model 
which has been proposed by Compton and coward (1989) which 
illustrates the way that these variables affect fertility. 
Figure 1 1" Inter-relationships between the basic 
components of fertility behaviour. 
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One 'of the major problems in most developing 
countries is the translation of motivations and fertility 
attitudes into actual behaviour. The translation depends 
not only on motivations and fertility costs, but also on 
the ability of couples to make independent and effective 
decisions. As is well known, in Arab society the influence 
of the extended family on a couples decisions may be 
considerable, as is the influence of the husband over his 
wife in making such decisions. 
Figure 1 2" Variables which affect fertility. 
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Fertility regulation is defined in this thesis as all 
modern methods including both contraceptive methods and 
induced abortion. However, traditional and natural methods 
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such as prolonged breast feeding period and natural methods 
and abstinance from sexual intercourse are excluded. 
Fertility control in most demographic studies refer only to 
modern methods of fertility control. 
1.6 Interaction between fertility components and 
modernisation. 
In theory, in the absence of fertility regulation, 
completed family size is determined mainly by the supply 
side of the equation. Demand for children is close to 
supply or may even exceed it. As a consequence couples may 
not have any idea about the number of children wanted and 
there will be no motivation to control fertility. 
In developed countries demand for children is below 
supply, and fertility regulation is widely used. As a 
result, demand for children is considered to be the main 
determinant of fertility. Most developing countries have 
experienced dramatic reductions in infant mortality rates, 
while fertility levels have not followed the same pattern 
of mortality reduction. In some countries fertility levels 
have not declined and remain at a high level (the second 
stage of transition theory). 
Easterlin (1975,1978,1982,1983) has proposed a 
model which links fertility components with the development 
process (modernisation) through time. Modernisation can be 
defined as the transformation of economic, social and 
political organisation and in human personality (Easterlin, 
1967). Four aspects of modernisation are selected for 
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special attention in Easterlin's model: 
1. Public health and medical care. 
2. Formal education and the mass media. 
3. Urbanisation. 
4. The introduction of new consumer goods. 
Figure 1.3: Trends in fertility variables associated with 
economic and social modernization. 
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This model sees fertility as evolving from a 
situation in which the couple cannot achieve their desired 
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number to one in which the potential number of children is 
in excess of the desired number. As a consequence the 
number of unwanted children increases if fertility 
regulation is not used. 
The model identifies three main stages: 
1. A pre-modern situation, where parents are unable to 
have as many children as they would like. In this 
stage, there is no motivation to limit fertility. The 
number of children parents have in this stage is 
mainly governed by natural fertility and the 
probability of child survival. It is to be expected 
that the approach of modernisation will, through time, 
have an impact on the supply determinants increasing 
the actual number of children surviving to adulthood 
(Olusanga, 1971; Findlay and Findlay, 1987). Family 
planning in this stage may not succeed since its 
objectives are contrary to personal fertility 
preferences. 
2. In this second stage, the potential number of children 
will increase, while the desired family size and 
fertility costs will be reduced. As a result there is 
an increase in couples motivation for fertility 
control, in order to avoid having unwanted children. 
In this stage the response to socio-economic 
development and fertility regulation emerges in a 
differential fashion in society, with some segments of 
the population being more favourably disposed to it 
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than others. Changes in the socio-economic environment 
will be required to raise living standards and 
aspirations to a certain level before producing a 
reduction in desired family size (Davis, 1967). 
3. The third stage can be described as one in which there 
is a rapid reduction in couples desire for children, an 
increasing control of fertility and a reduction in the 
number of unwanted children. This occurs as the 
ability of couples to make their own independent 
decisions and as availability of efficient 
contraceptive methods makes these decisions effective 
in producing changes in fertility behaviour. 
1.7 Family size Preference 
Fertility preferences, when implemented, are 
potentially very important in shaping actual fertility. 
From a strictly applied point of view information on 
reproductive motivations may be useful to population policy 
makers (Lightbourne and Macdonald, 1982). From the 
theoretical point of view, information on reproductive 
behaviour and the motives behind such behaviour may be 
helpful in understanding the forces affecting fertility, 
and increasing knowledge about the relationship between 
attitudes and behaviour (El-Khorazaty, 1985). 
Lightbourne (1985) has argued that desired family size is 
the most important determinant of fertility control in 
developing countries. 
The term "fertility preference" has been used to refer 
to several different conceptions of the number of children 
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which a couple may wish to have. These include intended 
family size, expected family size, desired family size, 
ideal family size and the best number of children (Ryder 
and Westoff, 1969). Fertility surveys vary widely in their 
approaches to measuring these concepts. Also different 
measures and approaches can be used because there is no 
standard measure. 
Demand for children usually refers to the number of 
surviving children which couples would like to have during 
their reproductive years. Demographers often attempt to 
measure and examine the demand side by measuring desired 
family size from couples' responses in fertility surveys. 
A distinction, sometimes, is made between couples 
desired family size and the ideal family size for the 
population in general, although the two terms are often 
used synonymously. Several studies have attempted to 
consider the differences between the two concepts (Ryder 
and Westoff, 1969). In developed countries the ideal 
family size corresponds fairly closely with the actual 
behaviour of couples (Whelpton et al., 1966), as a result 
of the widespread use of and access to contraceptives 
(Higgins, 1962). This is not the case in developing 
countries. Desired family size, in developing countries 
in general, and in Arab countries in particular, does not 
correspond with ideal family size simply because of the 
influence of traditional norms on respondents responses. 
Any changes in the socio-economic and political 
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circumstances of a society in a developing country will be 
reflected in peoples views of what constitutes the ideal 
family size. Therefore, in studying ideal family size it 
is important to do so in the changing context of the 
specific society under study. This stands in stark 
contradiction to the arguments of some researchers such as 
Bumpass (1967). 
There have been several studies which confirm the 
idea that ideal family size changes with changing political 
situations. The widespread baby boom phenomenon in Europe 
and North America after the Second World War, for example, 
may have been a result of changing attitudes towards ideal 
family size (Bouvier, 1980). Similarly it is to be 
expected that ideal family size in the West Bank will be 
higher than in other Arab countries as a result of the 
area's military occupation. There seems little doubt that 
many West Bank people consider population growth as one 
part of their struggle to maintain their roots in the areas 
(Ata, 1986; Abu-Lughod, 1982). 
A couples' decision regarding desired family size will 
be affected by a range of economic and social variables 
such as family income, financial resources, family power, 
perceptions of the role of children as a source of support 
in old age, etc. All these functions vary from one society 
to another, or even from one group to another within a 
given society (Lee, 1977). There are, therefore, a great 
many factors which affect desired family size in any given 
society (Arnold et al., 1975) and which for any couple will 
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affect their perceptions of the costs and benefits of 
having children (Willis, 1973). 
Inquiries into desired family size were first included 
in a fertility survey conducted in the U. S. A. in the early 
1950s. During the last three decades K. A. P. (knowledge, 
attitudes and practice of birth control) surveys have 
become widespread in developing countries (Kondel and 
Prachuabmoh, 1973). 
Various types of questions can be used in measuring 
desired family size. They include: 
(a) Questions about the desire for additional children. 
Desired family size may be computed by adding the 
number to the actual number of children the family 
already has. Sometimes such questions are replaced by 
asking if additional children are wanted in future. 
This question is used frequently in fertility surveys 
carried out on couples in the reproductive ages. 
(b) Questions about the total number of children a couple 
would like to have. These types of questions were 
used and directed at the wives interviewed in the 
World Fertility Survey (U. N. 1981). The problem of 
using such questions is that the actual family size 
may affect the respondents' preferences (Freedman et 
al., 1975). 
(C) Questions measuring ideal family size. Respondents 
were asked about the number of children they thought 
other people like neighbours should have (Blake, 
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1967). Another variant of this question which has 
been used is to ask respondents about what they 
consider to be a suitable number of children for a 
family to have in general. 
(d) Questions about desired number of children and their 
gender. These types of questions are very important 
in societies with a strong male preference. Sometimes 
questions on the desired gender of children may 
include information about birth order and spacing 
between children. Coombs et al. (1975) presented 
respondents with different possible mixes of children 
in their study of desired number of children in order 
to discover the effect of child gender on people's 
responses. 
Arnold et al. (1975) argued that questions on desired 
family size become more reliable if such questions are 
followed by other questions about the number of surviving 
children, number of children who have died and 
contraceptive usage. 
1.7.1 Validity 
Measures of desired family size must evaluate the 
validity of responses. Respondents should be asked to 
report what was their desired family size at the time of 
marriage in order to discover how much responses may vary 
through time. The respondents may, for example, be 
influenced by his or her current situation, yet the actions 
which the researcher wants to evaluate relate to past 
behaviour and perceptions. 
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The validity of direct questions about desired family 
size has been put in doubt by Frohardt-Lane et al. (1977). 
They have criticized direct methods on several grounds as 
have Kondel and Prachuabmoh (1973) who suggest that direct 
questions are particularly inappropriate in developing 
countries where birth control is not widely used. They 
have also argued that the validity of responses is very low 
among illiterate groups. Lightbourne (1985) found that 
poor, uneducated women in rural areas in traditional 
societies are not motivated to restrict their fertility. 
Several studies have made direct enquiries into 
whether or not respondents have thought about desired 
family size (see Mason, 1983). Gray and Morgan (1976) have 
argued that meaningful responses may be achieved, but only 
by adequate probing and careful phrasing of questions. 
This argument was also supported by Ware (1974) who found 
that most respondents who refused to answer questions on 
religious or cultural grounds would have been willing to 
respond if they had been asked about the number of 
children "they hoped that God would give them". 
The validity of responses on desired family size is 
also associated with the use of contraceptives. In 
societies where controlling the supply of children has been 
impossible or extremely costly, responses to survey 
questions about desired family size should not be taken to 
reflect actual family size or expected fertility behaviour. 
Bulatao and Arnold (1977) have argued that by contrast in 
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societies where contraception has become more acceptable 
and more widely available, couples take considerable 
interest in the number of children which they would like to 
have. Contraception is an important factor in determining 
the relationship between desired and actual family size. 
When contraceptive methods are available, cheap and 
acceptable, actual family size should be equal to or 
slightly exceed the desired number of children (Ryder, 
1981). For example, Knodel and Prachuabmoh (1973) found 
that only a few women in Thailand who had used 
contraceptives had exceeded their desired number of 
children. 
It is possible to conclude that when contraception is 
unknown or unavailable the validity of responses on desired 
family size will be low, but in other cases they will be of 
some value. 
1.7.2 Respondents 
Questions about desired family and childbearing 
behaviour attitudes are usually directed to either the 
husband or the wife. Most studies on fertility attitudes 
restrict the questions to the wife on the implicit 
assumption that wives' views on these matters equate to 
those of their husbands' (Stycos et al., 1968). In many 
studies wives have been asked about their husband's 
attitudes as well as their attitudes (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975). One of the criticisms of the World Fertility Survey 
was that questions on these issues were only directed to 
wives and ignored husbands attitudes. This researcher 
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would argue that the husband's role and attitudes are, 
however, a crucial factor in fertility preferences. This 
is especially the case in male dominated societies, such as 
the Arab world, where the husband is usually the key 
decision maker for the family. 
There are studies of desired family size which have 
dealt only with husbands (Griffith, 1973; Tobin et al., 
1975; Lightbourne, 1985). Mitchell (1972) found that when 
there was disagreement between the responses of married 
couples in his survey in Hong Kong (as to whether or not to 
have more children) the husband's decision always tended to 
prevail. 
Several studies which interviewed both husbands and 
wives separately, found the responses and attitudes of 
spouses towards family size and fertility issues to be 
quite different (Campbell, 1974, Coombs and Fernandez, 
1978; Westoff, 1981). For example, Campbell (1974) found 
that husbands' generally desire more children than their 
wives, and that wives look more favourably on the use of 
contraceptives. Westoff (1981) found that 40% of couples 
in Thailand gave identical responses about desired family 
size. In most developing countries the husband's 
opposition towards using contraceptives is an important 
factor in explaining the low proportion of women using 
contraceptives. Cole and Allen (1979) have found that 
more educated males tended to have more positive attitudes 
towards the use of contraceptives than the less educated 
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ones. 
In developing countries, interviewing both husbands 
and wives separately may lead to a better understanding of 
future fertility change, because couples may never discuss 
fertility aspects with each other (Coombs and Fernandez, 
1978; Pullum, 1983). Also it is important to take into 
account the influence of the extended family and cultural 
norms on fertility preferences (Mason, 1983). Townes et 
al. (1980) have argued that some studies which focus only 
on husbands or wives preferences have failed to provide the 
mechanism for moving from intent to actual behaviour. 
1.8 Desired and actual family size 
The relationship between desired and actual family 
size is two-way. Desired family size affects the actual 
number of children in the family, especially when a couple 
has an idea about the number of children they want and when 
contraceptives are available. Therefore, an association 
would exist between desired and actual family size (Pullum, 
1980; Namboodiri, 1983). Questions about desired family 
size should be accompanied by questions on attitudes to and 
use of contraceptives. Knodel and Prachuabmoh (1973) found 
that the use of contraceptives tended to be greater once 
couples had reached or had nearly reached their desired 
family size. 
The relationship between actual and desired family 
size is likely to be very strong, if couples have a clear 
conception of their desired family size before having any 
children (Pullum, 1983). 
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The existence of a strong relationship between actual 
and desired family size has one of two possible 
explanations. First, preferences may be being successfully 
implemented. Secondly, respondents may tend to rationalize 
their preferences in terms of the actual number of children 
which they have (Pullum, 1983; Easterlin, 1973). 
Rationalization can take place long before the family has 
been completed. Pullum (1980) has argued that when the 
availability of birth control methods is limited, 
rationalization becomes the main explanation of the 
relationship between the two variables. 
Rationalization effects are easier to identify in 
circumstances where a large proportion of respondents 
indicate their desired family size as equal to their number 
of surviving children. The question of desired family size 
considered to be relatively meaningless when respondents 
who have achieved or exceeded the desired number declare 
that they do not want more children, but at the same time 
do not use contraceptives. Knodel and Prachuabmoh (1973) 
found that in Thailand only 25% of currently married women 
reported their desired family size to be equal to their 
actual family size. The proportion of women who reported 
their desired family size to exceed their actual number of 
surviving children, showed a rapid decline in relation to 
increases in the number of living children. 
1.9 Gender preference and couples' attitudes 
The subject of parental attitudes and aspirations 
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concerning the gender of children has attracted 
considerable analytical attention research (Vlassoff, 1990; 
Prachuabmoh et al. 1974; Williamson, 1976). The interest of 
demographers has been aroused mainly by evidence that 
gender preference may influence the process of family 
formation (United Nations Population Division, 1981). More 
specifically gender preference operates through: 
1) Completed family size. Most research would suggest 
that parents may go beyond their desired number of children 
in order to achieve the specific gender preferred (Cleland 
et al., 1983). Khan and Sirageldin (1977) found that 
Pakistani couples with a predominance of daughters were 
more willing to have up to three times as many additional 
children as couples who had the same number of sons. 
Berelson (1964) found that, among 5,000 couples in Turkey, 
parents with more sons were less likely to want more 
children than those of the same parity, but with more 
daughters. Repetto (1972) by contrast found no evidence in 
Morroco to confirm the idea that couples with a male 
preference would have more children if they already had 
more females. Parchuabmoh et al. (1974) also found that 
son preference did not have much influence on the desire 
for additional children in Thailand. Parachuabmoh et 
al's findings in Thailand may be attributed to a different 
pattern of culture where women's roles are different from 
that of their Arab counterparts. 
2) Gender preference is a big obstacle to control of 
family size. Parents who tend to control their births by 
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using efficient contraceptives after achieving their 
desired number of children may be reluctant to use such 
methods when they fail to achieve the minimum number of 
children of their preferred gender (Cleland et al., 1983). 
Morsa (1966) in his study in Tunisia, found that women with 
strong male preferences tended not to report the use of any 
contraceptive methods. Eliot (1968) argued that 
Algerian women with male child preferences continued 
childbearing long after they had reached the desired total 
number of children. Eillov (1967) noted that women 
attending family planning clinics in Ankara (Turkey) had 
more sons than daughters. Arnold and Zhaoxiang (1986) have 
found in one child families in China, that the proportion 
of couples who currently used contraceptives was higher if 
the couple had a son than if they had a daughter. 
The decision of couples with strong male preferences 
who want additional children will therefore be affected by 
the probability of having a son as their next child. 
Therefore the final decision with regard to having 
additional children will be determined by the anticipated 
gender of the new child (McClelland, 1979). It is to be 
expected that family size will increase with increasing 
strength of feeling about male child preferences. A 
conflict between strong male preference and the desire for 
a small family size is therefore likely to occur. Cain 
(1978) has confirmed this suggestion when he indicated that 
one argument often given to explain the low motivation for 
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limiting families in many developing countries is strong 
male preference. 
3) Sexual equality. Gender preference can be used as a 
rough indicator to measure the level of sexual equality in 
a society. A society which is characterized by a lack of 
strong gender preference is quite likely to be egalitarian. 
Therefore, gender preference cannot be seen as an isolated 
set of attitudes reflecting only fertility behaviour, but 
is an indicator of more profound attitudes to gender roles 
in society (Arnold and Zhaoziang, 1986). Levy (1957) has 
attributed son preference in Arab and Islamic societies to 
the division of labour and to male dominance in the family 
and society. El-Badry (1969) has pointed out that in 
Pakistan the death rate among females relative to males is 
higher in the childhood cohorts (from one to four years). 
One possible explanation for such differences is attributed 
to son preference where male children receive better 
nutrition and health care. 
1.9.1. Motivations for male child preferences 
Male child preference is a common attribute of 
traditional male dominated societies. Male dominance is 
evident in these societies in most aspects of the control 
and transfer of wealth (Rizk, 1959; Arnold and Zhaoxiang, 
1986). Male child preference is found to some extent in 
much of the developing world except in some Latin American 
countries (Williamson, 1976). In Arab and Islamic 
countries, male child preference is considered to be very 
strong and in most cases contributes to their high 
37 
fertility levels (Prothero, 1961). Reasons for male child 
preference include: - 
1) Cultural reasons. Strong male child preference has 
its roots in Arab culture. Arabs even in the pre-Islamic 
era were in favour of male births which were thought to 
have higher status because of the more important role of 
men in relation to the economic organization of the family 
(Schieffelin, 1967). Yaukey (1961) has described the 
influence of traditional Arab culture on Lebanese couples 
as follows: 
"There is little place for mature men and women 
without sons. The strength and power of the 
family as a unit is measured in terms of the 
number of sons born into it. The father gauges 
his success as head of the family largely in 
terms of the children he has (especially males). 
The same is true for women who gain security 
through their sons" 
Yaukey (1961) pp. 9-11 
2) Religious reasons. Levy (1957) has attributed the 
strong motives for male preference in Islamic countries to 
the influence of Islam which gives males superiority over 
females and has described these societies as male dominated 
societies. On the other hand most Muslim scholars reject 
the idea that Islam places men in superior positions to 
women. The consensus of opinion seems to be that Islam 
promoted women's positions and strengthened their role in 
society, giving them fuller rights than in the past. 
3) Socio-economic reasons. Male child preference might 
change over time in relation to changes in socio-economic 
development levels. In developed countries couples are less 
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motivated to have male children than in developing 
countries. A study in Israel carried out by Goshen- 
Gottstein (1966) interviewed 159 Jewish women expecting 
their first baby. Only 27% hoped their child would be 
male, while 31% stated a preference for the baby to be 
female. The remainder had no preference. Also Inkeles and 
Smith (1974) found that only 44% of male workers in an 
Israeli factory preferred more sons while 52% had no 
preference. The reason for the low male preference in 
Israel may be the influence of western culture reflecting 
the fact that the majority of Jews have migrated from the 
more developed countries. At the other extreme, Lahiri 
(1974) found the ideal sex ratio at birth was perceived in 
some Indian states to be about 300 male to 100 female 
babies. 
Many studies in Arab countries have also confirmed 
regional variations in the ideal sex ratio between rural 
and urban areas (Kirk, 1966). For example, Risk (1959) 
found that the ideal sex ratio for Egyptian women who had 
completed their family size was 130 and 280 males per 100 
females in urban and rural areas respectively. For young 
women the sex ratio was 122 and 240 males per 100 females 
for urban and rural areas respectively. Another study 
carried out by Eliot (1966) in Algeria, showed that the 
desired sex ratio for urban women was 120 while in Berber 
villages, the ideal sex ratio reached 240 males per 100 
females. 
For changes to occur in couples' attitudes towards 
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male child preferences in most developing countries, 
improvements in social and economic conditions will first 
be necessary (Fawcett et al., 1974). These changes would 
reduce the effect of the social, economic and psychological 
reasons that caused male preference. 
In addition to male child preference, couples may 
have preference with regard to birth order (e. g. first 
child to be male and the second to be female and the last 
one to be male). This makes the measuring of son 
preference more complicated, and especially the ability of 
couples to control the number of births. 
To summarise, the search for a better understanding of 
desired family size requires analysis of gender preferences 
in relation to a couples' evolving attitudes towards family 
formation. However, gender preferences are only one of a 
number of important factors such as political attitudes, 
cultural norms, womens employment, male dominance and 
family structure which affect a couples attitudes and 
ultimately actual family size. As an example of the 
importance of gender preferences, Dhindsa (1986) found 91% 
of couples who were not satisfied with their actual family 
composition tended to enlarge their families in the hope of 
having more male children. 
1.10 Fertility decision making 
The essentials of any social science theory are the 
variables and relations that specify social behaviour. The 
theoretical structure of all such theories become complex 
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as soon as the decision making process is introduced 
(Leibenstien, 1981). This is especially the case when 
investigating decisions on family size. Are these 
decisions which are taken really significant in affecting 
behaviour? Which of the various factors and circumstances 
that influence the decision should be included as the most 
important explanatory variables? The best approach to the 
problem is therefore to seek to understand the nature of 
the relationship on the one hand between spouses, and on 
the other hand between married couples and society, in 
order to determine whether they are free and independent to 
make their own decisions in terms of the social, economic 
and psychological costs and benefits of having children. 
Are couples they pressurized by social norms, and the 
consideration of trying to emulate others and act according 
to the models of other reference groups in society? 
Fertility decision making involves choices between 
alternative forms of behaviour. Some of the psychological 
and economic models which have been put forward have 
incorporated perceptions both of the balance between the 
costs and benefits of having children and also the 
perceptios of the acceptability of fertility regulation 
(Hass, 1974). The choice or preference for one set of 
values and form of behaviour rather than another reflects 
an assessment of the relative importance of the social and 
psychological costs and rewards that accompany specific 
types of behaviour and value systems (Scanzoni and Fox, 
1980). 
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The idea that couples make their own decisions in a 
rational way in order to maximize the expected rewards and 
minimize expected costs have been used to explain 
childbearing behaviour and fertility of at least two 
different levels of analysis. Economists have used 
decision theory to explain variations in fertility at 
aggregate levels, such as differences in completed family 
size by social class (see Easterlin, 1967). By contrast 
anthropologists and psychologists have used decisions 
theory to explain the way individuals come to make 
particular decisions. For example, decision making 
processes may be influenced by the nature of husband-wife 
interactions (familial power relations, and levels of 
marital satisfaction). These in turn may have an important 
role in determining family size (Bagozzi and Van Loo, 
1978). 
Hollerbach (1980) has classified fertility decision 
into four types. These include: - 
(a) Non-rational decisions where the individual acts 
against his better interest. 
(b) Coercive decisions, when one individual has the power 
to enforce a decision on another. 
(c) Joint decisions, when decisions are reached by two or 
more individuals on the basis of accommodation, 
compromise, compliance or mutual agreement. 
(d) Unilateral decisions, when the decision is made by one 
or more individuals in conflict with others' desires. 
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The research evidence suggest that fertility 
decision making in traditional or pre-transitional 
societies is strongly influenced not only by a couples own 
parents but also by kin and to some extent by non-kin 
groups all of whom exert an influence (Kar and Talbot, 
1980). Caldwell (1983) has argued that in such societies 
the older generation controlled every aspect of life 
including familial production, consumption, marriage and 
fertility decision making. The influence of kin on a 
couples' decisions may be through different channels (a) by 
social consensus transmitted to the individual (b) by 
advice and counsel, (c) by shared values, judgement on the 
priority of fertility related behaviour and the imposition 
of sanctions. 
Individual decision making must therefore be an 
irrelevant concept in primitive societies with high 
fertility levels, because the full weight of societal norms 
reinforces existing childbearing behaviour (Hagar, 1987). 
Therefore, most variations in fertility level can be 
attributed to external factors such as environmental and 
biological ones. Many studies support this view that 
individual decisions are of little importance in this 
context (see Marshall et al., 1972). As a result 
individual perceptions in these societies should be ignored 
as predictors of fertility behaviour and the focus should 
be on how corporate social decisions are reached and how 
norms and values are transmitted and produce distinctive 
demographic behaviour. Becker (1960) has argued that 
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fertility only starts to decline when individual decisions 
become more influencial. 
Changing kin relations in many developing countries 
underlies an economic transfer in familial power caused 
mainly by Western influences such as the media and the 
education system. Family relations change in favour of 
reducing age and sex differentiation, lowering the economic 
value of children and encouraging fertility regulation 
(Hagar, 1987). These changes may transfer the key 
decision-making process from the older to the younger 
generation (Caldwell, 1983). The resulting changes in 
fertility may be far greater than those expected as a 
specific consequence of economic change alone. It is 
possible to argue that fertility decision making processes 
and behaviour remain stable despite substantial economic 
changes. 
In general, decision making is regarded as the outcome 
of an unique combination of individual volition and social 
interaction found within the family unit (Bagozzi and Van 
Loo, 1978). However some researchers have failed to pay 
adequate attention to the mechanisms linking individuals' 
intents to their behaviour. This is probably because they 
focus only on individual decisions and have ignored the 
social setting and cultural norms which constrain the 
individual's actions (Townes et al., 1980). 
Besides kin influence on couples' decisions, friends, 
neighbours, health professionals and community leaders may 
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also affect couples' decisions by being a source of 
information or a means of communication (Hull, 1983). Hill 
et al. (1959) indicated that more than 30% of Puerto Rican 
couples reported that their decisions were influenced by 
non-kin. Lee (1979) pointed out that women are more likely 
to adopt family planning if a woman in their social group 
has already used contraceptives, since this means they can 
receive information and emotional support. Miller and 
Godwin (1977) have argued that people usually sought advice 
from people whom they regard as wise, even although they 
may not be relatives. 
Leibenstein (1981) has proposed a hierarchy of rules 
with regard to fertility decisions. These can be harmonised 
with the stages of the demographic transition and with 
levels of socio-economic development. These rules can be 
applied to all decisions concerning marriage, 
contraceptives, breastfeeding, abortion and desired family 
size. Leibenstien (1981) has argued that decisions depend 
on conventional behaviour, partial calculation and full 
calculation. The first two alternatives mainly dominate in 
traditional societies and can be studied by the 
anthropological approach or sometimes by other social 
science methods of measuring attitudes. This is true 
despite the argument of Arnold et al. (1975), which says 
that as long as individuals want as many children as 
possible, it is irrelevant to study fertility decision 
making. This argument ignores the fact that the supply 
side is considered as a product of decision making which in 
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turn determines fertility. The latter two alternatives 
require more complex decision making models because they 
involve comparing alternative strategies and selecting the 
best or most satisfactory one in relation to the 
individual's functions (Simon, 1979). 
1.10.1 Relations between spouses 
Having children requires two people from different 
sexes, but they are not always equally involved in 
fertility decisions. Couples relations are determined by 
cultural factors and socio-economic characteristics. These 
relations usually change with socio-economic development in 
society. Better communication between couples has been 
associated with the wives educational level, socio-economic 
status and levels of urbanization (Caldwell, 1968; 
Mitchell, 1972). Moreover, the family background is a very 
important element in affecting a couple's communication 
(Gecas, 1979). 
Communication can be defined as verbalization of 
information, ideas, attitudes and beliefs from one person 
to another. Communication is an important issue in 
decision making because it links the husband and wife in 
the decision making process by discussion and may lead to 
mutual agreement about the desired family size and family 
planning (Hill et al., 1959). 
Measuring couples levels of communication faces many 
different problems. They include the following: - 
(a) The majority of studies on couples' communication are 
46 
based on interview only with the wife (Hollerbach, 1980), 
while only a few studies pertain to men (Hall, 1971). Very 
few studies have collected information from both men and 
women (Coombs and Fernandez, 1978). Research making 
comparisons between the responses of husbands and wives 
have indicated that discussion does not occur extensively 
on fertility issues and joint fertility decisions are not 
predominate (Coombs and Chang, 1981; Yaukey et al., 1967). 
(b) Treatment of communication as static. The examination 
of the relationship between communication and fertility at 
one point in time presents communication as a static 
rather than dynamic process (Beckman, 1983). 
(c) Conjugal relationships and communication are largely 
defined in relation to the power of spouses in making 
fertility decisions. 
Two other points with regard to communication between 
couples are worthy of comment: - 
First, egalitarianism. It has been argued that an 
egalitarian relation between spouses negatively affects the 
demand for children and helps couples not to exceed their 
desired family size. The problem of studying egalitarian 
decision making is that its significance changes during the 
life cycle. Studies by Coombs and Chang (1981) in 
developing countries indicated that younger couples tend to 
have a more egalitarian decision making style than their 
elders. Also they found that disagreement between couples 
may be attributed to differences between spouses such as 
age and education. Moreover Bhatia and Neuman (1980) have 
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argued that levels of communication are strongly related to 
social class and generational differences. 
Second: husband's approval of the use of contraceptives. 
Studies in developing countries have indicated that 
husbands' approval is an important factor encouraging wives 
to use contraceptives (Stycos et al., 1968). Chamie (1978) 
found that 40% of women who abandoned the use of 
contraceptives attributed this to their husband's 
opposition. Kim and Lee (1973) pointed out that a 
husband's approval of family planning had a significant 
effect'on the proportion of women using contraceptives in 
South Korea, especially among less educated women who 
depended more on their husband's knowledge. This may lead 
to the conclusion that a husband's influence is likely to 
be more pervasive in cases of disagreements, especially in 
male dominant societies. 
Husband-wife communication can take more than one 
possible form. Some researchers have argued that such 
communication can be seen as a consequence rather than a 
determinant, where husbands and wives start discussing 
birth control or number of children desired after child 
conception (Hartford, 1971) while others suggest that a 
high level of communication leads to contraceptives. 
Moreover Poffenberger (1968) has argued that effective 
communication between couples does not necessarily lead to 
birth control, especially when the extended family has the 
final say in childbearing decisions. 
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The relationship between couples can be classified 
into three main categories (Rainwater, 1965). 
(1) Joint role relationship. In this situation husbands 
and wives share activities, tasks and decision making. 
(2) Segregated role relationships. In this case the 
division of labour and activities within the family is 
emphasised. 
(3) Intermediate role relationships. As suggested by the 
term this implies a situation which falls between the above 
categories. 
Finally the status of women and their role in the 
family and society is very important and should be taken 
into account in studying couples' decisions. It is 
believed that a wife's power leads to effective and higher 
level of communication and not vice-versa. Hill et al. 
(1959) found a negative association between male dominance 
and the use of contraceptives in Puerto Rico, while 
Mitchell (1972) found a positive relation between greater 
power by the wife and the use of contraceptives among women 
in Hong Kong. 
1.11 Cultural norms and child preference 
The study of fertility preference and childbearing 
attitudes should focus on two dimensions: couples 
characteristics and the characteristics of the groups of 
which the individuals are members. The latter includes 
analysis of family structure, cultural factors and socio- 
economic relations between couples and kin (Knodel and 
Prachuabmoh, 1973). This means that ideally macro and 
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micro-analytical approaches should be used at the same time 
to understand fertility behaviour at different levels of 
socio-economic development. For example some fertility 
aspects are more easily identified by the first approach, 
such as abortion and contraceptive use, while others are 
more easily detected by the latter approach such as 
marriage patterns and breastfeeding. Tobin (1976) has 
argued that desired family size should be regarded as a 
result of the interplay between structural and cultural 
factors on the one hand and personal characteristics on the 
other. 
Cultural norms are often used to explain, predict and 
interpret trends and patterns of reproductive behaviour. 
Gibbs (1965) has argued that social norms constitute an 
expectation, not just a description of behaviour, because 
they are considered as rules stating how people ought to 
feel, think, behave and act in particular circumstances 
(Hawthorn, 1970). To specify the mechanisms through which 
norms operate towards marriage and childbearing aspects, 
the interaction between individual and kin members is an 
important element in determining individual behaviour, such 
as when, how and to whom he/she should marry. They also 
affect when couples start and later stop having children by 
using contraceptives (Page and Lesthaeghe, 1981). 
Cultural norms constitute the base for husband and 
wife relationships and may ultimately affect the decision 
making process itself in more direct ways. The effect of 
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cultural norms seems to be more clearly related to 
intermediate variables than to directly determining the 
number of children in a family (Lee, 1979). 
The influence of cultural factors varies from one 
culture to another. Some cultures are relatively tolerant 
of change so long as it does not contradict existing rules. 
In rigid cultures any deviation is considered to be a great 
sin. The nature of culture affects the speed of social 
change in a society (Lightbourne, 1985). 
Nowadays it is wrong to assume that most people in 
traditional societies lived in isolated environments 
especially after the improvement of road networks, 
communications, mass media, education and migration. These 
factors help the transfer of new ideas from one society to 
another, and consequently challenge traditional culture. 
Ryder (1973) has explained how education can be the 
principle force for change in intergenerational attitudes. 
The advent of state schools, for example, takes children 
out of family control to some extent and may introduce 
changes to some concepts and norms which children would 
otherwise have learned from their families at an earlier 
age. Marshall et al. (1972) have argued that cultural 
norms may change over time, so as to facilitate socio- 
economic mobility without eradicating the key elements of 
culture which distinguish a society's identity. 
Cultural norms reinforced by negative sanctions are 
imposed on those who deviate and positive sanctions are 
granted to those who conform (Mason, 1983). The socio- 
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economic and psychological influence of deviating from 
traditional norms should be added to other costs of having 
children. Caldwell (1982) argued that the maintenance of 
traditional systems and norms in many developing countries 
may be attributed to the perception of parents that they 
should be treated in the same manner as their own parents. 
Most people in traditional societies adopt traditional 
values without questioning the premises on which these 
rest. A wide range of factors contribute to sustaining 
traditional value systems such as religious factors 
imparted through religious teaching and social sanctions. 
The value of a cohesive extended family structure is easily 
illustrated in many developing countries given its 
importance as a source of help (economic and emotion) to 
family members, especially in periods of need and illness. 
Ryder (1973) has argued that the introduction of 
alternatives sources of help to the individual from outside 
the family is a key influence in introducing and making 
acceptable a wide range of new ideas. This stage is 
considered to be the first step in bringing about 
fundamental social changes. 
Several studies carried out by social and cultural 
anthropologists have attracted the interest of demographers 
(see Jones, 1977) because the process of reproduction in 
many developing countries is still strongly influenced by 
cultural factors (Mehryer et al., 1977). The influence of 
cultural norms can be noticed in different aspects of 
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reproductive behaviour. These are: - 
1. Decision making. In traditional societes most of 
fertility decisions are determined by the views of 
extended family members (Arnold et al., 1975). The 
extent of power of the husband and wife differ from one 
culture to another. Womens' decisions often seem to be 
irrelevant if only men are viewed as responsible for 
making decisions. Also even if couples' have a clear 
view of their objectives, their decision making power 
may still be weak and may not result in action, if real 
decision making power lies in the hands of their 
extended families. 
2. Child value. Cultural factors may maximize child value 
without regard to the cost and benefits of children to 
an individual family. From the economic point of view 
in Arab countries, cultural factors, supported by 
Islamic teaching, reduce a couples' worries about their 
children's needs, since many people still believe that 
he who "gave children teeth will also provide them with 
food". 
3. Womens' position in the family. In traditional culture 
the values of women are often measured largely by the 
number of children they have (Arnold et al., 1975). It 
has been argued that the relative power and influence 
enjoyed by women as mothers is relevant to their 
childbearing preferences and perceptions. Bulatao 
(1982) concluded that mothers in general are awarded 
higher status and treated with more social respect than 
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childless women. It is believed in Arab societies that 
women who receive little satisfaction from their 
marriage (relationship with their husbands and their 
families) will seek it in motherhood. It is believed 
that having children supports the wife's position and 
protects them from divorce or from their husband 
marrying again. 
4. Marriage pattern. To marry and produce children has 
been emphasized as important in most traditional 
cultures, and especially in Arab culture (Ata, 1986). 
Cultural norms usually determine age at marriage for 
both male and female. In Arab culture an early age at 
marriage especially for females is still practised. In 
rural Egypt, El-Khorazaty (1985) found that nearly all 
marriages were arranged by couples' parents. Also he 
found that more than 90% of females were married before 
reaching 20 years of age. Mauldin and Berelson (1978) 
found that over 40% of fertility decline in some 
developing countries could be attributed to delays in 
the age of marriage. 
5. Desired number of children. Cultural norms may 
directly effect the number of children preferred by 
couples. Caldwell (1978) has argued that cultural 
norms and religious beliefs operate directly to sustain 
high fertility levels, but time also moulds a society 
in such a way as to bring rewards from high fertility. 
Indirectly cultural norms may affect desired family 
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size through social, economic, political and religious 
considerations. Arab and Islamic culture has been 
described as strongly pro-natalist where early 
marriages still are widely practised in order to have 
large families. Farooq (1985) found in tropical Africa 
that Muslims tended to desire and attain larger numbers 
of children than other groups. 
6. Taste. The term taste has been emphasized by Easterlin 
(1975). Taste covered a wide range of cultural factors 
such as social pressures, social norms, fear and 
satisfaction. Therefore, in order to change couples' 
tastes, there should be changes in peoples' attitudes 
and beliefs towards the desired number of children. 
Mehryar et al. (1977) attributed the failure of family 
planning programmes to bring down fertility levels to 
cultural factors such as attitudes and beliefs. 
7. Gender preference. Williamson (1976) indicated that in 
many developing countries, male children are preferred 
over female ones. The strong motivation for having 
male children was supported by cultural factors despite 
the fact that females sometimes provide more help and 
support to their families than male children. 
One of the common approaches to measuring the effect 
of cultural norms in surveys is to ask respondents about 
their approval or disapproval of particular behaviour. Few 
surveys in developing countries have used this approach to 
measure desired family size. Simmons (1974) has 
suggested that the most suitable way to discover about 
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family size norms is to ask respondents about their views 
of the number of children which would either make a family 
too large or too small. Caldwell (1982) has used 
"agreement and disagreement" scales to measure respondents' 
opinions and attitudes towards fertility behaviour. 
1.12 Socio economic factors and couples' preference 
Socio-economic developmental levels can be measured by 
many factors. The most frequent variables used in 
demographic studies are family income, place of residence 
(rural and urban), education and women's work. Lightbourne 
(1985) found that these variables have a significant 
influence on desired family size. 
Socio-economic development may radically alter the 
demand for children and shift couples' preferences from 
having large families to having small and moderate sized 
ones. This could be a result of the following factors: - 
(a) Socio-economic development leads to increased 
educational attainment, and higher aspirations to 
gain a higher levels of education. 
(b) A reduction in children's contribution, during their 
early years to the household income. 
(c) The shift from agricultural activity to other 
economic sectors requires an investment of human and 
physical capital, and a shift from an unskilled 
workforce to a more skilled labour force (Richards 
(1983). 
(d) Changes in couples' taste. Couples look more 
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favourably on consumer goods, including those 
necessary for a better quality of children. In turn 
this may lead them to wish to have smaller familes. 
(e) Increase in women's employment opportunities in the 
waged labour market may raise the direct cost of 
having children, because as a result time will become 
a more important and valuable resource to working 
parents. 
(f) The breakdown of traditional systems and the weakness 
of traditional norms and values to challenge new 
ideas about life style. A change away from 
traditional systems may reduce the presence of 
benefits to parents of having children and may 
increase parents' desire for economic independence. 
One United Nations (1981) study, using data from 15 
countries, focussed on currently married women with three 
living children and showed that education and women's 
occupations have a significant effect on average desired 
family size. On this basis it was argued that the average 
desired family size changes as a result of changes in a 
couples' circumstances. Some studies suggest that 
analysis of women's characteristics give the best basis for 
the prediction of fertility preferences (Singh and 
Casterline, 1985). 
1.12.1 Income. 
The income-fertility relationship has long played a 
central role in the demographic transition literature. In 
the long run income growth and economic development tend to 
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reduce fertility. The relationship between income and 
desired family size is complex since changes in income go 
hand in hand with changes in education, female employment, 
parental aspirations, time value, availability of 
consumption goods and technology. 
Simon (1977) has examined the effect of income on 
desired family size over both the short and long term. He 
did this to distinguish between the direct and indirect 
influence of income on fertility preference. Turchi (1975) 
found that an increase in income in the short term reduces 
the number of desired children if alternative goods and 
services are efficient in providing parents with social and 
psychological satisfaction. 
Many studies have found an inverse relationship 
between income and desired family size. Dhindsa (1986) for 
example found that people from lower income groups have a 
tendency to produce a higher number of children compared to 
those from higher income groups. Farooq (1985) found 
income to be positively associated with the supply side 
(natural fertility) and negatively associated with 
fertility preference. Backer and Lewis (1974) argued that 
an increase in income enhances the desire for a higher 
quality of children, hence, parents with a higher income, 
desire a higher education for their children more than do 
lower income parents. Coombs and Sun (1978) found that the 
desired number of children decreased as the husband income 
increased, but the correlation between income and desired 
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was not strong. Blake and Delpinal (1979) found that 
income had little effect on the desired family size after 
controlling other variables. 
The effect of income on the desired family size may be 
influenced to a large extent by a family's social and 
economic conditions. For example, the effect of higher 
income in an urban area may differ from that in rural ones. 
Encarnacion (1974) found that in the Phillipines there was 
a negative relationship between income and desired 
fertility in urban areas and a positive association in 
rural areas. Anker (1978) argued that when land is the 
main source of income a positive relation between desired 
family size and income results. Therefore the effect of 
income on fertility preference may differ according to the 
historical and geographical context of the study. 
It has been suggested that the economic returns from 
children to their parents diminish gradually when parents 
income increases (Leibenstein, 1957). Higher income and 
the ability to save money may reduce the economic 
advantages of having large families. Many studies suggest 
negative relationships between the economic benefits of 
having children and parents' income (Caldwell, 1978). 
Blake (1968) argued that desired family size was 
determined mainly by social norms, not by the economic 
characteristics of the household and community, thus, 
ignoring the fact that economic variables (which affect 
consumer behaviour) may ultimately affect the social norms 
themselves. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the 
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effect of economic factors such as income will appear more 
clearly in the long run. 
1.12.2 Women's employment 
The relationships between fertility and female 
employment have been explored in numerous studies. The 
direction of the relationship is still unclear (Singh and 
Casterline, 1985). For example, in societies where there 
is a high female participation in the labour force, there 
will be low fertility levels. On the other hand, lower 
fertility may attract women to share in the labour force. 
However, the relationships and their form may be decided by 
variables such as income, education and cultural norms 
(Singh and Casterline, 1985). Therefore, several 
relationships between women's work and fertility are 
possible. Collver and Longlois (1962) argued that women's 
employment has an adverse effect on fertility. Mincer 
(1963) found that an increase in women's wages tended to 
reduce fertility. Having many children or giving priority 
to childbearing is considered by many to be an obstacle to 
women's employment (Sweet, 1982). 
It has been recognized that the fertility preferences 
of working women vary according to the nature of the work, 
their place of residence and social class (Abdalla, 1987). 
Urban jobs may actually facilitate and subsidise 
childbearing. The inverse relationship between women's 
work and fertility preferences in urban areas is clearer 
than in rural areas (Abdallah, 1987) mainly as a result 
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of: - 
(1) Children's costs being different, where the extended 
family can look after children and replace working 
women in their domestic duties (Farooq, 1985). 
(2) Urban jobs require highly qualified women (Farooq, 
1985). 
(3) Agricultural work usually requires a large family 
size, since children can contribute to their families 
income at an early age, especially in societies which 
are characterized with an intensive labour force. 
(4) Parents' aspirations to raise the level of their 
children's education and their standards of living. 
This effect may be stronger in urban areas than in 
rural ones. 
In general, working women have lower fertility than 
non-working women (U. N. 1985). El-Khorazaty (1985) found 
that the mean number of additional children desired is 
higher for non-working wives for families with no more than 
two surviving children. This means that working women will 
be satisfied with fewer children as compared to non-working 
wives. 
The inverse relationship between women's employment 
and fertility is often absent in developing countries 
mainly as a result of the mode of operation of the family 
system (men only responsible to household income) and 
cultural norms (more tolerant with younger and older to 
work) and the small percentage of women who participate in 
the labour force as compared with that in developed 
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countries (Goldstein, 1972). Some researchers attribute 
the low proportion of working women in developing societies 
to the lack of opportunities in waged sectors of the 
economy and also to cultural norms (Sultan, 1986). 
The effect of women's work on fertility or desired 
number of children may be indirect. While women's work 
increases family income it also leads to an exchange of 
ideas with other people. It emancipates women from 
traditional norms, and facilitates better communication, 
greater equality of participation in family decision making 
processes, and it increases womens freedom inside and 
outside their homes. It also makes them more secure and 
economically independent (Hagar, 1987). 
1.12.3 Education 
Wives' education is expected to be one of the most 
important variables shaping household fertility, decision 
making and behaviour (Cleland and Rodriguez, 1988). Tobin 
(1976) has argued that a husband's education reflects more 
accurately the socio-economic status of the household. 
Education is generally negatively associated with 
desired family size and fertility levels (Gomes, 1984). 
Farooq (1985) has argued that any increase in parents 
educational level will lead to a decrease in the number of 
children desired. Cho (1978) found differences in the 
desired family size in five Asian countries; Korea, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Thailand. Cho found that 
women with poor educational levels tended to have larger 
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families than women with more education. 
Education influences the main components of fertility 
behaviour. Education is positively associated with the 
supply side, since maternal education increases the 
probability of child survival (Campbell, 1974) through its 
effect in increasing family income (Pust et al., 1985) and 
in helping towards an awareness of the need for better 
health care, nutrition and child care. On the other hand, 
educated women are less motivated to resort to 
breastfeeding thus increasing their chance of pregnancy. 
On the demand side, parents' educational levels have a 
negative influence on the number of children wanted 
(Willis, 1973). The influence of education may be direct 
or indirect. For example, education raises couples 
aspirations towards achieving higher living standards and 
to achieving better education for their own children 
(Ryder, 1983). Education increases the relative cost of 
children (Becker, 1965). Education may also result in a 
shift in couples' tastes and increase their demand for 
consumer goods. Education may weaken kinship socio- 
economic relations, thus, decreasing the expected benefit 
from children (Gomes, 1984). It will also reduce the 
contribution of child labour in their early years. An 
increase in women's educational levels may be positively 
associated with attitudes towards the use of contraceptives 
which ultimately may affect fertility levels. 
Tobin (1976) has argued that less education for women 
may mean that they give greater intrinsic value to the 
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maternal role, while higher education may make them more 
likely to use contraceptives and become more successful in 
family planning. on the other hand, women with higher 
education are likely to desire higher educational levels 
for their children (Gomes, 1984). Duesenberry (1960) has 
pointed out that families with higher incomes are likely to 
encourage the attainment high level of education for their 
children than do parents with a lower income. Therefore, 
it is possible to argue that children's education may be 
used as a direct measure of children's quality and cost. 
1.12.4 Place of residence 
Differences in the desired family size can be 
attributed to the place of residence, where urbanization 
has a substantially negative effect on the total number of 
children preferred. Knodel and Prachuabmoh (1973) found 
that in Thailand urban women desire less number of children 
than rural and semi-urban women. Differences in the 
desired family size can also be found in the urban area 
according to social classes. Dhindsa (1986) has found that 
people from the lower classes tended to have higher 
fertility levels than people from the higher classes. 
Pullum (1980) attributed the differences in desired family 
size after controlling for the actual family size to place 
of residence among women in Sri Lanka. 
Regional differences in fertility preferences can 
therefore be attributed to spatial variations in socio- 
economic development reflecting differences in couples' 
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characteristics, to difference in life styles and to 
geographical variations in the constraints and influences 
on fertility attitudes which have been outlined by Compton 
and Coward (1989), and shown earlier in this thesis in 
Figure 1.2. 
1.13 Conclusion 
This literature review has sought to highlight the 
most important recent research findings to emerge on 
fertility behaviour. It has shown that it is much easier 
to theorise and schematise relationships between on the one 
hand social economic political and physical environmental 
factors and on the other hand fertility attitudes and 
behaviour, than it is to establish empirical research 
findings about these relationships which have widespread 
applicability. Most generalisations about the interactions 
between these forces are culturally and historically 
specific. In particular sweeping generalisations about 
factors affecting fertility behaviour in the developing 
countries should be avoided given the diversity of 
demographic and cultural contexts of these countries. In 
elaborating on this theme this thesis now turns to the 
specific cultural and historical context of fertility 
trends amongst the Arab population of the West Bank in the 
20th century. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEST BANK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present some of the main 
demographic characteristics of the West Bank population in 
the aftermath of the 1967 war when the whole area came 
under Israeli control. Prior to doing this, however, it is 
necessary to review some of the problems facing demographic 
research in the West Bank. It has never been an easy task 
to assemble reliable. statistics on the Palestinian 
population. The problems can be summarised as follows: - 
1. After the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, and 
the subsequent economic and political developments in 
the Arab East, a large segment of the Palestinian 
people were scattered beyond the borders of their 
homeland. Most of them settled in neighbouring Arab 
countries. Estimates show that in 1980 more than 3 
million Palestinians lived outside Palestine, and could 
not obtain "family reunfication permits" and were 
consequently prevented from returning to their native 
homes (Abu-Lughod, 1982). Table 2.1 and figure 2.1 
show different estimates of the Palestinian 
distribution over the world in 1980. Several of the 
Arab host countries did not publish separate statistics 
on the Palestinian population. The most confused 
situations are found in the East Bank of Jordan and to 
a lesser extent in Lebanon. In both these areas 
66 
absorption of the Palestinians, through inter-marriage 
and naturalization has been extensive (Hill, 1983). 
2. The fact that some Palestinians have obtained 
citizenship of other countries is a major problem for 
demographic analysis of the situation. Jordan provides 
a good example of this. In the early fifties, the 
Jordanian government granted its citizenship to every 
Palestinian residing in the West Bank, including those 
in refugee camps in both the East and West Bank. The 
Jordanian decision was taken after an official link was 
made in 1950 between the West Bank and Trans Jordan 
under the name of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Henceforth, many Arab and non-Arab countries classified 
the Palestinians as Jordanian, simply because they 
travelled on Jordanian passports and reported their 
nationality as being Jordanian. This has been one 
major source of big differences between different 
statistical estimes. 
3. Reliability and validity of data. Most demographic 
data depends on estimates. Some biased data may be 
attributed to political aims. For example, it is easy 
to point to this reason as explaining some of the 
differences between the Arab and Israeli estimates of 
the size of the Palestinian population. There are, 
however, differences within Israel with regard to 
official estimates of the size of the Palestinian 
population. For example, in 1980 the Israeli Central 
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Bureau of Statistics released a population estimate of 
the West Bank population as being 704,000 while the 
Israeli Interior Ministry gave an estimate of 871,000 
(Sabatello, 1983). 
4. Since 1967 only one census has been conducted in the 
occupied territories. The census was carried out under 
curfew conditions and was designed to constitute the 
basis for issuing identity cards to the inhabitants of 
the areas. No subsequent census has been taken 
although two full population censuses have been carried 
out in Israel in the years 1972 and 1983. All Israeli 
sources exclude East Jerusalem (70,000 inhabitants in 
1967) from their analysis. This was formally annexed 
to Israel directly after the occupation. 
5. Because of military rule it is difficult and sometimes 
impossible for any Arab researcher from the occupied 
territories to obtain permission to conduct a survey in 
the occupied territories. Also the Israeli authorities 
do not allow researchers to study or even to look at 
vital registration or migration records. Therefore, 
most researchers do their surveys illegally and without 
permission from the Israeli authorities. 
6. In the past two years during the Palestinian Intifada 
(uprising), conducting surveys in the occupied 
territories has become extremely difficult because of 
road blocks, military checkpoints, curfews and travel 
bans. In addition, Palestinians in the territory have 
become even more sensitive to giving information to 
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Table 2.1 
Palestinian distribution by place of residence. 
PLACE OF ABU-LUGHOD ESTIMATES 1980 *PLO ESTIMATES 1980 
RESIDENCE IN IN 
THOUSANDS % THOUSANDS % 
**West Bank 818.3 18.6 833.0 18.4 
Gaza strip 476.7 10.9 401.6 8.9 
Israel 530.6 12.1 550.8 12.2 
Jordan 1160.8 26.4 1148.2 25.4 
Syria 215.5 4.9 122.6 4.9 
Lebanon 347.1 7.9 492.2 10.9 
Kuwait 278.8 6.4 294.9 6.5 
Iraq 20.0 0.5 20.6 0.5 
Libya 23.0 0.5 23.8 0.5 
Egypt 48.5 1.1 34.3 0.8 
Saudi Arabia 127.0 2.9 137.0 3.0 
U. A. E. 34.7 0.8 37.0 0.9 
Qatar 22.5 0.5 24.0 0.6 
Other Arab 
Countries 48.2 1.1 51.0 1.1 
U. S. A. 102.0 2.3 105.0 2.3 
Rest of the 
world 136.3 3.1 140.0 3.1 
TOTAL 4,390.0 100 4,516.0 100 
Sources: Pa lestinian Liberation Organisation, 1982, p32. 
Ab u-Lughod, 1982, p184. 
*PLO: Pales tine Liberation Organ isation 
The percentage was calculated by the researcher. 
*Excluding East Jerusalem (118 , 000 
inhabitants i n 1980 
according to Central Bureau of St atistics). 
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researchers because of their 
fear of them being either 
Israeli intelligence or being 
in some way politically 
motivated. 
Figure 2.1: ' Distribution of the Palestinian 
Population in 
in the World (1980)_.. 
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2.2 Population Growth and Political Change 1900-1948 
Since some of the current population trends in the 
West Bank derive from and have been affected by the pre 
1967 patterns, it is worthwhile dealing briefly with events 
dating back to before the Israeli occupation. 
It is very difficult to obtain reliable information 
on population changes among the Arab Palestinian population 
during the late Ottoman empire. The natural increase of 
the Palestinian population appears to have been modest 
through the second half of the nineteenth century and 
probably up to the end of the Ottoman period. It may be 
assumed that mortality and fertility rates were at a very 
high level and that fertility levels varied very little 
until 1900. Estimates indicate that between the middle of 
the nineteenth century and the outbreak of the first world 
war the Arabs in Palestine grew slowly from 500,000 to 
600,000 (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979). 
According to Israeli sources (Israeli Statistical 
Abstract 1950/1951) the total number of Jewish people in 
Palestine in 1882 numbered approximately 24,000. This 
number doubled in eighteen years to reach 50,000 at the 
beginning of this century. Most of the increase came from 
the first immigration wave from Russia (Abu-Lughod, 1982). 
According to the Ottoman census of 1914 which is 
summarised in the census of Palestine (1922), the total 
population numbered 689,272 of whom about 60,000 were 
Jewish. They constituted about 8.8% of the total 
population of Palestine. 
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During the first world war, population decreased, 
Jewish immigration halted, and the Ottoman government 
expelled 30,000 Russian Jews as a policy against the 
Russian government. This factor, together with a higher 
mortality rate due to epidemics and famines, caused a sharp 
decline in the size of the Jewish population to about 
57,000 in 1918 (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979). 
Different demographic forces account for the growth 
of the Jewish and Arab population in Palestine in the post 
war period. Net immigration accounted for increase amongst 
the Jews, while natural increase led to growth of the Arab 
population. Ehrlich (1980) attributed 82% of the Jewish 
population growth between 1919-1923 to the immigration 
waves. 
The relative and absolute size of the Arab and the 
Jewish population in Palestine was a central issue from the 
beginning of the British mandate until the establishment of 
the state of Israel in 1948. The British authorities in 
Palestine conducted two censuses, the first one in October 
1922 and the second in November 1931. Besides the British 
censuses, there was also civil registration which recorded 
births, deaths and migration. Population estimates for 
Palestine, based on data from the censuses and from the 
estimate of the civil registration were published annually 
until the year 1945. 
According to the first British census of 1922, the 
total population at the beginning of mandate was about 
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757,500 of which 668,000 were Arabs and 84,000 where Jews. 
The majority of the Arab population were mulsims 
constituting 88%, Arab Christians made up 11% while Druze 
constituted only 1%. These percentages did not change 
significantly during the period of the British mandate 
(Abu-Lughod, 1982). 
During the British mandate, Jewish population growth 
in Palestine was very high as a result of the mass waves of 
Jewish immigration in response to the activities of Zionist 
agencies. Jewish immigration to Palestine became the 
central issue in the emerging conflict between the Arabs 
and Jews during and after the British mandate. The Jewish 
population grew at an annual average rate of 9% during the 
years 1922-1948. Approximately three quarters of this 
growth may be attributed to immigration. While the Arab 
population did not grow as rapidly, but rather at an 
average of 2.7% per annum at the same period (Friedlander 
and Goldscheider, 1979). 
A survey of Palestine in 1946 indicated that crude 
death rates had fallen from 30.2 per thousand in 1927/29 to 
18.7 per thousand in 1942/44. This trend may be 
exaggerated, since substantial under-registration of 
deaths at the earlier date seems probable. The decline 
in mortality rate was accompanied by an increase in life 
expectancy at birth from 37.5 in 1927/29 to 50 years in 
1942/44 (Survey of Palestine, 1946). Bachi (1977) has 
estimated life expectancy of the Arabs in Palestine in 
1926/27 at 37.9 years for the females and 39.1 years for 
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males. 
The distribution of the population in Palestine by 
region and religion for the period 1922-1945 makes it clear 
that muslims constituted the vast majority in most regions. 
The Jewish percentage increased rapidly especially in some 
regions. For example, the proportion of Jews increased in 
Jafa-Tel Aviv from less than 22% of the total population to 
about 50% in 1931 and continued to increase to reach 70% 
in 
1948. In 1931 about 68% of the Jewish population was 
settled in the Jafa-Tel Aviv and Jerusalem belt. 65,000 
Jews (one third of the Jewish population) were settled in 
Jafa-Tel Aviv and about 55,000 in Jerusalem according to 
the 1931 census. 
Jewish immigration took place in three main periods: - 
1) 1924-1926 as a result of intensive Zionist propaganda 
in the wake of the Balfour declaration in 1917 and 
assisted by the economic crisis in the West. 
2) 1933-1939 because of Nazism and anti-semitism in 
Germany. 
3) 1943-1948 with the formation of the Jewish legion in 
1944 which became the nucleus of the Israeli army 
(Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979). 
The 1931 census indicated that net immigration of 
Jews between 1922-1931 was about 60,000 compared with a 
total increase of 90,000 in that period. One third of the 
population increase was considered to be a result of Jewish 
natural increase. Jewish immigration reached its peak in 
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the year 1925 when 34,000 Jews entered Palestine (Abu- 
Lughod, 1982). By 1931 the total number of Jews in 
Palestine was 174,000, of whom only 42% were born in 
Palestine and about 80% of the total Jewish migrants 
population were born in Europe. 
On the other hand, the 1931 census shows that the 
Arab population's growth can be attributed mainly to the 
natural increase with the crude birth rate at 52.2 per 
thousand and the crude death rate at 26 per thousand. As a 
result, the natural growth rate was 27 per thousand. The 
census also indicates that more than 95% of the Arab 
population were born in Palestine. 
Between 1932-1936 the size of the Jewish population 
doubled as a result of intensive immigration involving 
172,000 people. By contrast, natural increase only 
involved about 26,000 people. By the end of 1936 the 
Jewish population constituted 28% of the total population 
of Palestine as compared with only 16% in 1922. 
At the end of 1943, the statistical department in 
Palestine indicated that the total population had reached 
1,676,571 of this total about half a million were Jews 
(30%), while by the end of 1946 the total population 
increased to reach 1,887,214. Of this total, only 31% were 
Jews. Freidlander and Goldscheider (1979) estimated the 
proportion of the Jewish population on the eve of the 
declaration of State of Israel as 34.5%. It is believed 
that illegal Jewish immigration reached its peak in 1947, 
the last year of British mandate. 
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As a result of the 1948 war, Israeli forces occupied 
77% of what had been the British mandated territory of 
Palestine. The Arab population of this area declined 
sharply from about 900,000 to about 130,000 including 
66,000 Bedouin in the southern part of Palestine (Abu- 
Lughod, 1971; U. N. 1950). Most of these people lived in 
rural districts and in the small towns of Northern Israel 
between Haifa and Lake Tiberias. 
The distribution of Palestinian refugees in 1948 was 
as follows: the West Bank 39%, Gaza Strip 26%, Lebanon 
14%, Syria 10%, Jordan 10% and Egypt 1%. In terms of their 
religion about 93% of refugees were Muslims and 7% were 
Christians, while most of the Druze remained in their lands 
(Kossaifi, 1980). 
Today the recent statistics of UNRWA (1987) indicated 
that about 2.2 million Palestinians registered as refugees. 
These Palestinians are scattered throughout Jordan (East 
Bank), Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip and West Bank. These 
countries were given first priorities by refugees mainly 
because the majority of them preferred to be close to their 
relatives and because of the widespread belief that they 
will return to in their homes in the nearest future. 
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Table 2.2 
Factors influencing the demographic change of the total 
population of Palestine (by religion) 1922-1945 
RELIGION 
Muslim Christian Druze Jew Total 
23.10.22 598,177 71,464 7,617 83,790 761,048 
31.12.45 1,101,565 139,285 14,858 554,329 1,810,037 
Overall 
increase 503,338 67,821 7,241 470,539 1,048,989 
Natural 
increase 491,855 48,724 6,493 129,989 677,061 
Net 
migration 20,533 19,097 748 340,550 380,928 
Total 
increase % 100 100 100 100 100 
Natural 
increase % 96 72 90 28 64 
Net 
migration % 4 28 10 72 36 
These numbers exclude the British army forces in Palestine 
but include nomadic people in Negev desert. 
Percentage was calcu lated by r esearcher. 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1946, p17. 
Table 2.3 
Population compositi on: propo rtion of the total population 
by religious group, 1922-1945. 
Muslim Christian Druze Jew Total 
Oct. 1922 74.9 11.01 1.18 12.91 649,048 
July 1926 71.5 9.43 1.08 18.44 810,885 
Nov. 1931 71.7 9.20 1.04 18.06 966,761 
Dec. 1936 61.24 8.35 0.87 29.54 1,300,139 
Dec. 1940 59.63 8.16 0.85 31.36 1,477,977 
Dec. 1945 59.37 7.99 0.85 31.79 1,743,484 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1946, p14. 
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Table 2.4 shows that almost all of refugee camps 
which were erected by the UNRWA are located in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The refugee camps accommodate nearly 
35% of the total Palestinian refugees. However, most 
refugees who are better off financially rather live in 
cities and not in refugee camps, taking into account the 
fact that most refugees are situated in areas adjacent to 
cities. 
Most researchers define Palestinian refugees as the 
people who registered and carried a UNRWA Registration card 
(United Nation Relief and Working Agency). The UNRWA 
defines a Palestinian refugee for operational purposes as 
those people or their descendents whose normal residence 
was in Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948, and who as a result of that 
conflict lost both their home and means of livelihood 
(Rowley, 1984). 
Table 2.4 
Distribution of registered refugee population in 1987. 
Jordan West Gaza Lebananon Syria Total 
(East Bank) Bank Strip 
Registered 
refugees 845,542 373,586 445,397 278,609 257,989 2,201,123 
Percentage 38.4 17 20.2 12.7 11.7 100 
Lived in 
camps 208,716 94,824 244,416 143,809 75,208 766,973 
Percentage 24.7 25.4 54.9 51.6 29.2 34.8 
No. of camps 10 20 8 13 10 61 
Source: UNRWA report, 1987, p23. 
Percentage calculated by researcher. 
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2.3 West Bank population between 1948-1967 
The West Bank is the name which was given to most of 
the region of Palestine which was not occupied by the 
Israelis after the 1948 Arab Israeli war. The area of the 
West Bank covers 5,879 K. m. (Europa, 1988). In 1949 it was 
officially integrated with trans Jordan under the name of 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, while the Gaza Strip (the 
other small part remained from Palestine) came under 
Egyption administration (see Figure 2.2). 
The West Bank population is composed of two groups. 
First, pre 1948 refugees expelled from their lands as a 
result of the 1948 war. Second, long term residents of the 
West Bank before 1948. The main sources of demographic 
data in the period 1948-1967 when it was under Jordanian 
rule are: The first Jordanian census which was conducted 
in 1952 and the comprehensive Jordanian census of 
population and housing undertaken in November 1961. 
When reviewing the demographic history of a 
population it is easy to lose sight of the major forces 
accounting for population changes, and to focus instead on 
the chronological sequence of specific geographical 
details. Prior to presenting these details, it is 
therefore insightful to identify the major forces 
explaining population change in the West Bank in the period 
1948-1967. This should help the reader to distinguish 
"general forces" from particular detail. 
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Figure 2.2: General location map of the West Bank and its 
neighbours. 
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The history of demographic development has been 
dichotomized in the West Bank between periods of warfare 
and social unrest on the one hand, and periods of relative 
tranquility and continuity on the other. Later in this 
chapter details of the political events under-pinning these 
periods are discussed, but first it is useful to list the 
different demographic regimes operating in these two types 
of "environments". 
(1) Troubled periods. After the 1948 and 1967 wars a 
great number of Palestinian people left their homes as a 
result of alien occupation. More than 700,000 people were 
forced to leave Palestine during the 1948 war (U. N. 1950, 
Abu-Lughod, 1971) as a direct result of the creation of the 
Israeli state. Directly after the 1967 war around 170,000 
Palestinian people (one fifth of the total West Bank 
population) emigrated to Jordan and other neighbouring 
countries as a result of the Israeli take over of the 
territory (Schmelz et al., 1977; Kossaifi, 1985). The role 
of political factors in affecting migration is clearest 
during troubled periods, but this does not mean that the 
influence of the political situation disappears in 
relatively peaceful periods. 
(2) Periods of relative tranquility. These represent the 
periods of the early 1950s until the eve of the June 1967 
war. Voluntary migration took place. It was characterised 
as highly selective in terms of the age and sex of 
migrants. The average net migration rate of around 25 per 
thousand per year meant that the size of West Bank 
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population remained almost constant. It rose from 742,000 
in 1952 to only 804,000 on the eve of the 1967 war. This 
meant that net emigration had the effect of cancelling most 
population growth (Sabatello, 1983). The motives behind 
this kind of migration were mainly economic, and reflected 
the fact that the West Bank economy lacked jobs for both 
West Bankers and the refugees who had been driven there 
from their land in 1948. Equally it reflects imbalanced 
development and investment between the East and West Banks 
of Jordan, in the period after the West Bank became part of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The favourable economic 
and social conditions prevailing in the East Bank and Gulf 
states, particularly in Kuwait, encouraged the people to 
leave the West Bank and to seek jobs in these countries. 
Having made these general comments it now becomes 
possible to return to a review of the detailed chronology 
of West Bank population growth. The total population of 
the West Bank in 1949 was approximately 400,000 persons. 
This number increased rapidly to reach 742,000 within three 
years. The annual rate of increase of the West Bank 
population for the period 1949-1952 was therefore a 
remarkable 20.6% (Department of Statistics in Jordan, 
1963). Most of the increase came from the large number of 
Palestinian immigrants in the aftermath of the 1948 war. 
The total number of immigrants was about 250,000, while 
160,000 settled in the Gaza Strip (Benvenisti, 1987). 
The population of the West Bank increased from 
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742,300 in 1952 to 805,400 in 1961. The average annual 
growth rate for this period was only 0.9%. This was mainly 
a result of the great number of people who chose to become 
labour emigrants to the Gulf states, especially amongst the 
refugees. 
The underlying reasons for leaving the West Bank were 
the poor level of economic development, the difficulties in 
finding jobs in the local labour market and the 
deterioration of living standards. At the same time, 
favourable economic and social factors in the East Bank and 
Gulf states, particularly in Kuwait, were considered to be 
the driving forces behind several waves of emigration from 
the West Bank (Kossaifi, 1985). 
Table 2.5 indicates that the number of emigrants from 
the West Bank during the period 1952-1967 was around 
400,000 persons. The result of this emigration was the 
relatively slow growth of the West Bank population. The 
total number of people increased by about 60,000 over 16 
years, or an annual growth rate of 0.51%. The table also 
reveals that emigration was more intensive in the early 
1960s than in the 1950s. The annual growth rate during the 
period 1961-1967 was nearly zero. 
According to the Jordanian census of 1961, the crude 
birth rate in the early 1960's was around 45 per thousand 
in the West Bank, while the crude death rate was around 18 
per thousand. 
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Table 2.5 
Palestinian migrants from the West Bank. 
1 2 3 4 
Actual Estimated Emigrants Estimated 
No. of population since last annual growth 
residents resulting enumeration rate since 
from Natural (2-1) last 
Increase enumeration 
(without 
migration 
1951 742,289 --- 
1961 801,365 952,900 210,600 0.83 
1967 *803,600 955,600 154,200 0.05 
Source: Kossaifi, 1985, p93. 
* 1967 estimates back to 31st May 1967. 
** Annual growth rate of 2.7% was applied for the period 
1952-1961,3.2% for the period 1961-1967. 
The selectivity of migration from the West Bank 
affected the population structure (age and sex). Most 
emigrants were from the young, most active age groups. 
Female labour migration was more difficult as a result of 
the norms and customs of Islamic society. Nevertheless, 
even in the most conservative segments of West Bank 
society, female emigration occurred, as wives and children 
moved following the initial emigration of their husbands. 
Through a comparative analysis of the Jordanian census of 
1961 and 1967 conducted by Israel, this researcher 
concluded that about 40% (50,000 to 57,000) of the 
emigrants were women. 
The demographic development of the Palestinians in 
the West Bank therefore reflects the way they were treated 
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not only by the Israelis but also by their Arab neighbours. 
Kossaifi (1980) has suggested that the Palestinians in the 
West Bank suffered from a policy of "Jordanization". This 
involved the concentration of investment and economic 
projects in the East Bank. This policy has affected the 
socio-economic character and prosperity of the West Bank, 
and consequently had both direct and indirect influences on 
demographic variables and socio-economic development 
levels. This, amongst other factors, helps to explain why 
the West Bank population declined between 1952 and 1961 
from being 55.8% to being 43.0% respectively of the total 
population of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
2.4 West Bank population after the Israeli occupation 
In the wake of June 1967, when the West Bank came 
under Israeli occupation, considerable qualitative and 
quantitative changes took place in the Palestinian 
population of the area. For instance, the voluntary 
migration was replaced by forced migration and the migrants 
who left the West Bank could no longer return when they 
wished without entry permits from the Israeli authorities. 
Moreover, all West Bankers who were outside the territories 
prior to the 1967 Arab Israeli war were not allowed to 
return and were forced to stay abroad. This section aims 
to investigate the important changes which took place with 
regard to West Bank population since 1967. Aspects such as 
population size, structure, fertility and mortality, 
migration, labour force, and Jewish settlement in the West 
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Bank will be discussed and analysed. 
2.4.1 Population size 
Most contemporary data on the size of the West Bank 
population are based on estimates and statistical models 
and not on census information. No census has been carried 
out since 1967. Current population estimates by age and 
sex are prepared by the Israel Central Bureau of 
Statistics. However, de facto annual migration balances 
and estimates of mortality can be obtained from model life 
tables which are published on an annual basis. 
According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
the West Bank population had reached 836,000 people by 
1986. This total excludes the Jewish settlers in the West 
Bank and the Arab population of East Jerusalem. This 
figure also does not include 150,000 holders of West Bank 
identity cards who are residing abroad whose papers 
are maintained at exit stations. Therefore, it is easy to 
conclude that the total population of the West Bank could 
exceed one million people. 
Table 2.6 reveals that it took until 1985 for the 
West Bank population to surpass the population size 
achieved prior to the invasion in may 1967, when 803,600 
people lived in the West Bank. Following the invasion an 
estimated 218,000 people emigrated between June and 
September 1967 (Kossaifi, 1985). This exodus reduced the 
population to only 586,000. The emigration of West Bankers 
continued after that date but on a smaller scale (Table 
2.6). 
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The balance of natural population increase and net 
emigration in the 20 years that were to follow saw the West 
Bank population increase once again by about 250,000 
people. This meant that the population increased by 42.7% 
within 20 years. The annual average growth rate was about 
2%, while the average level of net migration for that 
period was about 8,500 people per annum, compared with an 
average level of natural increase of about 20,000 people 
per annum. 
Examination of annual growth rates reveals 
considerable changes from year to year. In the period 
1968-1970 it stood at only 1.7% per annum, from 1970-1980 
at 1.87%. The rate increased gradually to reach 2.14% in 
1980-1986, while the maximum recorded was in the period 
1983-1986 when the annual growth rate was 2.78%. This meant 
that the annual growth rate and natural increase were 
closer to each other. 
Comparing this annual growth rate with that during 
the period of the Jordanian regime is interesting. Between 
1952 and 1961 the average annual growth rate was only 0.9%, 
while under the Israeli occupation the average annual 
growth rate is 1.89%. It is clear that the rate under 
Israeli occupation is two times greater that the rate of 
the Jordanian period. The reason may be attributed mainly 
to the fact that during Jordanian rule, West Bankers were 
free to leave the West Bank and return whenever they felt 
it appropriate, while lots of restrictions have 
subsequently been imposed on the Palestinians by the 
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Israeli authorities. 
Table 2.6 
West Bank population estimates and source of population 
growth. 
YEAR Population Annual Net migration Natural 
at the end growth thousands increase 
of period (%) thousands 
1967 585.9 - 13(2) 3 
1968 583.1 -0.48 15.8 13 
1969 597.9 2.54 1.3 13.5 
1970 607.8 1.66 5.0 14.9 
1971 622.6 2.43 2.5 17.3 
1972 633.5 1.75 7.3 18.1 
1973 652.4 2.90 0.3 18.7*(18.6) 
1974 669.7 2.65 2.8 20.1 
1975 675.2 0.82 15.1 20.6 
1976 683.3 1.20 14.4 22.5 
1977 695.7 1.81 10.2 22.7*(22.6) 
1978 708.0 1.77 9.4 21.6*(21.7) 
1979 718.6 1.50 12.6 23.3*(23.2) 
1980 724.3 0.79 17.3 22.9*(23.0) 
1981 731.8 1.00 15.7 23.2 
1982 749.3 2.39 7.9 24.5*(25.4) 
1983 771.8 3.00 2.7 25.2 
1984 793.4 2.80 5.8 27.4 
1985 815.5 2.78 5.0 27.1 
1986 836.0 2.51 - - 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1987. 
(1) Calculated by researcher. 
(2) From September to December, 1967. 
*( ) Corrected by researcher. 
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2.4.2 Fertility and mortality 
The source of a population's natural increase arises 
from the balance of fertility and mortality. The fertility 
rate of the West Bank population has slightly changed over 
the last generation. From data reconstructed from the 
Jordanian census 1961 and the Israeli census 1967, it may 
be concluded that there is no evidence to suggest any 
substantial decline in fertility from the initial high 
levels recorded amongst Arabs during the period of the 
British mandate. On the contrary, it appears that 
fertility probably increased during the 1930s and 1940s and 
has continued to increase since 1948 (Friedlander and 
Goldscheider, 1979). This trend can also be found in other 
developing countries, when they start to experience 
improvement in their health services and the general 
standard of living (Heer, 1983). 
Table 2.7 shows that the crude birth rate increased 
from 43.9 per thousand in 1968 to reach 45.4 per thousand 
in 1975. After that date, the crude birth rate decreased 
to 42.1 per thousand in 1980 and to about 40 per thousand 
in 1986. This may reflect a change in age structure of the 
population rather than any reduction in underlying 
fertility levels. This view is also substantiated by 
examining the total number of births. There is an increase 
in the absolute number of births from 25,650 in 1968 to 
30,400 in 1980. But in 1985 and 1986 the number decreased 
to 33,238 and 33,035 respectively. 
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The Jordanian census in 1961 reveals that West Bank 
fertility was very high in the pre census period. The 
average level for all West Bank women in the reproductive 
ages in 1961 was 7.5. This number was close to the total 
fertility rate obtained through calculations of registered 
births for the years surrounding the census (Hill, 1983). 
This rate is an indication of the high levels in the 
reproductive age cohorts of couples in the West Bank. Most 
studies of the demography of the West Bank reveal a 
significant change in the fertility pattern since 1978. 
For example, the total fertility rate was around 7.5 for 
the period 1967-1978 and this rate decreased to 7.2 for the 
period 1978-1981. After 1981 the total fertility rate 
dropped to slightly less than 7 children (Hill, 1983; 
Sabatello, 1983; Benvenisti, 1986). 
The change in fertility patterns has been accompanied 
by a shift in the peak age of childbearing from 20-29 to 
30-39. This has probably been caused by a postponement in 
age of women at marriage. The fertility of women in the 
20-39 age group contributed to about 83% of the total 
births in the occupied territories (Benvenisti, 1986). 
This reveals that childbearing is distributed over a wide 
range of age cohorts and that fertility control still has 
not reduced the number of births amongst older women to the 
extent which might have been expected. 
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Table 2.7 
Live births by sex and place of birth, 1968-1986. 
1968 1975 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 
TOTAL 25,650 30,522 30,400 32,041 33,803 33,238 33,035 
Males 13,342 15,890 15,490 16,598 17,444 17,289 17,100 
Females 12,308 14,632 14,460 15,441 16,359 15,949 15,953 
Place of birth 
Hospital 3,463 9,177 12,292 16,566 17,283 18,588 19,466 
Outside 22,187 21,345 18,108 15,475 16,520 14,650 13,587 
Hospital 
% birth 13.5 30.1 40.4 51.7 51.1 55.9 58.9 
in 
Hospital 
Birth 43.9 45.4 42.1 42.3 43.0 41.3 40.0 
rates 
per 1000 
population 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1987, No. 38, 
Jerusalem. 
Despite the poor coverage and quality of mortality 
data, not only during the British mandate and Jordanian 
regime, but also after 1967 (Israeli occupation), it is 
worth analysing the available data. According to the 
Jordanian census of 1961 the mortality rate of children 
under five years of age was still as high as 25%. By the 
mid sixties this had fallen to 21%. After 1967 the child 
mortality rate decreased slowly and was probably down to 
10% in the mid 1970s (Hill, 1983). Estimates of the infant 
mortality rate during the first year of life in the 1960s 
are of the order of 15%. Thus the population of the West 
Bank which fell under Israeli occupation was distinguished 
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by a high mortality rate. 
Surveys carried out during the 1970s by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics suggest that infant mortality rates 
(IMR) were about 100 per thousand in the mid 1970s. This 
level is contradictory with those deriving from vital 
registration sources, which usually give a lower rate as a 
result of incomplete registration. One factor which has 
helped to reduce IMR is the increasing percentage of births 
occurring in clinics and hospitals. This increased from 
13.5% in 1968 to about 60% in 1986 as shown in table 2.7. 
In spite of the decline in mortality rates in the 
West Bank, it is worth comparing the West Bank death rate 
with rates in Jordan which is very similar to the West Bank 
in most of its characteristics. Yossif (1982) indicates 
that the crude death rate in Jordan in 1976 was 9.1 per 
thousand while in the West Bank it was 12 per thousand in 
the same year. The differences between the West Bank and 
Jordan may be due to some factors such as differences in 
health services and the differences in age structure of the 
two populations. 
2.4.3 Sex and age structure 
All the current trends in the West Bank population 
are conducive to a "young" age structure. This type of age 
structure can be found in most of the Arab world with its 
high fertility levels. Table 2.8 shows that from 1967 to 
the early 1980's the percentage of people under the age of 
15 diminished gradually from 49% in 1967 to 46.4 in 1982. 
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Since 1983 there has been a slight increase in the 
proportion of children under 15 years of age, which reached 
46.6 in 1985. The general decrease in the 1970s in the 
proportion of the population under the age of 15 can be 
explained partly by the effect of age selective migration. 
In the 1980's the proportion of young people under the age 
of 15 became relatively stable as a result of a reduction 
of average net migration, especially after 1982. The 
proportion of the population in the age group 35-44 sharply 
declined from 9.0% to 5.3% during the period 1967-1985. 
Again the change may be because emigration became highly 
selective among some age groups, especially those of 
working age. Also, there is a gradual decrease in the 
proportion of elderly (65 years and over) to about half in 
the period 1967-1985. The reason behind this decrease may 
be attributed to the fact that most old aged people depend 
on their sons for their livelihood. Thus they prefer to 
live with them wherever they work even if they are working 
outside the West Bank. For the differences in population 
composition, see figure 2.3 and 2.4. 
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Figure 2.3: West Bank population by age and sex, 1967. 
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Figure 2.4: West Bank Population by age and sex, 1985. 
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Table 2.8 
Population estimates by age group 1967-1985 (percentages) 
AGE GROUP 
Year 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total No 
thousands 
1967 49.0 8.6 6.3 9.7 9.0 5.7 5.2 6.5 585.9 
1972 48.6 11.7 6.5 9.0 8.2 6.1 4.0 5.9 633.7 
1975 47.2 12.9 9.4 8.6 7.0 6.6 3.8 4.5 695.8 
1982 46.4 12.3 10.7 10.4 5.8 6.1 4.3 4.0 749.3 
1983 46.4 12.1 10.7 11.3 5.4 6.0 4.4 3.8 771.8 
1985 46.6 11.4 10.6 12.2 5.3 5.6 4.6 3.8 793.4 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel (1986) No. 37, 
Jerusalem. 
In contrast to the reduction in the proportion of 
some age groups (young and old people), the proportion in 
the middle aged cohorts of 15-39 years increased gradually 
between 1967 and 1985. This could be attributed to several 
factors: - 
1. The Israeli labour market has attracted unskilled young 
people to work inside Israel while, for example, 
working in the Gulf States demanded more experience. 
2. The current existence of Palestinian Universities and 
Colleges in the West Bank has provided students with 
study opportunities inside the territories. 
3. Travel restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities 
mainly on young people has discouraged emigration. 
4. The Universities and Colleges in Jordan and other Arab 
countries have restricted their conditions for 
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admissions of students from the West Bank as part of 
the Arab policy against the evacuation of the occupied 
territories. 
5. Conscript services in Jordan, which began in 1977, 
discourage West Bank youths from settling or working in 
Jordan. 
To estimate the influence of migration on the 
population's age groups, rough calculations were done in 
Table 2.9 to compare the size of an age group at the end of 
1967 with the estimated size of the age group 15 years 
later. Almost all the differences can be attributed to 
migration. 
It is clear from Table 2.9 that of the five selected 
age groups those in their late teens (15-19) in 1967 were 
most likely to subsequently participate in the migration 
outflows. At least one out of two in that age group left 
the West Bank. This is explained by their being of the 
optimum age for migrant labour in the mid 1970's when oil 
prices had risen rapidly. 
In addition, an estimated 25% depletion in the older 
25-29 and 30-34 age groups occurred because of emigration. 
This trend confirms the idea that after 1967 the migration 
movement became highly selective within some age groups. 
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Table 2.9 
Survivorship ratio (%) of selected cohorts (1967-1982). 
Age in No. of people Remained in *Survival Age in 
1967 at the end of 1982 rates (%) 1982 
1967 (thousands) 
(thousands) 
12 3(2/1 x 100) 
10-14 82.0 53.3 65.0 25-29 
15-19 52.5 24.7 47.0 30-34 
20-24 38.5 22.0 57.1 35-39 
25-29 29.3 21.4 73.0 40-44 
30-34 29.2 23.2 79.5 45-49 
*Calculated by the researcher t x 100 
t-n 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1984. 
According to Table 2.10, sex ratios reveal 
deficiences in the registration of females in the age 
groups 15 years and under. This is found frequently in 
Arab countries. 
Table 2.10 shows the higher percentage of males in 
1985 found in the age groups 0-29. Sex ratios show peak 
male dominance in the age band 15-19 years in 1985. The 
situation is reversed in the age group 35-39, when the 
proportion of females become higher. The sex ratio of men 
to 100 women reaches 63.1 in the age group 35-44. 
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Table 2.10 
Population structure by sex and age, 1967,1985 (1,000s). 
AGE GROUP *1967 **1985 
Female Male Total Female Male Total 
0-4 56.0 51.2 107.2 72.7 75.3 148.0 
5-9 52.0 46.9 98.9 58.5 63.1 121.6 
10-14 44.4 37.6 82.0 48.2 52.1 100.3 
15-19 26.9 25.6 52.5 43.1 48.2 91.3 
20-24 16.4 22.1 38.5 41.1 43.1 84.2 
25-29 11.6 17.7 29.3 31.2 32.1 63.3 
30-34 12.7 16.5 29.2 17.0 16.1 33.1 
35-39 11.4 16.8 28.2 13.0 8.2 21.2 
40-44 11.3 14.3 25.6 13.0 8.2 21.2 
45-49 8.5 8.8 17.3 12.0 9.0 22.0 
50-54 7.5 9.2 16.7 13.0 9.0 22.0 
55-59 6.5 5.2 11.7 12.2 9.0 21.0 
60-64 9.2 9.9 19.1 7.9 7.1 15.0 
65+ 22.4 20.0 44.4 15.5 14.5 30.0 
TOTAL 297.0 301.6 598.6 398.4 395.0 793.4 
Source: *Population census in administrative territories, 
1967, Jerusalem, 1968. 
**Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 37, 
Jerusalem, 1986. 
When compared with data from 1967, the data indicates 
that the percentage of males in the early age groups (up to 
the 15-19 cohorts) is high, but the peak ratio of 118.1 
occurs in the age group 10-14. The percentage of women 
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relative to the total population appears to use from the 
20-24 age group. The big differences between the number of 
males and females which were found in the age group 25-29 
years may be due to the large number of males in this age 
group who emigrated directly after the 1967 war. 
The impact of population structure on the socio- 
economic conditions in the West Bank is represented here by 
the dependency ratio. Using the data in Table 2.10 makes 
it possible to calculate this ratio. This well known and 
frequently used ratio is an index relating the number of 
children under the age of 15 and the population aged 65 and 
over to the population of working age (15-64). 
Table 2.11 indicates that the dependency ratio in 
1967 and 1972 were very high as a result of heavy 
emigration of the working age population. After 1972 when 
the number of emigrants moderated, a steady decline in the 
dependency ratio occurred. The rate in the 1980's became 
around 100. However, the dependency ratio is only a 
theoretical measure of the economic potential of a 
population. There are many factors which affect the actual 
as opposed to the theoretical dependency ratio. These 
include: 
1. The high level of fertility which seems to increase the 
ratio of the population under 15 years of age to the 
rest of the population. 
2. The infant mortality rate. Reductions in the IMR mean 
more surviving infants and therefore more children. 
3. Demand for higher education. Increased demand reduces 
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the proportion of the population entering the labour 
market at an early age. Thus the number of adults 
actually in waged employment may be much smaller than 
indicated by the dependency ratio (that is to say the 
true level of dependency is higher than indicated by 
the statistics). 
4. Women's participation rates. The low ratio of women 
participating in the West Bank labour market as a 
result of cultural values and norms, reducing the de 
facto size of the West Bank labour force and hence 
increases the true ratio of dependents to waged 
employees or actively employed. 
Table 2.11 
Dependency ratios in the West Bank (1967-1985). 
1967 1972 1977 1982 1983 1985 
*Dependency 
Ratio 124.4 119.7 106.8 101.4 100.1 101.6 
*Calculated by researcher from Table 2.10 
2.4.4. Migration 
Many forms of migration have left their scars on the 
West Bank population. Perhaps the first impact worth 
noting was when 250,000-280,000 refugees settled in the 
West Bank after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 
(Sabatello, 1983). Subsequently migration started to 
redistribute the West Bank population to other neighbouring 
countries. The size of these migration movements was 
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considerable and is reflected in the low net growth rate of 
the West Bank population. The West Bank population 
increased on average by 60,000 people in the period 1952- 
1967, with an annual growth rate not exceeding 0.53% 
(Kossaifi, 1985). 
One may conclude from Table 2.5 that the emigration 
movement in the early 1960's was more than that of the 
1950's, as reflected in net annual growth rates. The 
average net migration per annum has been estimated as 28 
per thousand for the period 1952-1961. This rate increased 
for the period 1961-1967 to reach 32 per thousand. 
Initially in the early 1950's the migration process 
was highly selective in terms of age and sex; men 
outnumbered women and young men outnumbered those over 40 
years of age. During the 1960's there was an increasing 
trend towards reuniting families (Sabatello, 1983). 
In the aftermath of 1967 it has been estimated that 
one fifth of the West Bank population emigrated to Jordan 
(about 150,000) (Kossaifi, 1985). Jordanian sources have 
estimated an influx of 177,000 between June and September 
1967. As a result of these migrations the size of the West 
Bank population in 1970 was considered to be only 
equivalent to the total population of Arabs in Palestine in 
1922. 
Emigration from the West Bank continued from 1968 
until 1986 as shown in Table 2.6, but at a smaller scale. 
As a result of emigration the annual growth of the West 
Bank population under Israeli occupation for the period 
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1967-1986 was about 2.1% as compared with 0.55% during the 
Jordanian period (1952-1967). 
Several phases of West Bank emigration can be 
distinguished during the Israeli period of occupation as 
indicated in Table 2.6. 
- The first phase covers the period between September 1967 
until the end of 1968, when about 30,000 left the West 
Bank, in addition to 180,000 refugees who departed directly 
after the war and before the carrying out of the Israeli 
census of September, 1967. The pattern of emigration 
during this period can be described as family migration 
because a large proportion of emigrants wanted to avoid 
permanent separation from relatives and breadwinners 
already living abroad. Kossaifi (1985) indicated that 
81% of those who emigrated during the period 1967-1972 were 
children under 15 years of age. The Kuwaiti census in 1975 
indicated that the proportion of Palestinians and 
Jordanians under 15 years of age in Kuwait increased from 
35.3% in 1965 to 50.4% in 1970. Also the proportion of 
elders over 65 years of age increased from 0.5% to 0.7% in 
the same period. 
- The second phase covers the period 1969-1974. This 
period was characterised by low emigration. The annual 
average net migration was about 2,700 people. The reason 
for such a decline in emigration included: - 
1. In 1968, Israel and Jordan agreed to the opening of 
bridges between the East (Jordan) and the West (West 
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Bank) to regulate the Palestinian movements and the 
West Bank flow of goods and produce. This policy 
eliminated the danger of permanent separation like that 
which had occurred after the 1948 war. The "open 
bridges" policy still exists today, although some 
restrictions are imposed on the movement of young 
people. Thus, the economic motives (pull and push 
factors) from inside and outside the area became the 
main reasons for migration. 
2. The Israeli labour market was open to Arab workers from 
the occupied territories. After 1967, Israeli 
authorities allowed only a small number of Arab workers 
to work inside Israel. By 1969, the Israeli government 
relaxed most of the restrictions on Arab workers 
movement to Israel. This movement was encouraged by 
the fact that the wages in Israel were much higher than 
those in local labour markets and in Jordan. 
3. The repeated conflicts between the Jordanian army and 
Palestinian guerillas in 1969 and 1970. had adverse 
effects on emigration levels. 
4. The decline in job opportunities in Jordan after 1967 
was followed by the Jordanian Civil war of 1970. 
- The third phase involved a return to high net 
emigration. This phase covers the period 1975-1982, when 
about 13,000 people left the West Bank annually. The 
pattern of emigration in this period can be described once 
again as highly selective in terms of age and sex. Reasons 
behind the high waves of emigration included: - 
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1. The high demand for labourers in Arab oil countries 
after the 1973 and 1979 increase in oil prices. 
2. The Jordanian government started a new development plan 
in 1973, which created a lot of job opportunities. 
3. The crisis in the Israeli economy after the 1973 war, 
followed by the weakness of the Israeli currency, and 
high inflation rates especially in the early 1980's 
reduced the attraction of the Israeli labour market. 
Since 1974, the Israeli currency has continuously lost 
its value against major world currencies (Mansour, 
1988). Inflation rose from 37.9% in 1975 to reach 
373.8% in 1984 (Shadid, 1988). 
- The fourth phase has been characterised by a modest net 
emigration rate. The average net migration rate during the 
period 1983-1986 was about 4,500 people annually. The 
reduction in West Bank emigration can be explained by many 
factors. 
1. The decrease in oil revenues in the mid 1980's led to a 
drop in new job opportunities in the Gulf State (Abed, 
1988). 
2. Compulsory military service in Jordan prevented younger 
workers and students from residing or working 
in 
Jordan. This led Jordan to introduce new measures in 
order to curb movements out of the West Bank 
(Abed, 
1988). 
3. There was a general scarcity of job opportunities 
in 
Jordan in the 1980's. 
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4. The Israeli authorities imposed a lot of restrictions 
on youth movements from the West Bank. 
Data on patterns of emigration from the West Bank 
(i. e. from different parts of the West Bank) are scarce and 
unreliable. There are signs that there has been faster 
population growth in the southern West Bank districts 
(Hebron and Bethlehem) than in the northern West Bank 
districts (Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarem) (Benvinisti, 1986). 
The differences in population growth between districts do 
not seem to be the result of differential fertility levels, 
but reflect emigration patterns. Most West Bank emigrants 
from the north settled in the Gulf states while people from 
the south and middle West Bank preferred to emigrate to 
North America (Kossaifi, 1985). Opportunities for the 
latter migration movement have been more constrained and 
consequently have produced a differential emigration 
pattern. 
2.4.5 Labour force 
West Bankers have in the past coped with the problem 
of their limited job market by seeking employment either in 
the East Bank (Jordan) or in other countries. Since 1967, 
a considerable number of people from the West Bank have 
also accepted work inside Israel. 
In the first year of Israeli occupation, the Israeli 
government allowed only a limited number of people to work 
inside Israel's labour market. The number of Arabs in the 
West Bank who worked inside Israel did not exceed 5,000 
people in 1968. According to Israeli Central Bureau of 
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Statistics the total number of West Bank workers who worked 
inside Israel in 1970 was about 14,700. This number 
equalled only 13% of the total amount of manpower in the 
West Bank. In 1975, the total number increased 
dramatically to reach 40,000. This number constituted 
about one third of the total labour force. After 1975 
there was a slight increase in the number, when it reached 
47,500 by 1985, while the proportion of West Bank workers 
who worked inside Israel did not change significantly and 
remained around 30% of the total labour force between 1975- 
1985 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1987). 
In 1982 about 43,000 people from the West Bank were 
officially employed in Israel, in addition to an estimated 
20,000 unregistered workers. Moreover, 15,000 Arabs from 
East Jerusalem worked in West Jerusalem (the original 
Israeli part) or inside Israel, while about another 15,000 
people worked for Israeli contractors inside the West Bank, 
especially in the construction sector (Hochstein, 1983). 
Since 1967 the West Bank has effectively provided a 
pool of unskilled or semi-skilled workers for Israel. Over 
half of the West Bankers who work inside Israel are working 
in the construction sectors. They consistitute about 18% 
of the total number of people employed in construction and 
public work in Israel (Abu-Lughod, 1982). 
The labour force participation rate during the period 
1968 to 1985 has not exceeded 35%, while the labour force 
participation of Jewish people has climbed to reach 50% in 
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1983 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1984). In Jordan, 
the 1982 participation rate reached 42% (Ministry of 
Labour, 1983). The reasons behind the low participation 
rate from the West Bank may include: 
1. Workers emigration from the West Bank to Jordan and 
other Arab oil countries, particularly from skilled and 
semi-skilled workers. 
2. The scarcity of female job opportunities. Therefore, 
it is expected that the women's participation in the 
labour force in the West Bank is less than that in 
Jordan. The proportion of working women or those 
seeking employment is about 13% (Abu-Shokor, 1987). 
3. The proportion of women in the labour force in both 
Jordan and the West Bank is lower than that in Israel 
as a result of cultural norms and religious teaching. 
4. The proportion of young people under the age of 15 in 
Jordan and the West Bank is higher than that in Israel 
as a result of higher fertility levels. 
5. There has been an increase in the proportion of 
children and young people attending schools and 
universities. The proportion of the population who 
attended post school education (universities and 
colleges) increased from 0.9% in 1970 to 10.1% in 1985. 
The increase for women was from 0.5% to 6.6% for the 
same period (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986). 
Table 2.12 indicates that the labour force itself 
increased from 93,000 in 1968 to 159,200 in 1985, an 
absolute increase of 66,200 (71.2%), compared with the 
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Jordanian rate of increase of 95% in the same period, which 
gives an indication of the impact of emigration on the 
labour force. 
The poor performance of the West Bank economy as a 
result of lack of investment, lack of resources and the 
confiscation of large areas of agricultural land by the 
Israeli authorities for military and Jewish settlement 
purposes made the West Bank labour market incapable of 
offering job opportunities, at least with the same level of 
wages offered by the Israeli labour market. 
Table 2.12 shows that the size of the employed labour 
force inside the West Bank increased by only 4,000 workers 
per annum over the past 14 years. This phenomenon can 
easily be explained by high rates of labour emigration and 
a large number of West Bank workers inside Israel. Table 
2.13 indicates a significant shift from the productive 
sector to the services. For example, the number of 
employees in the agricultural sector declined by 30% 
between 1970-1984. This decline could be due to several 
factors, such as the confiscation of agricultural land, 
relatively high wages in the Israeli labour market provided 
to unskilled people and water resources which are 
controlled by Israeli's national water company "Mekorot". 
The industrial sector stagnated as a result of 
skilled emigration, competition with Israeli production, 
high taxes and a low level of investment in this sector. 
Therefore, the number of employees in this sector did not 
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substantially change. In contrast with that the number of 
employees in services increased by 33.6% during this period 
(1970-1984). 
Table 2.13 
Distribution of employment in the West Bank, by economic 
sector (1970-1984). 
1970 1975 1980 1983 1984 
Total (thousand) 99.9 91.9 94.3 99.0 104 
Agriculture 42.4 31.8 31.3 29.2 29.6 
Industry 14.6 14.5 14.3 16.0 16.5 
Construction 8.4 7.7 10.1 10.9 11.8 
Services 34.5 37.9 38.6 43.0 46.1 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1985, p725. 
It is possible to suggest a theoretical model of West 
Bank labour movement since 1967. This model could be 
developed through further research and with the 
availability of more reliable data. As already discussed 
the West Bank operates as a reservoir of skilled, semi- 
skilled and unskilled labour force. The incapability of 
the West Bank labour market to provide jobs for the 
available all manpower has, therefore, resulted in large 
segments of labour being tapped by the Israeli market while 
segments have become migrant labour to Jordan and other 
countries. 
The Israeli labour market has attracted unskilled 
and, to some extent, semi-skilled labour with better wages 
compared with the income offered in the local market 
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(Sabatello, 1983). Abu-Shokor (1987) found that 77% of all 
employees in Israel were aged between 16 and 35, and about 
37% of the total number were first time entrants to the 
labour market. He also found that only 7% of workers had 
attained more than secondary education. Thus it is easy to 
conclude that most West Bank labourers in Israel were 
unskilled and semi-skilled. 
It is difficult to obtain separate data from 
Jordanian resources about West Bankers working in Jordan, 
simply because they are regarded as Jordanian citizens. 
However, it would seem likely that most emigrants from the 
West Bank who migrate to Jordan are: - 
1. Skilled people with a higher level of education. These 
people lack the experience to work in the Gulf States 
and did not find suitable jobs in the West Bank, or 
refused to work as a blue collar workers inside Israel. 
2. Semi-skilled people who found good opportunities to 
work in Jordan, especially in the construction sector. 
Some of these migrants came directly from the West Bank 
labour market while others came after a spell employed in 
the Israeli labour market. Most of them hope to gain 
experience in order to later obtain a job in the Arab oil 
countries. 
The high salaries and wages offered in the Gulf 
States have attracted Palestinians, even though access to 
this desirable labour market is highly constrained. Many 
Gulf employers demand not only work experience but also 
insist that an employee must be single or come on a 
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batchelor status contract. 
Figure 2.5: West Bank labour Movement model. 
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The Kuwaiti census in 1975 indicated that 44% of the 
employed "Jordanian and Palestinian" workforce were 
professional people in high management level jobs and 26.7% 
held other administrative jobs. 
Return migration from the Gulf states started to 
increase in the early 1980's and has increased almost every 
year since. Most return migrants have preferred to 
resettle in Jordan where the opportunities to have suitable 
jobs and investments are greater than in the West Bank. 
This is especially true amongst skilled workers. 
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2.4.6 Jewish settlements in the West Bank 
Following the occupation of the West Bank, Israel 
embarked on a policy of colonial settlement in the occupied 
territories (West Bank, Gaza strip, Golan Heights, Sinai). 
A series of military settlements established along the 
Jordan Valley in 1968, were followed in 1969 by a number of 
civilian agricultural settlements (Harris, 1980). At first 
the civilian settlements were planned by a number of 
agencies and extremely religious groups with little co- 
ordination or agreement between them. 
Pressure groups brought about the establishment of 
new settlements, many of which were in existence long 
before any planning approval or building permission had 
been granted. The Israeli government did not reject or 
revise the action of these agencies. 
In the early 1980's circumstances changed, the major 
settlement agencies agreed to produce a master plan for the 
West Bank to be approved and supported by the government 
(Hochstein, 1983). In 1979 the Israeli government 
recognised and accepted by all the settlements which had 
been previously established (Rowley, 1984). 
The main elements of the master plan were as 
follows: - 
1. Planners approved an average population growth rate of 
5-7.5% in these forecasts. The Jewish settler 
population numbered 120,000 in 1980 (including 
Jerusalem) but was projected to increase to reach 
600,000-800,000 people by the year 2010. 
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2. The plan attempted to increase the Jewish population in 
the West Bank from 2.8% of the total West Bank 
population in 1982 to 27-42% by 2010. 
3. An extensive road network was proposed across the West 
Bank, linking all the settlements to each other and to 
Jerusalem. 
4. Extensive agriculture and industrial developments were 
to be promoted to provide employment for the Jewish 
settlers. 
The main aim of this plan was clear; firstly, to 
bring a large Jewish population into the West Bank and 
secondly, to ensure a wide distribution of Jewish 
settlements and population in order to change the 
demographic and strategic geography of the area. 
The Israeli authorities confiscated all the land 
which had been at the disposal of the Jordanian government. 
By the middle of 1980 more than half of all West Bank land 
had been expropriated. The area exceeded one million 
donums (Abed, 1988). Also the Israeli government 
confiscated 328,789 donums of land from absentees who had 
fled abroad when the 1967 war broke out. Also, 21,000 
donums were expropriated in the Jerusalem area and its 
environs. These figures exclude the area which the 
occupying forces had fenced off for military purposes 
(Kossaifi, 1980). 
Table 2.14 shows the increase in Jewish settlers in 
the West Bank from early 1970's until 1986. The number of 
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Jewish settlers in the West Bank increased by less than 
1,200 in 1972 to 10,000 by the end of 1979. The average 
growth rate of Jewish settlers was 7.5% for this period, 
while the average growth rate for all of the period (1972- 
1986) was about 50%. It can also be noted from the table 
that the total increase in Jewish settlers from 1972 until 
1979 equals half the total increase in the year 1984. The 
proportion of the Jewish population inside the West Bank 
increased from less than 0.2% in 1972 and reached more than 
7% in 1986. 
The differences in the Jewish population growth rate 
in the West Bank in the 1970's and 1980's reflects the 
differences in the settlement strategy of the two main 
political parties (Labour and Likud). When the Likud party 
gained power in 1977, about 17 colonial settlements were 
established in the West Bank. Between 1977 and the end of 
1978, a further 8 were already being founded by religious 
groups (Rowley, 1984). 
The establishment and expansion of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank meant that West Bank Arab 
farmers and bedouin nomads have been continually subjected 
to land expropriation and the seizure of their livestock. 
For example, two Israeli settlements (Mehola and Argaman) 
were constructed on 13,100 donums confiscated from the two 
neighbouring Arab villages of Bardala and Marj Najeh 
(Matar, 1984). 
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Table 2.14 
Jewish settlers in the West Bank (1972-1986). 
YEAR TOTAL 
NUMBER 
ABSOLUTE 
INCREASE 
PERCENTAGE OF 
THE TOTAL ARAB 
POPULATION 
1972 1182 - 0.19 
1973 1514 332 0.23 
1974 2019 505 0.30 
1975 2581 562 0.38 
1976 3176 595 0.46 
1977 5023 1847 0.72 
1978 7361 2383 1.00 
1979 10000 2369 1.40 
1980 12424 2424 1.70 
1981 16119 3695 2.20 
1982 21000 4881 2.80 
1983 27500 6500 3.60 
1984 44146 16546 5.60 
1985 52960 8814 6.70 
1986 60480 7540 7.20 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1987, No. 38, 
Jerusalem. 
Figure 2.6 shows the Israeli settlement distribution 
over the West Bank. It is clear from the map that most 
Israeli settlements are concentrated in the Jerusalem area 
which was formally annexed after the 1967 occupation and 
linked to West Jerusalem (the Israeli side), they are also 
spread across Jordan Valley for agriculture and military 
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purposes. 
Figure 2.6: Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
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The annual average growth rate of Jewish settlers in 
the West Bank during the period 1972-1986 was 3.34%, while 
the annual growth rate for the Arabs in the West Bank was 
only 2.13% in the same period. It is to be expected that 
since 1986 the growth of Jewish settlers in the West Bank 
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will show a further remarkable increase as a result of the 
following factors: 
1. Government corroboration with the settlement policy in 
the occupied territories. 
2. Government financial support to the settlers to provide 
settlement construction. The total expenditure in 
establishing and maintaining these settlements 
was estimated in mid 1985 to be more than 2 billion 
dollars (Abed, 1988). 
3. Serious attempts by the Israeli government to absorb 
Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe and resettle them in the occupied territories. 
4. The increasing influence of right wing and religious 
groups within the government. 
5. The increase in the number of settlements and the size 
of the Jewish population in the West Bank is expected 
to have a negative effect on Arab population growth by 
forcing West Bankers to leave the West Bank. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has presented an overview of the basic 
features of demographic development of the Palestinian 
people from the beginning of this century, under three 
different regimes: The British mandate, the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and Israel. The political situation 
has played a great role in shaping and reshaping the West 
Bank population. The first dramatic change in the West 
Bank population came in 1948 following the declaration of 
the State of Israel, when about 250,000-300,000 were forced 
118 
to leave their homes and settle in U. N. established refugee 
camps in the West Bank. 
The West Bank's limited resources encouraged male 
youths to seek employment in the East Bank (Jordan) and 
other Arab and foreign countries. This type of migration 
has affected the population size, the age and sex structure 
and socio economic development level in the West Bank. The 
population size remained almost stable during the Jordanian 
period (1950-1967). 
Once again after the 1967 war, there was an exodus of 
about one fifth of the West Bank population. Further 
emigration in the 20 years which followed left the West 
Bank population in 1984 at a lower level than that of 1967 
prior to the Israeli take over. 
The migration of West Bankers has largely been a 
result of the Israeli policy in the occupied territories, 
which appears to have sought to create a vacuum in the West 
Bank in order to make way for Jewish settlers (Abu-Lughod, 
1982). To evaluate the Israeli occupation role, it is 
important to summarize the repercussions of Israeli 
occupation on the West Bank and its population in terms of 
the following factors: 
1. Israeli labour market. Arab youth working in Israel 
has had a negative effect on West Bank development by 
attracting students, farmers and skilled workers away 
from the West Bank and making the West Bank economy 
more dependent on Israel. On the other hand the 
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Israeli labour market reduced the unemployment rate, 
and reduced the migration level to other countries. It 
also increased, to some extent, family income and 
living standards in the West Bank which ultimately has 
had some effect on demographic trends. 
2. Jerusalem's annexation. Following the 1967 occupation, 
the Israeli authorities formally annexed Arab East 
Jerusalem and considered it as part of their capital. 
The East Jerusalem area included more than 120,000 
inhabitants in 1985. 
3. Establishment of Israeli settlements. After the 
occupation, Israel adopted a policy of establishing 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The number and 
size of these settlements increased in the late 1970's 
in an attempt to change the demographic features of the 
West Bank population. This factor may be regarded as 
one of the important reasons for the Palestinian 
uprising. 
4. West Bank migration. Israel does not allow West 
Bankers from outside the territories to return to their 
motherland unless they hold an Israeli military 
identity card. This is very hard, if not impossible, 
to obtain. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present the methodological 
procedures and techniques implemented in this study. More 
specifically, this chapter will discuss the following 
aspects: - 
1. Research problem. 
2. Objectives of the study. 
3. Hypothesis. 
4. Research design. 
5. The questionnaire (Interview schedule). 
6. The survey. 
7. The statistical techniques and methods of analysis. 
3.2 Research problem 
The West Bank population has witnessed a dramatic 
change since 1948 as a result of the prolonged Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In the aftermath of 1967, the West Bank came 
under Israeli control. Since then the Israeli authorities 
have shown little concern for the West Bank's socio- 
economic development, although they have not been slow to 
draw on aspects of the areas physical and human resources 
to assist with the development of Israel itself. 
There is a lack of accurate data on the population of 
the West Bank. Since the beginning of the occupation only 
one census has been carried out. It is believed that the 
main motives behind this census were political. Annual 
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estimates for the West Bank population have, however, been 
published in the Statistical Abstract of Israel. In most 
cases there are contradictions in the data used by 
different Israeli sources (Sabatello, 1983). The Israeli 
data for the West Bank population are inadequate and may be 
an unreliable and misleading source of information (Hill, 
1983; McDowall, 1989). The Israeli authorities have in 
addition denied Arab researchers access to various 
publications on the West Bank population with the exception 
of the statistical Abstract of Israel, making deeper 
evaluation of demographic issues difficult. 
Immediately after the occupation, Israeli authorities 
adopted several measures towards the evacuation of 
Palestinians from their lands. Some of these measures 
include land confiscation, seizing natural resources, 
encouraging Jewish settlement inside the occupied 
territories, denying the Arabs the right to return to their 
homes and encouraging the Arabs to leave the occupied 
territories by various kinds of pressure (Abu-Lughod, 1982; 
Harris, 1980; McDowall, 1989; Matar, 1984). The fertility 
levels of the Palestinians and their attitudes towards 
fertility has become a critical issue. The researcher 
believes that the demographic struggle will remain a 
decisive factor in any future Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
hence merits further research work. 
Most studies of developing countries, including the 
World Fertility Survey, reveal a decline in fertility 
122 
levels and changes in attitudes towards having large 
families. This decline is attributed to government 
population policies, modernisation and the effects of the 
development process, and couples changing aspirations and 
socio-economic considerations concerning their desire to 
have children (Coward, 1986). Numerous studies using 
different approaches have attempted to explain the factors 
that cause variations in fertility levels and rates of 
fertility decline. So far, none of the studies have given 
adequate explanation of the reasons behind fertility 
changes. For example Clarke (1985) found that most Islamic 
countries including the Arab ones have experienced little 
demographic transition despite the differences in socio- 
economic status, development level and cultural values 
between these countries. 
3.3 Objectives of the study 
In the 1960s and 1970s fertility in most Arab 
countries did not decline much despite the substantial 
reductions in mortality rates and the effects of socio- 
economic development processes. Fargues (1989) has shown 
that as a result Arab growth rates rose constantly until 
the early 1980s. In the 1980s, however, in some Arab 
countries such as Algeria significant drops in Total 
Fertility Rate did occur, leading to the expectation that 
fertility levels in other parts of the Arab World would 
seen experience similar reductions. One might anticipate 
that fertility levels in the West Bank would follow the 
same trends as those of most other Arab countries but with 
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there being always some fertility differential. This 
differential, like that between Catholics and Protestants 
in N. Ireland (Compton and Coward, 1989) might be assumed 
to reflect the more favourable attitudes towards having 
large families which arises out of the region's unusual 
(unfortunate) political situation. 
In order to improve the understanding of fertility 
trends and the effect of fertility attitudes on actual 
fertility behaviour in the West Bank, this study examined 
and analysed West Bank couples attitudes towards current 
and future fertility behaviour. In order to achieve this 
general objective, this study investigates the following 
issues: 
1. The effect of cultural norms on couple's childbearing 
behaviour and attitudes. 
2. The changes in marital circumstances, such as age at 
marriage and marriage between relatives, as an 
influence on actual childbearing behaviour. 
3. The extent to which the perceived costs and benefits of 
having children influence motives, desires, attitudes 
and decisions towards childbearing behaviour. 
4. Gender preference and its influence on family size and 
the efficient use of contraceptives. 
5. The use of desired family size as a reliable measure 
for predicting any changes in future fertility 
6. The differences between "ideal" and "desired" family 
size 
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7. The relationship between desired family size and actual 
fertility behaviour. Is there any interrelation 
between them? 
8. The childbearing decision making process and its effect 
on fertility attitudes. 
3.4 Hypotheses 
In light of objectives outlined above and in the 
context of the literature review some working hypotheses 
emerged for analysing. From the literature review it 
seemed reasonable to hypothesize, that in the West Bank, as 
elsewhere in the world, a couple's attitude to fertility 
would vary in relation to the couple's age, education 
level, family income, the child mortality rate, the level 
of women's participation in the labour force and the 
location of residence. It was hypothesized that desired 
family size would reflect a couple's attitude towards their 
demand for children and could be used as an effective 
measure for future fertility prediciton, especially if 
couples had the capability to implement their decisions 
through efficient contraceptive use. 
In some respects specific to either Arab culture or 
the West Bank, are a number of hypotheses, which in the 
statistical sense of the word, might differentiate 
fertility behaviour in this region from that in other parts 
of the world. While the researcher was unable within the 
scope of this study to undertake a cross-national study, he 
did investigate the validity or otherwise of the following 
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hypotheses for couples in the West Bank: 
1. Male attitudes with regard to childbearing behaviour 
are much more influential than female attitudes. 
2. Husbands prefer more children than their wives. 
3. Women are more willing than men to use contraceptives 
and to regulate childbirth. 
4. Strong marital relationships and effective 
communication between partners may bridge the gap 
between partners in terms of their individual 
preferences, and may also reduce the differences 
between actual and desired family size. 
5. Child gender preference is an obstacle to the 
achievement of a couple's plans with regard to the 
number of children desired. 
6. As a result of changes in family structure and the 
shift from agricultural activities to other economic 
sectors, parents will have less influence on the 
childbearing behaviour of the next generation. 
7. Couples are likely to wish that their sons will have 
fewer children than they have had, or desired to have. 
8. Changes in marriage pattern and age at marriage for 
both male and female have a substantial effect on 
childbearing behaviour. 
9. The cost and benefit of children plays a less important 
role in determining the couple's childbearing decision 
by comparison with cultural norms and values. 
10. The average desired family size is expected to be less 
than the average ideal family size. 
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3.5 Research design 
The main purpose of the field work was to obtain 
reliable answers to the research questions listed above 
through the application of social science research methods. 
The researcher tried, within the constraints imposed on 
anyone working in the West Bank to follow standard field 
research methods in order to maximise the utility of the 
survey findings. 
Primary data were collected by the researcher between 
July and November, 1988 through a suite of surveys in the 
West Bank. The area was divided into four different 
environments for the purposes of the research. These 
environments represented the different physical-cultural 
and socio-economic conditions of the region. They 
included: 
1) The rural environment. Rural areas are mostly occupied 
by small size population of peasants in each location 
(village). These villages are characterised by strong 
and cohesive family ties and structure. The vast 
majority of the population, including women and 
children, work on their own farms. As far as their 
life style is concerned, they are less receptive to 
social change and are characterised by traditional ways 
of life. 
2) Town environment. The people of this environment enjoy 
a combination of rural and urban life styles. Apart 
from agricultural work, they are engaged in other 
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activities and services such as the running of small 
firms, enterprises and local shops. In the town, one 
can find secondary schools, clinics and health centres. 
Modern transportation between these areas and urban 
centres is widely available. The town environment was 
represented in the survey by households selected from 
towns and large villages. 
3) Modern environment. This environment is dominated by 
an urban lifestyle. This kind of environment is found 
mainly in large cities like Nablus and Jerusalem. It 
was noted, however, that urban culture is not 
homogenous because of factors such as internal 
migration, variations in family income between areas in 
a city and different levels of socio-economic 
development. Therefore, for the purpose of the study, 
it was important to cover a range of city social 
classes as represented by low, middle and upper class 
communities. 
4) Refugee camps. This environment consists of refugee 
camps and represents a whole different pattern of 
social life. The people of this environment were 
forced to leave their homes and area of birth after the 
1948 Arab-Israeli war. The majority of the refugees 
work as menial labourers and live in poor economic and 
housing conditions. 
3.6 Sample selection 
The author's sample was drawn from the various 
environments as follows. 
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(1) The urban environment was represented by Nablus city. 
Nablus is the West Bank's largest, most industrial and most 
important commercial city. Nablus is home to more than 
60,000 people. For the purpose of this study a total of 
300 households were chosen equally from the city's three 
main social classes, as defined by Nablus City Chamber of 
Commerce. According to this classification the city is 
divided into several quarters based on socio-economic 
considerations. In the circumstances of the occupied 
territories, statistically random or stratified sampling 
was considered impossible. Instead purposive samples were 
taken from three different quarters. These were chosen to 
represent the different social classes after consultation 
and advice from people in the department of regional 
planning and development. The three quarters included: - 
a) Al-Kassaba quarter (Nablus old city) from which 100 
households were selected. 
b) Al-Jabal Al-Shamali. This represents the middle class 
from which 100 households were chosen. 
c) A1-Makhfiahi which represents the upper class (the 
richest area in the city). Again, 100 households were 
selected. 
(2) Small villages. A total of 5 villages in Nablus 
district were selected randomly. The criteria used for 
determining and selecting these villages were: 
(a) population size (less than 1500 inhabitants), and 
(b) settlements administered by a local chief (Mukhtar). 
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Figure 3.1: Location map of survey areas. 
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Nearly all the households in these villages were involved 
in the survey. The sub-sample was distributed as follows: 
a) Rameen - 70 households. 
b) Salim - 62 households. 
c) Beit Emreen - 79 households. 
d) Al-libban - 76 households. 
e) Qusseen - 35 households. 
(3) Towns. Two towns, Asira Al-Shamalieha and Tubas were 
selected to represent this level in the settlement 
hierarchy. The criteria used for the selection of the 
towns were (a) the towns must be inhabited by 5 to 20 
thousand residents, (b) the towns must be administrated by 
town council, and (c) a total of 150 households were 
selected randomly from two quarters of each town. 
(4) Refugee camps. A total of 100 households were chosen, 
and were divided equally between Ain Beit Elma and Balata 
refugee camp. The households, however, were selected from 
the centre of these camps, in order to avoid Israeli check 
and observation points. 
The survey was designed to represent as closely as 
possible the population distribution across the West Bank 
settlement system. About two thirds of the West Bank 
population live in rural areas (small villages and towns) 
and about one tenth of the total population live in refugee 
camps. Figure 3.1 shows the location of the areas in which 
the survey was conducted. 
3.7 Questionnaire 
A structured questionnaire was devised in a manner 
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that would provide an optimum level of information. A 
number of questions may appear repetitious, but these 
questions serve the purpose of gauging the reliability of 
the responses. 
Two types of questionnaire were constructed by the 
researcher. The first was designed to obtain data from the 
husbands, while the second was designed to gather data from 
the wives. The questionnaires contain many similar 
questions with regards to couple's attitudes towards family 
size preference. The questions were selected to be 
pertinent, easy and quick to answer. In many of the 
questions a list of alternative answers were provided. 
However, in order to make sure that no vital information or 
opinions were missed out, many of the questions ended with 
an alternative "other - specify" category, where 
respondents were asked to furnish their own answers. On 
the other hand ambiguous, embarassing and sensitive 
questions were avoided. 
In designing the questionnaire, the questions which 
were thought to be of most interest to respondents were 
placed at the beginning of the interview schedule. It was 
believed that such an approach would attract respondents to 
the study and therefore increase the response rates. 
The questionnaire contained three main sections. 
They were: 
1) General background. Questions under this heading were 
designed to gather information on household members such as 
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household size, relation to the head of household, age, 
sex, level of education, work status and religion. 
2) Husbands' attitudes. This section was designed to 
gather data from the husbands. The information included 
questions about family structure, house characteristics, 
family income, family possessions, attitudes towards 
marriage, childbearing behaviour, decision making and his 
preference towards family size and gender. 
3) Wives' attitudes. This section contained questions 
about womens work and marriage attitudes, current 
fertility, childbearing behaviour, desired family size, 
gender preference, decision making, family planning and 
attitudes towards the use of contraceptives. 
A sample questionnaire is included as an Appendix of 
this thesis. 
3.8 Interview staff 
Three students (a male and two females) from the 
Sociology Department at An-Najah University (Nablus) were 
recruited by the researcher to help in the data collection. 
They were briefed on most of the conceivable administrative 
and circumstantial difficulties which they might encounter 
during the survey. The students were informed of the 
purpose of the study as well as the way of conducting 
interviews. 
The research assistants along with the researcher 
were grouped into two equal teams, of which each included 
one female. The male in each team was assigned the 
responsibility of interviewing husbands, while the females 
133 
were in charge of interviewing female respondents. As far 
as conducting the interviews, it is worth pointing out 
that respondents from the same household were interviewed 
separately and away from one another, (in separate rooms). 
The main reasons behind the recruitment of the 
research staff were: 
1) The large size of the sample. It was believed that 
conducting a survey of this size, especially during the 
Palestinian uprising, "Intifada", would take a long time if 
the researcher chose to do it alone. 
2) Females find it much easier to gain entry into Arab 
homes. Some Arab families are very conservative and female 
interviewers on their own sometimes find it difficult to 
gain entry, especially at times when husbands are away from 
the home. 
3) Due to the nature of the study, it was believed that 
female respondents would be more willing to co-operate with 
female interviewers especially when seeking information 
about private and personal issues. 
4) Wives may feel more at ease in the presence of another 
woman, even when they agree to be interviewed by a male. 
3.9 Pilot study 
Once the questionnaire was translated into Arabic, a 
pre-test of the questionnaire was carried out between 20th 
June and 3rd July, 1988. This covered 50 households as 
follows: 
1) Small villages - 10 households. 
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2) Towns - 10 households. 
3) Nablus City - 21 households (7 households from each 
class). 
4) Refugee camps -9 households. 
The pilot study was conducted with the aid of the 
assistants employed by the researcher. Prior to their 
actual participation they underwent theoretical and 
intensive training. Theoretical training included 
information as to how the interviewer should present 
him/herself to the respondents and the proper way to ask 
questions and record data. 
The results emerging from the pilot study indicated 
that there was some need for revision, particularly in 
rephrasing the questions and in adopting the proper 
language tones for various age and educational levels of 
respondent. Three questions were omitted from the 
questionnaire because of respondents reluctance to answer 
them. 
3.10 In the field 
The field work lasted for a period of five months, 
ranging from loth July, 1988 to loth November. Married 
couples (husbands and wives) were the main respondents. 
Several reasons can be given for the decision to interview 
both husbands and wives. They are: - 
1) Cultural. The husband in an Arab society has a 
dominant role in decision making in every aspect of family 
life (Findlay, 1990; Weeks, 1988). Therefore, the husband 
is responsible for structuring the family and its 
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relations, while the wife's role is less important 
especially in the early stages of marriage. 
2) Political. Sometimes wives have no choice, but they 
may replace their husbands, especially in cases where 
husbands are at work outside the West Bank or are under 
arrest. 
3) Wives are considered to be appropriate respondents in 
fertility and family planning surveys in other parts of the 
world. Their responses are needed to enable comparative 
analysis and in understanding fertility attitudes and 
behaviour. 
4) Socio-economic development may make female decision 
making and womens roles more influential in the future. 
The 1985 fertility survey carried out in Jordan was 
directed to husbands. It indicated that husbands' views 
towards fertility attitudes and behaviour are more 
traditional than womens. It was also found that there are 
differences between husbands and wives responses. 
Therefore, for the present study it was considered 
worthwhile investigating the differences between a couple's 
preferences and comparing their responses where 
appropriate. 
A face to face approach was decided as preferable to 
other methods of conducting surveys. A face to face 
interview permits a greater flexibility in clarifying 
questions and is suitable particularly for multiple choice 
answers. 
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The majority of interviews were made on the first 
contact without any prior knowledge of or arrangement with 
the respondents. Appointments were necessary with a few 
people holding professional jobs. 
The interviewers were instructed to introduce 
themselves as students from An-Najah University who are 
collecting data about fertility attitudes to be used only 
for academic purposes. This was considered necessary in 
order to avoid suspicion of being mistaken for government 
agents whose mission was to collect information for tax 
purposes. Interviewers sometimes found it necessary to 
explain the purposes of the study in detail because the 
majority of respondents in refugee camps and other poorer 
areas became wary of them thinking that the purpose behind 
the interview was to allocate financial aid. On some 
occasions, wives insisted on discussing their answers with 
their husbands, or husband's family. This, in itself could 
be suggested as a vital topic for further research. 
The average interview time was about 30 minutes, but 
in some cases interviews took more than an hour. The most 
convenient time to conduct an interview was in the 
afternoon between two and six o'clock, when husbands were 
at home after coming back from work. The interviews were 
not conducted after 6.00pm because of the closure of areas 
by the Israeli army. In some cases the researcher found it 
too risky to travel after 6.00pm because the united 
leadership of the uprising issued leaflets banning the 
driving of cars after 6.00pm, especially in the Nablus area 
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where Palestinian cars were confiscated by Israeli soldiers 
and were then used by the Israeli army in their raids on 
Palestinian villages and homes. 
3.11 Research limitations 
Originally, the research was intended to cover the 
whole area of the West Bank, but due to unforeseen 
difficulties, and due to the Palestinian uprising, the 
researcher, along with his supervisor, agreed to limit the 
sample to Nablus district. The Nablus district is one of 
only three administrative divisions on the West Bank. The 
other two are Hebron and Jerusalem. Although Nablus is 
more urbanised and forms a more important commercial and 
industrial area than the other districts, it seems 
improbable that responses to the authors questionnaire, on 
attitudes towards fertility, would have received different 
responses in other parts of the West Bank. The sampling 
method therefore tried to be representative of Nablus 
district, but interpretation of the results are of wider 
significance and may be argued to be indicative of 
attitudes in the West Bank as a whole. West Bank society 
is relatively small and homogeneous, yet obviously given 
the lack of reliable secondary data, and the constraints 
placed on the sampling design, it is hard to verify this. 
Problems faced by the researcher included: - 
Firstly, problems resulting from the research techniques 
used. These included: 
138 
a) Respondents found it difficult to conceptualise some of 
the suggested responses to the questions like "strongly 
agree"/"agree". Lack of understanding stemmed partly from 
some respondents low educational level. 
b) Lack of recall by women as to the number of deceased 
infants. In many cases the wives had to resort to their 
husbands for information. 
c) Interference of other members of the family in the 
interviews. This happened in many cases where educated 
children were present in the homes and where the wives were 
relatively old. 
d) Wives reluctance to answer sensitive questions which 
they judge to be of a fatalistic nature. 
e) Respondents feelings of being disconcerted, especially 
when responding to some questions in the presence of their 
children. 
Secondly, problems resulting from the abnormal political 
situation. These problems included: 
a) The prolonged procedures the researcher had to go 
through in order to obtain a written permit from the 
Israeli authorities. In the occupied territories all 
researchers are required to obtain written approval from 
the Israeli military government. Such approval is very 
hard to obtain and in many cases it is even impossible. 
b) The researcher had on many cases to go through road 
blocks and military check points and would not be 
exaggerating to say that at times had to risk his life to 
complete the survey. At the time of the survey travel in 
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the occupied territories was immensely difficult, with 
soldiers frequently asking the researcher for his identity 
card. 
c) The continued closure of the area as a result of calls 
for general strikes made by the unified leadership of the 
uprising. 
d) The imposition of prolonged periods of curfew on Nablus 
area. Such problems demanded extra time on the part of the 
researcher. 
Despite the military occupation, the fear and 
suspicion of the interviewers, and other problems, the 
field work was successfully completed. 
3.12 Response rate 
The response rate achieved was nearly 90% of all 
households visited. Those who refused to be interviewed 
(around 10%) did not allow the interviewer to enter their 
houses. on many occasions, no reasons were given for such 
action, while on other occasions, the people gave reasons 
for their refusal. The reasons were: 
1) Many respondents demanded written permission from 
Israeli authorities. 
2) Some of the respondents suspected the motives behind 
the survey. Many of them thought it to be political. 
3) Some respondents asked about the purpose of the study 
and its benefit to them, and they reported that they had 
filled in questionnaires several times before but had seen 
no improvement in their situation. 
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Apart from this, an Israeli military patrol 
confiscated 50 questionnaires from the researcher (5% of 
the total sample) at a military check point near Nablus 
city. 
The researcher extended the survey areas in order to 
meet the targeted sample size. The final sample achieved 
was 1000 households. One of the completed questionnaires 
was confiscated at Tel-Aviv airport during a military 
search of the author. 
The response rate varied from one area to another. 
The highest proportion of respondents refusing to be 
interviewed was in Nablus City, especially in the upper 
class areas. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the 
response rate in each area. 
Table 3.1 
Response rate by area. 
AREA TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSE 
SAMPLE RESPONSES RATE 
Small villages 300 292 97.3% 
Towns 300 277 92.3% 
City, lower class 100 93 93.0% 
City, middle class 100 81 81.0% 
City, upper class 100 62 62.0% 
Refugee camps 100 96 96.0% 
TOTAL 1000 901 90.1% 
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The high response rate (90%) is attributed to two 
main reasons: 
Firstly, the immense amount of help received by the 
researcher, especially from the students of An-Najah 
University, who happened to be living in the areas of 
interviews. 
Secondly, the supportive letter obtained from the 
President of An-Najah National University (see Appendix). 
3.13 Statistical methods 
All of the data collected underwent computer 
analysis. The statistical techniques used varied with the 
types of variables being studied. 
Most of the methods used throughout this study are 
descriptive statistics such as mean, percentage and 
frequencies. Some inferences are drawn from correlations, 
chi-square, F-tests and Grammars V. These methods are used 
frequently to examine the inter-relationship between sub- 
groups and areas in the sample survey. 
In order to find out which of the independent 
variables accounted most for the differences in respondents 
attitudes and beliefs, a rather more sophisticated 
technique, discriminant functional analysis was performed. 
This technique is considered as an analytical predictor 
technique and a suitable technique for categorical data. 
All in all, these various statistical techniques were 
carried out with the use of the statistical package for 
the social sciences (SPSSX) at Glasgow University. 
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3.14 Summary 
This chapter has sought to outline the research 
design and the methodology used. More specifically, this 
chapter has been devoted to the discussion of the research 
problems, research objectives, and research instruments 
used by the author. 
Hopefully this gives the reader a better picture of 
where and how the West Bank data were collected. The 
chapters which follow contain a fuller discussion of the 
major findings. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
4.1 Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are two-fold: first, to 
describe and explain the basic personal, social and 
economic characteristics which appeared from the findings 
of the author's survey; second, to explore the differences 
between the various districts in their population 
characteristics. 
Some of the characteristics such as level of 
education, employment status and income might be regarded 
as non-demographic in the strict sense of the word, 
although they are frequently used as control variables to 
explain differential effects of demographic processes. For 
example, differences in fertility levels and in attitudes 
towards childbearing behaviour or family planning in 
different geographic areas may to some extent be explained 
by the differences in educational levels, variation in 
employment status, women's work and family income. 
4.2 Demographic characteristics 
Social, economic and demographic characteristics are 
closely interrelated. In fact, in most cases it is 
difficult to investigate one of them without taking into 
consideration the interaction and influence of the others. 
This section aims to shed light on the main household 
demographic features; age structure, sex composition, 
dependency ratio, and the size of the household. 
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4.2.1 Aqe structure 
Social scientists have a special interest in the age 
structure of a population due to the fact that social 
relationships within a given community are considerably 
affected by the relative number of people in each age 
group. Any development plan requires data on age and sex 
structure of the population. For example, age is an 
important variable in measuring potential school 
populations, future manpower, dependency ratio, etc. This 
kind of data is very useful for preparing current 
population estimates in both short and long term 
projections (Shryock and Seigel, 1980). 
In most demographic studies of population change, age 
structure is considered to be a significant variable 
affecting and affected by socio-economic and cultural 
circumstances of society such as economic problems, age 
dependency and social change. Age and sex usually form the 
basic classification for the study of other socio-economic 
characteristics, hence these characteristics vary with age 
and sex. 
Turning to the survey results, one can conclude that 
the West Bank population is relatively young. Table 4.1 
for example shows that the proportion of young people under 
the age of 15 constitutes 39.7% of the total population. 
The differences between the various areas seem to be small, 
ranging from 39.3% in rural areas to 41.3% in refugee 
camps. The proportion of West Bank population under the 
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age of 15, appears to be less than the average for most 
developing countries (Kabir, 1980). This can be 
attributed to several factors: 
1. High infant mortality rate. The low proportion of 
young population is partly a reflection of high infant 
mortality and child mortality rates caused by the under 
developed health services. The Israeli military government 
states that infant mortality claims 24-30 deaths per 1000 
live births, while the Central Bureau of Israeli Statistics 
indicates that the IMR is much higher at 70 per 1,000 
(Odeh, 1989). 
2. Low marriage rates. Marriage rates have dropped as a 
result of the increasing cost of dowries (money for the 
buying of gold and furniture. For example, in the 1980s 
the bridegroom on average would need more than 2000 J. D. 
(Jordanian dinars (£3,125). It is a problem for men to 
accumulate this amount within a short period of time under 
the prevailing severe economic conditions. 
3. Age at marriage. The increasing age at marriage has a 
direct impact on fertility levels as a result of education 
aspirations and job opportunities. 
4. Fertility decline. The decrease of population under 
the age of 15 might be evidence of decreasing fertility 
levels, because of the increasing number of women using 
contraceptives and on the other hand as a result of 
husbands obtaining jobs abroad or being arrested by Israeli 
authorities. 
Evidence of fertility decline can be shown clearly in 
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Table 4.2 where the proportion of children aged 0-4 is 
11.2% as compared with 13.1% for the age group 5-9 and 
15.4% for the age group 10-14 in both rural and urban 
areas. 
Because the age proportions of Table 4.1 and 4.2 are 
closed ratio statistics, the population in the middle age 
cohorts seems large simply because of the low percentage of 
young people (0-14) and the older generation (65 years and 
over). The proportion in the age cohorts 15-64 years was 
57.4%. This proportion ranges between 55.6% in urban areas 
and 57.9 in the refugee camps. 
The differences between the percentages of males and 
females in this age group are quite clear as shown in table 
4.1 where the proportion of females is higher than the 
proportion of males in both rural and urban areas. These 
differences could be explained as a result of male out 
migration. On the other hand, in refugee camps the 
percentage of males is higher than the percentage of 
females, simply because most of the middle aged males in 
refugee camps are unskilled and semi-skilled and find work 
in the Israeli labour market an adequate reason for their 
stay in the West Bank. Interestingly, this finding is 
supported by the study of Abu Shokor (1987) who found that 
Arab workers from refugee camps constitute a large 
percentage of the labour force in Israel. 
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Table 4.1 
Distribution of population by main age groups in rural, 
urban and refugee camps "percentage". 
< 15 15-64 65+ Total %N 
*RURAL 
Male 39.9 56.9 3.2 100 1925 
Female 38.7 58.2 3.1 100 2013 
Both 39.3 57.6 3.1 100 3938 
**URBAN 
Male 42.3 55.6 2.1 100 815 
Female 38.3 59.9 1.8 100 918 
Both 40.2 57.9 2.0 100 1733 
REFUGEE CAMPS 
Male 39.9 57.9 2.2 100 301 
Female 42.6 55.1 2.3 100 321 
Both 41.3 56.15 2.2 100 622 
TOTAL POPULATION 
Male 40.4 56.8 2.8 100 3041 
Female 38.9 58.4 2.7 100 3252 
Both 39.7 57.5 2.8 100 6293 
* Small villages and towns 
** City classes - lower, middle and upper 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
Table 4.2 clearly shows the effect of out migration 
on some age groups. The proportion of total population has 
fallen from 14.1% in the age group 15-19 to 10.9% in the 
age group 20-24 and to 7.9 in the age group 25-29. 
However, a substantial decrease is found in the age groups 
over 30 years, which confirms the idea that West Bank 
emigration is highly selective among active people. 
The findings of the author's survey show that the 
proportion of people aged 65 years and over did not reach 
4% in any sub-area. This proportion appears to be smaller 
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than expected. The main factors behind this include: - 
1. The poor level of health services under Israeli 
occupation. Odeh (1989) found that the number of 
doctors per capita in 1986 in occupied territories was 
8 per 10,000 compared with 28 per 10,000 for Israel and 
22 per 10,000 for Jordan. He also found the ratio of 
hospital bed/population in the occupied territories to 
be 1.6 per 1000 compared with 6.1 in Israel. From 1974 
to 1985 the population of the West Bank increased by 
21% while the number of hospital beds actually fell by 
6%. 
2. Many older people prefer to live with their sons who 
are working outside the West Bank, especially in 
Jordan. 
3. The present survey focuses only on currently married 
couples and excludes widowed and divorced couples, 
therefore reducing the proportion to a minimal 
percentage. 
4.2.2 Sex ratio 
Sex ratio is the principle measures of sex 
composition used in most technical studies. The sex ratio 
is usually defined as the number of males per 100 females. 
In general the national sex ratio falls within a narrow 
range of values from about 95 to 102 in stable populations 
(Shryock and Seigel, 1980). The sex ratio can be used for 
measuring net migration between areas and groups or for 
making comparisons for any one population through time. In 
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some cases, sex ratios are used for estimating levels of 
mortality and migration in specific age groups or testing 
for the accuracy of the vital registration data and the 
validity of data from surveys and censuses. 
The sex ratio of the West Bank population found in 
the authors survey was 94.8 men per 100 women. Table 4.3 
indicates that the sex ratio for the total population under 
15 years of age is 98.3. This ratio is slightly less than 
the national sex ratio of children under the age of 15 
years in most countries, which was carried out by World 
Fertility Survey (Kabir, 1980). The differences between 
different areas are quite obvious. For example, the sex 
ratio of rural areas was about 100 males for 100 females, 
while in refugee camps the sex ratio is about 85 males per 
100 females. These differences are believed to be a direct 
result of the following factors: 
1. Parents report young boys as girls in order to avoid 
the attention of evil spirits (evil eye). 
2. Many parents in Arab society choose not to report their 
infant daughters. 
3. Out migration effects. 
4. Females death rates in younger cohorts are considered 
to be lower than for males. 
It is important to indicate that some of these 
explanations are based on circumstantial evidence rather 
than on survey responses. 
The sex ratio of the population aged 15-64 is more 
sensitive and important for the study than the general sex 
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ratio because it reflects the character of the active 
population. The sex ratio of different areas lies between 
82.2 in urban areas and 95.2 in refugee camps. The level 
in the camps may be because refugees between 15-64 years 
are less motivated to emigrate compared with the 
populations of rural and urban areas. Table 4.3 reveals 
that urban areas are more affected by out migration than 
rural areas and refugee camps. This is true because urban 
people are more educated, richer and more skilled, thus 
making the accessibility of immigration easier. On the 
other hand, the bad economic conditions in rural areas and 
the refugee camps, the close-knit family structure and the 
existence of cohesive social relationships all encourage 
the young men of these communities to live with their 
parents. 
Table 4.3 
Sex ratio by main age groups in rural and urban areas and in refugee camps. 
<15 15-64 65+ Total 
population 
Rural 
Urban 
Refugee camps 
Total population 
99.8 94.6 98.4 95.9 
97.5 82.2 100.1 88.8 
84.7 95.2 87.0 93.8 
98.3 91.6 97.9 94.8 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
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Looking at the age group 65 and over one sees for the 
first time the number of men exceeding the number of women. 
This occurs in rural areas, while in urban and refugee 
camps the sex ratio is less than 100. The sex ratio of 
elders reflects the fact that females would outnumber males 
in this age group on the basis that women usually marry at 
a younger age. Also, the life expectancy for women may be 
higher than that of their male counterparts. 
4.2.3 Dependency ratio 
This measure represents the percentage of active 
people in the total population. From table 4.4 it is noted 
that the dependency ratio is low and this could be as a 
result of the population age structure with more than half 
of the population being in the active age group 15-64. 
Regarding the differences between areas, it is noted that 
the dependency ratio in refugee camps is high compared to 
the total population while the urban dependency ratio is 
lower than the average. This may be explained entirely by 
the effect of demographic variables. 
Table 4.4 
Dependency ratio in different areas 
refugee camps). 
RURAL URBAN REFUGEE CAMPS 
73.6 72.9 77.0 
(rural, urban and 
TOTAL POPULATION 
73.9 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
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It must be noted that the true dependency burden is 
higher than that shown in table 4.4, simply because not all 
people of working ages are actually employed. The true 
dependency ratio as shown in table 4.5 is calculated by 
taking into account the active proportion of the employed 
population (both men and women). Table 4.5 indicates that 
the true dependency ratio in both rural and urban areas is 
quite similar, while the dependency ratio in refugee camps 
is lower than in urban and rural areas as a result of the 
relatively high proportion of working men and women, which 
might be explained as a result of urgent needs and bad 
economic conditions of the camps in general. 
Table 4.5 
True dependency ratio in different areas (rural, urban and 
refugee camps. 
RURAL URBAN REFUGEE CAMPS TOTAL POPULATION 
206 207 184 196 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Looking at tables 4.4 and 4.5, one can see obvious 
differences between tables 4.4 and 4.5. This could be a 
result of: 
1. The low proportion of women participating in labour 
force. 
2. An increase in the proportion of men in the working age 
groups thought to be not working or seeking employment 
as a result of the volatile political situation in the 
occupied territories since the Palestinian uprising. 
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3. The increase in the number of males and females who are 
pursuing higher education. 
The true dependency ratio indicates that every 
working person should be responsible for the well being and 
support of two people in addition to themselves. 
4.2.4 Household size 
Generally speaking, the term "household size" relates 
to the entire number of persons living under one roof, 
eating together and sharing one budget. The researcher 
used this definition in collecting data on households in 
his survey. In the West Bank the household is usually made 
up of couples, children and other persons who are related 
to the husband or the wife as blood relatives or by 
adoption. In some cases in the West Bank the household 
includes the husband's parents, brothers and sisters and to 
a lesser extent some other close relatives. It is possible 
to find two or three households living in the same house 
though related together by blood relationships (married 
brothers). However, every household has its own budget and 
eats separately. 
The household size can be determined by several 
factors. They include: prevailing cultural values, 
extended family structure, the authority of elders, type of 
household economic activity and to some extent the 
political situation. These factors are all influenced in a 
complex fashion by the level of economic and social 
development. Therefore, it is to be expected that the 
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Table 4.6 
Household size distribution of different areas (Cumulative 
ö) 
Household Rural Urban Refugee Camps Total 
size population 
2 9.7 13.3 9.1 10.7 
3 20.0 23.7 22.2 21.3 
4 30.0 33.3 29.3 30.9 
5 40.0 46.0 42.4 42.0 
6 51.5 60.7 51.5 54.3 
7 62.9 75.7 64.6 66.9 
8 73.5 85.7 79.8 77.8 
9 83.3 92.0 87.9 86.4 
10 87.9 95.0 96.0 90.8 
11 92.8 98.0 97.0 94.8 
12 95.8 99.3 99.0 97.2 
13 97.3 99.7 99.0 98.2 
14 99.2 100.0 100.0 99.5 
15 99.5 - - 99.7 
16 100.0 - - 100.0 
Average 
Household 6.55 5.77 6.20 6.32 
Size 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
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household size in the past, as well as in contemporary 
traditional societies would be larger than in modern 
industrial societies. 
It is noted from table 4.6 that the average size of 
the household for the total population is about 6.3. The 
highest average is found in rural areas (6.55), while in 
urban areas the average is 5.77. 
Israeli sources suggest that the average family size 
in the West Bank was about 7 people in the 1970's, and 
since the beginning of 1980s that the size has started to 
decrease as a result of a reduction in fertility levels 
(Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1985). 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of household size, 1988. 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 4.6. 
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Household size 
Table 4.6 indicates that relatively large households 
are more dominant in rural areas than in urban areas or in 
refugee camps. For example, more than one third of rural 
families included 7 or more members while less than one 
quarter of urban households had 7 members or more. Table 
4.7 shows that the proportion of large households (10 
people and more) is also higher in rural areas (12.1%). 
Table 4.7 
Distribution of household size by different areas. 
Area Less than 5 Between 5-10 More than 10 
Rural 30.0 57.9 12.1 
Urban 33.3 61.7 5.0 
Refugee camps 29.3 66.7 4.0 
Total 30.9 59.3 9.8 
Calculated from table 4.6 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
4.3 Educational characteristics 
Education is believed to be an important variable 
accounting for many aspects of demographic behaviour. 
Graham-Brown (1984a) has argued that education has been one 
of the most important factors in producing social change 
amongst the Palestinian people, both inside and outside 
Palestine. 
The analysis of family education levels is thought to 
be a very important factor in analysing the relationships 
between education and other demographic aspects. 
Educational attainment has been shown to relate to the 
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achievement of economic rewards, employment security, 
prestige, occupational status and income levels. These 
relationships exist both at the individual level and at an 
aggregate level. Education therefore serves as an 
indicator of social and economic development. 
As education remains a strong explanatory variable in 
demographic studies, and because there was no available 
data on the West Bank since the last census in 1967, the 
description and evaluation of educational characteristics 
was considered of great importance in the author's survey. 
The ratio of Palestinians as a whole who have 
completed tertiary education is the highest of all Arab 
national groups (Zureik, 1977). The number of university 
graduates among Palestinians relative to the total 
population is considered to be one of the highest in the 
world, and probably the third highest (Hallaj, 1980). 
As a result of the political situation in the West 
Bank, Palestinians have lost their livelihood from the 
land. The Palestinians who were expelled or forced to 
migrate from their homes found themselves with limited 
employment opportunities. Many felt that the best thing 
for them to invest in was in their own higher education 
(Graham-Brown, 1984b). 
The extended family structure has helped support 
children in their education both morally and financially. 
It is common to find many extended family members 
supporting brothers or close relatives who are pursuing 
higher levels of education (Fasheh, 1984), while in some 
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cases farmers have sold some of their land in order to 
support their sons pursuit of education. 
Before 1967 and during the Jordanian period, the 
proportion of school enrollment increased remarkably as a 
result of development in the educational system, the 
establishment of local schools in towns and villages and as 
a result of the introduction of a compulsory elementary 
education (Baker, 1989). The Jordanian government has also 
encouraged educational attainment by limiting the 
employment opportunities in the army and civil services 
only to educated people (Graham-Brown, 1984a). UNRWA also 
offered free educational services by establishing many 
schools for children in refugee camps (Arafat, 1989). 
These facilities in education reduced the proportion of 
non-educated people especially among females. 
The increasing demand for skilled and qualified 
people outside the West Bank before and after 1967 
particularly in the oil Arab Countries, has encouraged 
parents to educate their children in the hope that they 
would get better jobs abroad and in return to help improve 
their standards of living. Therefore, children's education 
effectively became an avenue of liberation from poverty, 
hunger, dependency and want. It is perceived as a means of 
achieving a better income, the enhancement of family 
status, and the mastering to some extent of their own 
destiny (Nakhleh, 1977). 
Palestinians still have a bias towards male 
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education. This might be due to the perceived general 
benefit to the family. Given West Bank labour market 
constraints on female employment, there is of course some 
economic basis to this outlook. Indeed, some parents 
may discriminate against their daughters education in fear 
of losing a source of free household labour. This attitude 
confirms the traditional gender roles of wives as 
housekeepers and the husbands as financial providers. 
In the author's survey (Table 4.8) the proportion of 
people with no schooling level was only 17% of the total 
population. In refugee camps about a quarter of the 
population had no schooling. This might be attributed to 
several factors: 
1. The circumstances which accompanied the expulsion of 
Palestinians in 1948. 
2. Their adaption to a new life style in refugee camps 
after their expulsion. 
3. The inaccessibility of school enrollment in the first 
years after migration. 
4. The poor economic situation in the refugee camps has 
forced many children to seek employment and become 
craftsmen in order to help their destitute families. 
The differences between the proportion of males and 
females with no schooling level appears to be very large in 
rural areas and refugee camps. These variations reflect 
the cultural values, differential levels of education 
accessibility and the preference of a son's education over 
that of a daughter's. It is worth mentioning that most 
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uneducated people are from the older age groups, since many 
villages lack elementary schools for females. 
The differences between males and females with regard 
to their low level of education seems to be relatively 
small. This is not surprising because most families 
encourage their daughters to attain at least a minimum 
level of education before growing up. About 18.9% of the 
total population achieved lower education with slight 
differences between the different geographic areas as 
compared with those with no schooling level. 
About one third of the population aged 15 years and 
over achieved medium levels of education. At this level 
the differences between male and female education increased 
as a result of several factors. 
1. Middle level of education was not encouraged for 
females especially among the conservative and religious 
segments of the population because of the inevitable 
opportunities created by the encouragement for the 
mixing of the sexes in an unsupervised fashion, with 
all the implications which this has for the family's 
image (Al-Mufti, 1977). 
2. Lack of educational facilities. For example, some 
villages have neither a secondary school for girls nor 
for co-ed secondary education. Parents are hesitant to 
send their teenage daughters to co-ed schools outside 
their villages. The author, during his research, found 
that 2 out of 6 small villages did not have secondary 
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schools, while only one had a co-ed secondary school. 
3. Early age at marriage has a great influence on the 
proportion of women without secondary level education. 
It is worth noting that school life normally ends with 
the start of marriage. 
As for the higher education sector, the author's data 
reveal that 14% of the total population aged 15 years and 
over have achieved higher education. However, no 
significant differences were found between males and 
females in urban areas. There were big differences between 
the geographical areas. The proportion of highly educated 
people seems to be smaller than the actual achieved level, 
because most of the highly educated people found work 
opportunities outside the West Bank. The highly educated 
male immigrant can also be partially explained by the low 
differences between male and female who achieved a higher 
education. 
The differences between the percentage of males and 
females who achieved higher education in rural and refugee 
camps can be explained in light of the effect of cultural 
values, where some families do not allow their daughters to 
travel alone and be away from home to pursue university 
education. 
Despite the obstacles facing female education, there 
is a growing and improving distribution of educational 
institutions of higher learning in the West Bank. This 
improved accessibility of higher institutes of learning has 
encouraged some parents to allow their daughters to 
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continue their higher education locally. In the West Bank, 
for example, there are five major universities with the 
largest university "Al-Najah" being in Nablus. Table 4.8 
gives a clear picture of West Bank higher education. The 
availability of these institutions allowed women to attain 
higher education and to return to their homes in rural 
areas daily (Baker, 1989). More than 40% of total students 
in West Bank universities are females. For example, the 
proportion of females in Najah University is 42% of the 
total students. Al-Khatib (1976) estimated that 90% of 
students at Jordan University in Amman were of Palestinian 
origin and there are more females than males in some 
faculties. 
Table 4.8 
Profile of full-time students at higher education 
institutions on the West Bank 1985-1986. 
INSTITUTION NUMBER OF STUDENTS 
Male Female Total 
Al Najah University 1746 1261 3007 
Birzeit University 1634 770 2404 
Bethlehem University 681 516 1197 
Hebron University 1090 656 1746 
Al-Qudes University 613 807 1420 
Total 5764 4010 9774 
Source: Varsen Aghabekian, Ph. D. dissertation, 1988, p19. 
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A final cursory glance at the proportion of 
population aged 15 years and over who are still pursuing 
their studies, can be made in table 4.9. This table 
indicates that about one fifth of the active population are 
students. The differences between different areas and 
sexes in each area is not large. From this one can conclude 
the following: 
1. Female higher education is becoming more acceptable to 
the entire population of Palestinians. 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of population aged 15-64 by 
gender and educational level. 1988. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 4.9. 
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None Low Middle High Still student 
Table 4.9 
Percentage of the survey population aged 15 years and more 
by educational level and gender in rural, urban and refugee 
camps. 
AREA SCHOOLING 
None Lower Middle Higher Still Total 
Level Level Education Studying 
Rural 
Both 17.2 17.7 30.7 14.5 19.9 2395 
Male 7.9 18.9 33.1 19.1 21.0 1161 
Female 27.0 16.4 28.1 11.8 18.6 1234 
Urban 
Both 13.3 22.7 35.1 12.4 16.5 1035 
Male 11.9 24.1 36.1 12.6 15.2 470 
Female 14.8 21.0 33.9 12.2 18.0 565 
Refugee Cam ps 
Both 25.4 15.8 34.3 12.3 12.3 365 
Male 16.4 14.2 40.4 15.2 13.7 181 
Female 34.0 17.3 28.2 9.4 11.0 184 
Total Popul ation 
Both 16.9 18.9 32.2 13.7 18.2 3799 
Male 9.9 20.1 34.5 16.9 18.6 1812 
Female 24.1 17.6 29.7 10.5 17.8 1987 
None = no schooling at all 
Lower level = completed elementary level (6 years) 
Middle leve l = completed preparatory and secondary 
levels ( 6 years, three for each 
level). 
Higher educ ation = College and uni versities (after 
secondary school). 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
2. There is increasing demand for higher education among 
Palestinians. 
3. The gap between different areas and the differences 
between male and female in each area is becoming 
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smaller as a result of Palestinians' favourable 
attitude towards the achievement of higher education. 
Despite the aspirations and attitudes of Palestinians 
towards education, there are specific educational problems 
that exist as a result of the Israeli occupation. The 
problems include poor teaching conditions, inadequate 
physical facilities, out-dated curricula, limited school 
construction, inadequate text books, high drop-out rates 
and poor library and laboratory facilities (Abu Znaid, 
1990). Higher education institutions suffer from the 
frequent closure by Israeli authorities and road blocks. 
All the universities and colleges in the occupied 
territories have been closed since December 1987. 
4.4 Economic characteristics 
This section is dedicated to the discussion of 
economic activities of the households included in the 
survey. Aspects like household income, work status, 
standard of living, house characteristics, important 
economic characteristics will be discussed. It is believed 
that an understanding of the economic characteristics of a 
set of households are essential in interpreting the 
elements responsible for all social, economic and 
demographic change. It is of practical importance for the 
formulation of regional development policy and effective 
planning and administration. 
After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 
1967, Israeli authorities allowed the people from the 
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occupied territories to work inside Israel, although with 
some restriction at first (Hillal, 1974). Most of the Arab 
labour force entered the Israeli economic system as 
unskilled labour in a range of economic sectors (Abu- 
Shokor, 1987). The depressed economic situation in the 
occupied territories, after the occupation has certainly 
been an important factor in raising the number of people 
working inside Israel or in construction of Israeli 
settlements inside the West Bank. 
Working in Israel comprises a significant factor in 
attracting teenagers to leave school and join in the 
Israeli labout market. Working in Israel is also 
attractive to some farmers because it offers them 
relatively high wages as compared with agricultural work 
(United Nation Economic Commision for Western Asia, 1981). 
Growing investment in the Israeli labour market has 
created a new social and economic situation. On one hand, 
it has raised family income by increasing the opportunities 
for job seekers by providing them with better salaries as 
compared with the salaries offered in the West Bank. On 
the other hand, Arab workers engaged in employment inside 
Israel began to realise that more profits are generated for 
the Israeli economy, since the base wages rate of the Arab 
labour force are much cheaper than those of the Israeli 
worker or indeed of Arabs living in Israel itself. It is 
important to indicate that all Arab workers from the 
occupied territories are not allowed the same rights or 
wages as Israeli citizens (Abu-Shokor, 1987). 
168 
EI 
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank has brought 
major changes to the West Bank economy. These changes have 
occurred in part because of direct Israeli interventions in 
re-shaping economic structures such as patterns of trade, 
economic sectors, work status patterns, redirecting the 
labour force and the level of economic development inside 
the occupied territories. There have also been numerous 
and sometimes unexpected side effects in the economic and 
social spheres (Graham-Brown, 1984a). 
The substantial changes in the West Bank economy have 
had a significant influence on family structure and social 
norms. For example, West Bank youths who find work 
opportunities in the Israeli market will be more 
independent economically and as a result his/her parents 
lose some of their authority over them. This in turn 
affects the traditional structure of West Bank families 
(Heller, 1980). 
From the mid 1970s onwards the Israeli labour market 
became less attractive to Arab workers due to the following 
factors: 
1. The existence of alternative employment opportunities 
outside the West Bank, especially in the Gulf States 
after 1973. 
2. Many Arab workers lost their jobs in Israel after the 
signing of camp David accord between Egypt and Israel 
in 1978. 
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3. The devaluation of the Israeli currency after 1973 
among other foreign exchange currency. 
4. The uprising and its adverse economic repercussions on 
the Palestinians. 
5. The harassment of labourers by the Isaeli authorities. 
4.4.1 Work Status 
Household economic characteristics in general have 
been influenced mainly by the West Bank's economic and 
political situation. It is important to emphasise once 
again that the author's survey was carried out during the 
Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. The 
Palestinian uprising has had a great effect on every aspect 
of Palestinian life in the occupied territories. 
Population work status was classified into two main 
categories. First, "employed" persons, which included 
three sub-categories, working salaried employees, self 
employed and employer. Second, "unemployed" persons, 
involving people out of work, retired persons and students. 
The definitions used by the researcher for each category 
was as follows: 
1. Salared: comprises all persons aged 15-64 years who 
receive salaries, remuneration in wages and comission 
in both private and public sectors. 
2. Self employed: a person who operates his own 
enterprise or engages independently in the professions, 
trade and agriculture and who hires no employees. 
3. Employer: a person who operates, supervises or 
administers his own enterprise or engages independently 
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in the professions or trade but who also hires one or 
more persons. 
4. Not working: comprises all persons of working age 15- 
64 and who were found unemployed during the period of 
data collection. This includes a) those who are not 
working but are actively seeking jobs, b) home-makers - 
persons aged 15-64 who are engaged in domestic work and 
household duties in their own or their parents house, 
c) those who are of working age and unable to work. 
5. Retired: all persons who are not working but receiving 
income (pension) from their former employer. 
6. Students: consists of all persons of either sex who 
are attending regular educational institutions at any 
level. 
Table 4.10 shows that the proportion of total 
population in working age who are actually working is only 
37.8%. Of these two thirds are employees, working as 
professionals inside the West Bank or as unskilled workers 
in the Israeli labour market. The low activity rate of the 
West Bank labour force may be attributed to several 
factors: 
1. The gradual increase in the proportion of the 
population in schools or institutes of higher learning 
for both sexes. This accounts for about 18% of the 
total population aged 15-64 years. 
2. There is low participation of women in the labour 
force. The proportion of working females is about 7%, 
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while in Jordan, for example, the proportion of total 
working females is about 11% (Al-Akil, 1989). 
3. The political situation during the 1988-89 uprising has 
caused many workers to loose their jobs because of 
calls demanding them to quit their jobs in Israel. 
4. Scarcity of work opportunities in the local labour 
market (Kubursi, 1988; Mansour, 1988). 
Table 4.10 
Distribution of population aged 15-64 by gender and by work 
status in rural, urban and refugee camps. "Percentage". 
AREA EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED 
Sal- 
aried 
Self 
Employed 
Emp- 
loyer 
Not 
working 
Retired Student Total 
No. 
Rural 
Male 47.8 14.5 2.5 12.9 1.3 21.0 1098 
Female 4.5 1.3 0.0 75.5 0.1 18.6 1171 
Both 26.5 7.9 1.3 43.7 0.7 19.9 2269 
Urban 
Male 33.6 27.5 5.9 15.1 1.5 16.3 453 
Female 7.8 1.2 0.2 72.8 0.0 18.0 548 
Both 21.7 15.5 3.2 42.2 0.8 16.5 1001 
Refuge e camps 
Male 54.3 18.8 0.6 12.6 0.0 13.7 174 
Female 9.8 0.5 1.1 77.2 0.0 11.4 177 
Both 31.5 9.7 0.8 45.7 0.0 12.3 351 
Total population 
Male 44.3 18.9 3.3 13.6 1.2 18.6 1726 
Female 5.9 1.2 0.1 74.9 0.1 17.8 1898 
Both 25.6 10.4 1.8 43.4 0.6 18.2 3625 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
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Table 4.10 shows that the proportion of persons 
defined as employers was less than 2%. The majority are 
located in urban areas. The unstable political situation 
in the region has discouraged many investors from investing 
their money in the occupied territories. This argument is 
supported by the following factors: 
1. Industrial activities were minimal prior to the Israeli 
occupation and have remained so even under Israeli 
control (Hillal, 1974). The industrial sector mainly 
depends on traditional crafts and small agriculture 
based industries (Graham-Brown, 1984a). According to 
Awartani (1988) only seven establishments employed over 
one hundred employees. 
2. There are no Arab banks in the West Bank to facilitate 
investment and economic development. It is worth 
noting that all Arab banks were ordered to be shut by 
Israeli military order immediately after 1967 (Harris, 
1988). 
3. Only 4% of total land under cultivation is irrigated 
mostly in the Jordan Valley. In addition there has 
been a decrease in agricultural land as a result of 
Israel land confiscation policy. 
4. The Israeli authorities control all the exports and 
imports to the territories (Shadid, 1988). 
Table 4.10 indicates that self employees constitute 
about 19% of the total population of working age, most of 
them working as farmers, craftsmen or small merchants. The 
differences between various areas are quite clear, where 
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the highest proportion is found in urban areas. The low 
percentage (14.5%) in rural areas may be due to the fact 
that agricultural work mainly depends on children and 
womens work (Graham-Brown, 1984b). Also Israeli statistics 
indicate that employment in agriculture has declined 
steadily and substantially since 1967. The number of 
workers employed in agriculture whether hired or self- 
employed has dropped from 49,000 (45%) in 1969 to 28,000 
(19%) in 1984 (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1971,1986). 
The differences between males and females who are 
involved in the labour force are very large. These 
differences can be found in most developing countries, 
particularly Arab and Islamic societies (Findlay, 1990). 
About 93% of women of working age were out of work compared 
with 33.4% of males. Social and religious reasons may be 
considered as the main impediments to females working 
outside their homes. In most cases women's work is related 
to the family's domestic needs (Graham-Brown, 1984b). As 
Table 4.10 shows that the proportion of women in refugee 
camps who work outside their homes is higher than that of 
women in rural and urban areas. Also in the urban area it 
is possible for women to take professional jobs and gain 
independence as a result of education. It is worth 
mentioning that the low percentage of women employed does 
not mean participation of women is absent from the 
household or local economy. Some of them engage in 
embroidery work and farming with no paid salaries. 
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However, women usually prefer to describe themselves as 
housewives. This is for several reasons: 
1. They are unpaid workers. 
2. There is no regular timetable for employment. 
3. There is an overlap between their work in the house and 
in farms. 
4. Working in agriculture in general is strictly confined 
to members of the family (wife and children). 
5. Large segments of rural wives think that it is part of 
their duty to help their husbands on the farm. 
Most women who do work, do so as employees in the 
education sector. Many jobs are retricted to men on social 
and physical grounds. It must be noted that the percentage 
of working women is higher amongst widows and divorced 
women, hence adding further social disincentives to married 
women working. 
Table 4.10 shows that there are no big differences in 
the percentage of male and female students in the various 
areas. The high percentage of female students in the age 
15-64 gives an indication of the scale of change in 
cultural values that are taking place. This indicator 
reveals that the woman's position may change in the near 
future to include new roles. This may cause a delay in the 
age of marriage and an increase in females aspiration and 
endeavours. In return one might expect a considerable 
change in future demographic processes. 
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Figure 4.3: Population aged 15-64 by gender and work 
status, 1988. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 4.10. 
The "retired" percentage for both men and women in 
different areas as shown in Table 4.10 appears to be very 
low. This may be due to three main reasons. 
1. To reach retirement one needs to serve long periods in 
the workforce. 
2. There is no pension system for the Arab in the occupied 
territories under Israeli occupation, with the 
exception of Jerusalem which was formally annexed to 
Israel after 1967. 
3. Many older people, while less active than in the past, 
continue to play a role as unpaid labour in the rural 
economy. 
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4.4.2 Type of Work 
This sections aims to focus on heads of the household 
(husband) of working age to explore the distribution of 
these workers in various sectors of economy and to compare 
the outcome with previous data. Finally this section aims 
to discuss the variations of employment in each sector. 
The Jordanian census in 1961 indicates that 37.6% of the 
labour force was employed in agriculture as compared with 
11.5% in industry, while the services sector was dominant 
at around 50.5%. However, the Central Bureau of Israel 
Statistics in 1984 classified West Bank employment as 
follows: agriculture 28.5%, industry 15.9%, services 
55.6%. Moreover, the author's data indicated that about 
25% of husbands were found to be working in agriculture as 
compared with 11.3% in industry, while the remaining 
percentage, about 63%, are worked in services. It should 
of course be borne in mind that the author's survey was 
undertaken only in the northern part of the West Bank, and 
may not be entirely representative of the West Bank 
economy. 
Table 4.11 
Distribution of West Bank employment by economic sectors. 
Agriculture Industry Services 
*1961 37.6 11.5 50.5 
1984 28.5 15.9 55.6 
1988 25.4 11.3 63.3 
*data include East and West Banks of Jordan. 
Source: 1961 Jordanian Census, Statistical Abstract of 
Israel, 1985, Author's survey, 1988, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.11 reveals that the pattern of work has 
substantially changed since 1961 as a result of shifts in 
the economy. Employment in the agricultural sector has 
substantially decreased during the Israeli occupation while 
the level of employment in the industrial sector remained 
almost static. It can be concluded that the increase in 
the percentage of employees in services nearly equals the 
decrease in the agricultural sector. This would mean that 
no development has taken place in the productive sectors 
during the Israeli occupation. Inversely, the Israeli 
occupation has had a negative effect on the agricultural 
sector which is considered to be an important productive 
sector of the West Bank economy (Awartani, 1978). 
4.4.3 Household income 
Income is primarily an indicator of the standard of 
living. It is used as a measure of economic well-being and 
it is taken along with education attainment and occupation 
as a measure of socio-economic status. Household income 
has an important relationship to many variables such as 
mortality, fertility, migration, level of education and 
occupation. 
In the survey undertaken by the author, household 
income was intended to represent income from all sources. 
It is clear from Table 4.12 that more than 20% of all 
households were receiving very low incomes (under 100 J. D. 
per month) while the majority of household lived in what 
might be described as the middle income bracket (100-299 
J. D. ). The differences between the different geographical 
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areas are most noticeable at higher income levels (above 
300 J. D. per month). The low proportion of rural 
households who earned high income can be explained by two 
factors: - 
1. The decrease in agricultural rewards as a result of 
land confiscation by Israeli authorities. This has 
occurred because of the inability of local agricultural 
produce to compete with Israeli produce, and because of 
high taxes, and the difficulty in getting permission to 
export agricultural produce to Arab and European 
markets. 
2. Most heads of households underestimate their income 
from agriculture as a result of the irregularity of 
their income. 
Table 4.12 
Household monthly income distribution by different areas. 
AREA <50 50- 100- 150- 200- 250- 300- 350- 400- 450- 500 
99 149 199 249 299 349 399 449 499 + 
Rural 2.5 20.3 40.5 20.0 10.2 3.3 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 
Urban 2.3 16.8 20.0 17.3 10.3 7.0 6.8 4.3 2.0 3.5 9.8 
Refugee 
camps 3.0 8.1 29.3 21.2 14.1 10.1 8.1 4.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
Total 2.4 18.9 32.3 18.9 10.2 4.8 3.7 2.0 1.1 1.5 4.1 
Income by Jordanian dinars. 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of household monthly income 
(J. D. ) , 1988. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
4.4.4 Source of household income 
Household income in the West Bank comes from many 
different sources. This section will investigate the 
contribution of each source to household income. 
Table 413 shows that the work of the head of the 
household is the primary source of income. More than 55% 
of heads of households were responsible for 80% or more of 
household income. Only 10.9% of the heads of the household 
contributed nothing to their household income and depended 
on their incomes from other resources. Wives' work 
constituted a small percentage of the total household 
income. It is important to mention that most wives 
contribute to household income in an indirect way by 
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working without a salary through their participation in 
agricultural, domestic and craft work. 
The son's contribution to family income was varied 
depending on whether they lived with their families or not. 
For this purpose sons were divided into two categories: 
single and married sons. Unmarried sons usually lived with 
their families. It is clear that more than 80% of sons do 
not contribute to their household income. The 
participation of unmarried sons is double that of the 
married sons. 
The contribution of income from agricultural land 
rent to the household was less than expected. 72% of 
households received nothing from the land. To explain this 
one can say that the majority of farmers believe that what 
they gain from working their land is a repayment for their 
work and not a direct contribution from the land itself. 
The contribution of other sources such as property, 
investments, pensions, charities and from relatives seems 
to be very small and does not exceed 3%. This is a result 
of: 
1. The unstable political situation in the West Bank which 
discourages proper investment. 
2. The contributions of local charitable organisations are 
less than expected due to their inadequate financial 
resources. 
3. There is no pension system in the West Bank with the 
exception of East Jerusalem. 
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4. The contribution of relatives to household income is 
minimal because people already have to support their 
parents and immediate family. 
Table 4.13 
Source and contribution of household income. 
Nothing <20% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% >80% 
Head of 
household 10.9 0.3 4.6 16.6 12.3 55.3 
Wives work 95.0 0.4 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 
Unmarried 
children 78.3 5.7 9.0 5.3 1.3 2.2 
Married 
children 86.6 6.6 4.3 1.7 0.5 0.3 
From the 
land 72.2 18.0 7.8 1.6 0.1 0.3 
From 
property 79.1 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.2 0.2 
Investment 97.2 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Pension and 
charity 97.0 0.3 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.0 
Others 99.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
Table 4.14 shows that 7.7% of the households live 
permanently in economic difficulties, as compared with 
about 27% of households who meet economic difficulties on 
some occasions. While about two thirds of all households 
have not had any economic difficulties. 
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Table 4.14 
Financial difficulties facing households. 
Always Sometimes Never 
Total population 7.7 26.8 65.5 
Rural 8.0 27.3 64.7 
Urban 8.0 24.4 64.7 
Refugee camps 5.1 31.2 63.7 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
4.4.5 Living standards 
Many other indicators can be used to measure 
standards of living in addition to household income. This 
section will focus mainly on family possessions and 
household characteristics, and will investigate the 
differences between the different areas. 
For the purpose of this study the following 
belongings were used in order to measure respondents 
standards of living. They were ownership of a: private 
vehicle, black and white television, coloured television, 
video equipment, refrigerator, washing machine and 
telephone. Ownership of these types of consumer goods has 
increased as the proportion of households supplied with 
electricity has risen. The proportion of households with 
electricity rose between from 23% in 1967 to 51% in 1981 
(Sabatello, 1983). 
About one fourth of West Bank households have private 
cars. The highest percentage can be found in urban areas 
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(42.3%) as compared with 25.3% and 15.0% in refugee camps 
and rural areas respectively. It is important to note that 
some of these cars are used as taxis and contribute to 
household income. This phenomenon occurs more in rural 
areas and refugee camps where there are no reliable means 
of transportation available. The Israeli sources claimed 
that the number of households owning a private car tripled 
during the 1970s (Sabatello, 1983). 
Looking at table 4.15 one can notice that the 
majority of households in the sample are owners of 
televisions of some kind or another. However, it is shown 
from the table that coloured televisions and video sets are 
more widespread in urban areas than in rural areas and 
refugee camps where households normally resort to buying 
second hand black and white televisions at lower cost. 
Another possible argument for the increase in the 
percentage of television owners is the widespread 
perception that television and videos are considered as a 
part of a dowry on the part of the husband that has to be 
supplied before or at the time of marriage. 
More than 95% of all households possessed a 
refrigerator. As for washing machines the differences in 
responses are quite obvious. For example, almost 95% of 
urban households possess washing machines as compared to 
72.7 and 49% in refugee camps and rural areas respectively. 
In urban areas about 45% of the households had a telephone 
while the percentage did not exceed 8% in refugee camps and 
1% in rural areas. These differences can be attributed to 
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several factors: 
1. The communication network covers only. urban areas and 
adjacent refugee camps. 
2. Direct forms of communication are quite possible in 
villages and towns. 
Table 4.15 
Family possessions in different areas. 
PERCENTAGE 
Total Rural Urban Refugee 
camps 
1. Private car 24.2 15.0 42.3 25.3 
2. Black & white television 67.8 81.5 40.3 67.7 
3. Colour television 23.1 5.2 57.7 27.3 
4. Video 11.7 1.0 34.7 7.1 
5. Refrigerator 97.5 95.8 99.1 98.0 
6. Washing machine 66.3 49.0 94.5 72.7 
7. Telephone 15.0 1.0 45.3 8.1 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
In contrast with the statistics presented in Table 
4.14 the data on ownership of consumer goods reveals that 
the standard of living in urban areas is better than in 
rural areas and in refugee camps. But it is worth 
mentioning that these indicators may not give an accurate 
picture of the true standards of living in the West Bank. 
To ascertain to what extent the high ownership levels 
reflects the nature of the development processes which have 
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affected the West Bank. These include: 
1. Remittance of incomes from employment in Israel and 
abroad. 
2. The inflation effect and the drop of Israeli currency 
relative to other foreign currencies. This has 
encouraged people to purchase consumer items rather 
than to keep savings (Graham-Brown, 1984a). 
4.5 House characteristics 
The final section of this chapter will explore the 
housing characteristics such as house size, house ownership 
and the levels of rents. 
The study indicated that 75% of all households owned 
their own houses. The percentages differ in rural and 
urban areas (92.5% and 65.7% respectively). All the houses 
in refugee camps were erected by UNRWA. The differences in 
house ownership between rural and urban areas may be 
attributed to several factors. 
1. The price of land in urban areas is quite high while in 
rural areas most people are land owners. 
2. The accessibility of houses for rent in the urban areas 
is greater than in rural areas. 
3. As a result of cultural values and norms, people in 
rural areas give first priority to the establishment of 
homes more than do people in urban areas where renting 
is quite common. In rural areas, success and happiness 
is measured by the ownership of items such as homes, 
cars, televisions, etc., rather than in socio- 
professional advancement. 
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Table 4.16 
Percentage of house ownership in rural and urban areas. 
AREA OWNED RENTED 
Rural 92.5 7.5 
Urban 65.7 34.3 
Total 75.4 14.7 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
The level of rents reflects the supply and demand for 
houses in different types of environment. The level of 
rents according to the survey seemed to be low compared 
with other Arab countries. For example, 54.1% of household 
tennants paid less than 25 J. D. per month while about 15% 
of tennants paid between 25-49 J. D. monthly. 
The average number of rooms per household was 3.1, 
with little difference between rural and urban areas. The 
average number of rooms in the refugeee camps was 2.4. 
Jabr (1989) found that a family of four or five members in 
a refugee camp was likely to have only two rooms of 12 
square meters. It is important to mention that the size of 
rooms, the type of building and the material used in 
construction differ from one area to another. It is 
possible to measure the density of house occupance by 
dividing the number of people by the number of rooms. The 
results reveal that about 2 people occupy one room. This 
relatively low density may be due to effect of migration 
and the changes in the extended family structure system. 
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Table 4.17 
Percentage distribution of households by monthly rent 
(Jordanian dinar J. D. ) in rural and urban areas. 
AREA < 25 J. D. 25-49 J. D. 50-74 J. D. > 75 J. D. 
Rural 66.8 7.5 25.7 0.0 
Urban 46.0 34.0 19.7 0.3 
Total 54.1 14.7 21.3 0.1 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Table 4.18 shows that a high proportion of households 
in the refugee camps (43.4) lived in two rooms, while in 
rural areas about 60% of the household lived in two or 
three rooms. In urban areas the situation is better where 
more than half of all households lived in three or four 
rooms. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that 
accommodation conditions in urban areas are better than in 
rural areas, while the housing conditions in rural areas 
are superior to those in the refugee camps. 
Table 4.18 
The distribution of households by house size (% 
AREA 
1 2 3 
NUMBER 
4 
OF ROOMS 
5 6+ Average 
Rural 5.8 26.5 34.2 20.2 8.3 5.0 3.1 
Urban 10.0 21.0 26.7 25.0 11.3 6.0 3.2 
Refugee 
camps 13.0 43.4 32.3 10.1 1.0 0.0 2.4 
Total 7.8 26.5 31.7 20.6 8.5 4.8 3.1 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
188 
4.6 Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter indicate that 
the West Bank population composition although similar in 
terms of some aspects of its population structure to most 
developing countries is distinctive and in many respects 
unique because of its political and geographical context. 
For example, it has been shown that young people (under 15 
years) constitute a lower percentage of the total 
population than might be expected, and the elderly also 
constitute only a small proportion. This age structure 
affects the dependency ratio of the society. The sex 
ratio for the age group 15-64 is 92 males for every 100 
females. This provides evidence of migration selectivity. 
The result indicates that the proportion of young people is 
smaller than expected. As the result of high fertility, 
the household sizes are still very large, with 60% of the 
household having 5 to 10 members. 
Educational characteristics are considered to be an 
important variable in determining the demographic 
behaviour. The survey results indicate that the proportion 
of Palestinians pursuing higher education is very high 
compared with other developing countries. The most 
important issue arising from this is the changing attitudes 
towards female education. The direct effect of this 
educational surge on the demographic situation will be 
manifested in the rising female age at marriage and the 
changes which can be expected to follow in people's views 
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about childbearing behaviour. 
The proportion of female employment is very low as 
compared with other countries. Culture factors still 
discourage women from working outside their homes and in a 
mixed environment with males. Most females are still 
performing unpaid work within their household, or helping 
their parents with agricultural work. This situation may 
strengthen the dominant role of males in the family 
decision making. It also makes females'priority centred on 
childbearing. 
The chapter has shown that the majority of the West 
Bank population receive a moderate income. Most of this 
income is brought in by the head of the household. About 
one quarter of West Bank households face occasional 
financial difficulties as compared with about 8% who face 
permanent financial problems. The survey results suggest 
that on average there are two persons to a room in 
Palestinian households, and that West Bankers give 
priority to building houses either before or immediately 
after marriage. More than 75% of West Bank households own 
their houses. 
The differences between areas (rural, urban and 
refugee camps) are quite large. These variations 
themselves help to explain some of the geographical 
differences which exist in attitudes towards childbearing 
behaviour and family formation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES 
ON MARRIAGE PATTERNS 
5.1 Introduction 
Social customs and norms in West Bank society 
underwent a remarkable change in the twentieth century. 
The process of change was accelerated by the introduction 
of new schools and higher education institutions, the 
influence of Western culture, political factors such as the 
military occupation and the high level of forced migration, 
new job opportunities in Israel's labour market, as well as 
more diffuse aspects of socio-economic development. The 
effect of these factors differ from one area to another as 
well as between different groups in each area. 
It is generally assumed that marriage patterns are 
influenced to a varying degree by education levels, socio- 
cultural patterns, family cohesiveness and the nature of 
marriage arrangements. This chapter will explore and 
analyse the relationship between these various factors and 
marriage patterns in the West Bank. In particular the 
chapter investigates the scale of marriage between 
relatives and the age at marriage of both males and 
females. It will also investigate the changes which have 
taken place in these events and in the attitudes of couples 
in different areas and in different groups with relation to 
changes in cultural values and customs. 
The importance of studying marriage patterns and the 
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variations which exist between sub-areas and groups is 
immensely great for the study of fertility behaviour, 
because marriage constitutes the basis of family formation 
and the starting point for most child bearing couples. 
5.2 Marriage arrangements: cultural dimension 
In the Muslim world, marriage has been interpreted as 
a family affair, sanctioned by society in full anticipation 
that normal people should ultimately be married. By making 
a choice about their son's partner, the parent contributes 
towards reinforcing traditional values of parental 
authority and dependence (Wittfogel, 1953). In Arab 
societies, the father's dominance and influence over his 
family is much greater than in the West, and only a very 
few young people would dare to defy their parents and marry 
those of their own choice without their parents consent. 
Such independence of action would normally occur only 
amongst people who have lived in western countries and who 
marry western women. The case is very different for 
Palestinians who live outside the West Bank in other Arab 
countries, but who still have their parents in Palestine. 
In this situation, both males and females need to obtain 
the blessing of their parents before initiating their 
marriage. 
Marriage without the approval of the family is 
totally unacceptable in some Arab and Islamic societies. 
When it happens, the effects of breaching social norms and 
traditions are strongly felt by the bride and groom after 
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marriage. For example, in many instances, sons or even 
daughters, are excluded from inheritance of family wealth 
and are looked down upon by the community at large, for 
their deviations from the social equilibrium. 
Segregation between the sexes is a major mechanism 
which reinforces traditional values and norms with regard 
to arranged marriages, since it reduces the opportunity for 
self selection of spouses. Segregation between the sexes 
has been based upon Islamic teaching and traditions (May, 
1980). According to Peristiany (1965), any contact 
between males and females in Arab cultures is potentially 
dangerous and might lead to sexual affairs. For this 
purpose, seclusion and segregation have been carefully 
maintained in the Arab world for protection of females and 
to sustain family honour. 
The socially imposed segregation on unmarried people 
makes it difficult for them to fall in love without the 
categorical consent of the head of the family. This is 
especially so for girls. Consequently, the opportunity for 
men and women to make marriage arrangements on their own 
seems minimal. Although Islamic teaching urges 
segregation, yet Islam gives males and females the chance 
to see each other in the presence of their families prior 
to the making of the marriage contract. Islam also places 
the final decision in the hands of the girl whether or not 
to accept her proposed partner. 
Couples often get to know each other through 
arrangements made with close relatives or friends. The 
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advent of Universities, female employment, and the 
political role played by women as a result of the 
prevailing situation have all contributed to the gradual 
emancipation of women from the strictest traditional norms 
and values. 
In the West Bank, as well as in most Arab countries, 
Islamic teaching remains the basis for the maintenance and 
cohesiveness of the Arab family. Therefore, marriage and 
other family affairs are still subject to Islamic courts 
under Islamic "sharia" law. This may be considered by some 
as an impediment to social change in most of the Arab and 
Islamic world. Despite the rigid system confirmed by 
traditional and religious values concerning the mixing of 
the sexes in public places, changes on a limit scale have 
taken place in the West Bank (Hadded, 1980) especially 
amongst educated urban families and amongst the wealthy 
with western backgrounds. Some of the younger generation 
have started to meet in public and in private to talk with 
one another before marriage. 
There are several reasons for the practice of pre- 
arranged marriages in the West Bank: 
1. Communication difficulties between the sexes make it 
difficult for males to chose their partners. 
2. Tradition stipulates that marriage takes place under 
the direction of the husband's family. The man is 
expected to formally request the consent of his father 
in law before marriage, even though in some cases 
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marriage is pre-arranged at the time of a girl's birth 
(betrothal). 
3. Tradition in the West Bank demands explicitly that 
marriage should be initiated by the couples' parents, 
ruling out therefore any possibility of self-selection 
by spouses. 
4. In some cases marriage is seen as an economic 
security. A rich family will want to make sure that 
sons and daughters will marry brides and bridegrooms of 
their same status. This is assured by the mechanism of 
the bride price (dowry) demanded by rich families 
ensuring that not every one can marry a daughter from 
their family. 
5. Sometimes the family contributes to the dowry of the 
bride, but if the prospective husband has adequate 
savings for the dowry, and is economically independent, 
he might be able to marry without a family arrangement. 
However, he may later be chastised by his family and 
may be punished through disinheritance (Rosenfeld, 
1957). 
6. It is unlikely for the parents of the girl to agree to 
a man's request for their daughter's hand without the 
presence of his father and in some cases members of his 
extended family. 
The families start to seek suitable partners for 
their sons whenever they reach a marriageable age. In 
most cases families carry out all marriage arrangements on 
behalf of their sons' and without their prior knowledge of 
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the subject, especially when the prospective boy does not 
show any intention to marry. The male and female must 
obey their parents decision and consent to their 
arrangement as a result of cultural and Islamic teachings 
which emphasise the importance of loyalty and obedience to 
parents. 
The search for a wife is usually initiated at the 
request the son's father. In many cases, sisters, aunts 
and mothers pay visits to the prospective wife's home. 
During the visit, more attention will be paid to the girls 
behaviour especially to her interactions with her parents 
or other members of the family. Interestingly, in many 
instances, the girl does not even have the slightest idea 
of the purpose of the visit (Daghestani, 1968). 
According to Goode (1963), traditional views of the 
appropriate wife require her to embody the qualities of 
honour, a good reputation, appropriate ancestry and 
pleasant physical appearance. However, the prophet 
Mohammed in his "Hadith" simply stated that: 
"A women is married for four things: her wealth, 
family status, beauty and her religion. He who 
does not marry the religious woman will be a 
loser" (Khan, 1978). 
Sometimes the son's family has no choice in seeking a 
partner for their son, especially when a suitable girl from 
the extended family is found. As the old Arabic saying 
goes "Ibn El Am Bitayyeh An Al Faras". That is "Your 
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uncle's son always has first priority". 
Sarhan (1976) in his study on Palestinians residing 
in Kuwait, found that 71% of the men in his sample had 
entrusted their mothers with their choice of partners. The 
remainder had made their own choice and convinced their 
parents or relatives to arrange the marriage of their 
choice. 
West Bank culture is harder on women than on men 
because of the obsession with honour. Women have less 
chances to participate in selecting their partners (Haddad, 
1980). The opinions of her father and family are decisive 
in the selection of a male partner. Frequently, the girl's 
family arranges her marriage without prior discussion with 
her. This procedure is not congruous with Islamic 
teaching. 
"If a man arranges the marriage of his daughter 
without her agreement, the whole marriage will be 
unacceptable". Hadith (Khan, 1978) 
According to Islamic law and Arab culture men have 
the right to marry more than one wife under specific 
conditions. In the West Bank the proportion of men who 
have more than one wife is very small. In this present 
study, the researcher found that only 1.8% of married men 
had more than one wife. Of these two thirds were more than 
50 years old. The reasons given were: 
1. Conflict between him and his first wife's family. 
2. The first wife proved infertile. 
3. The first wife was disobedient to her husband and his 
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family. 
5.3 Couples characteristics and methods of acquaintance 
Turning now to the survey it is possible to 
investigate the validity of many of the generalisations 
stated earlier. Table 5.1 shows that the majority of women 
(about 62%) were married to men without there having been 
any previous personal relationship. In villages and towns 
relatives often live close to each other and therefore they 
interact more strongly for purely social and economic 
reasons. The more cohesive structure of the extended 
family in rural areas also permits greater contact between 
potential spouses. only a small percentage of women in the 
sample (2.6%) married men whom they came to know through 
their work or through their studies. 
Table 5.1 
Husbands and wives methods of acquaintance by place of 
residence. (Percentages). 
In schools At work Through Did not 
& colleges relatives know him 
before 
Total population 1.0 1.6 35.2 62.1 
Small villages 0.3 0.3 40.0 59.3 
Towns 2.3 0.7 40.3 56.7 
City, lower class - 1.0 26.0 73.0 
City, middle class - 3.0 32.0 65.0 
City, upper class - 3.0 25.0 72.0 
Refugee camps 2.0 6.0 28.5 63.0 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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From a cursory glance at table 5.2, one can notice a 
negative relationship between the wife's age and the 
likelihood of her getting to know her husband through 
kinship links before marriage. The percentage decreases 
from 46% in the oldest generation to 25% for the youngest. 
Inversely, the proportion of women who did not know their 
husbands before marriage increases gradually from 52.7% in 
the oldest generation to 70% in youngest generation. These 
remarkable findings attest the continued significance of 
social norms in the making of marriage arrangements. The 
trend may be partially explained by the rising proportion 
of the population living in urban environments, where 
kinship links operate less well in introducing spouses to 
one another before marriage. 
Table 5.2 
Husband and wife's methods of acquaintance by wife's age. 
Wife's age In schools At work Through Did not 
& colleges relatives know him 
before 
More than 50 years 0.1 0.9 46.3 52.7 
Between 30-50 years 0.2 1.0 34.4 62.7 
Less than 30 years 2.6 3.3 25.0 70.0 
Total population 1.0 1.6 35.2 62.1 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
As for the influence of education on marriage 
arrangements, Table 5.3 indicates that although highly 
educated women may have greater freedom to reject their 
potential partners, the majority still married men whom 
they had not previously known. The proportion of women who 
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were married to relatives decreases from 44.7% among 
illiterate women to 24.3% among highly educated women. 
But the most remarkable finding of Table 5.3 remains the 
fact that the percentage of women who married strangers 
(men not known before marriage) actually increased with 
increases in the educational level attained. This can be 
attributed to the following: Highly educated females have 
their own views regarding their potential partners. As 
mentioned earlier the decision and opinions of educated 
females are more respected and more welcomed by the members 
of their family. As a result, they are normally selective 
in their choice with regard to their partners. For 
example, a highly educated female may be willing to accept 
a stranger because of his qualifications and status while 
being inherently opposed to marriage to a relative. Less 
educated women were still in many cases forced to marry 
relatives. 
Table 5.3 
Husbands and wifes methods of acquaintance by educational 
levels. (Percentages). 
Wifes In schools At work Through Did not 
educational & colleges relatives know him 
level before 
Illiterate - 0.3 44.7 55.0 
*Low education 0.1 0.4 36.9 62.6 
**Middle education 0.3 1.4 34.9 63.4 
***High education 3.8 4.5 24.3 67.4 
Total population 1.0 1.6 35.2 62.1 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
* elementary and preparatory 
** secondary 
*** college, university 
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5.4 Age at Marriage 
Age at marriage remains an important variable in any 
comprehensive study on demography (McCarthy, 1982). 
Demographic studies have shown that the differences in age 
at marriage can account for substantial variations in 
fertility behaviour, and that changes in age at marriage 
have had a dramatic influence on fertility levels through 
changing the length of exposure to the risk of 
childbearing. 
The process of socio-economic development and 
demographic changes always take place at different rates 
among different sub-groups of any society. Therefore, when 
studying the pattern of age at marriage it is important to 
consider the extent to which these patterns differ within a 
population, and to assess why certain segments of the 
population are experiencing demographic change more rapidly 
than others. 
5.4.1 Age at marriage and place of residence 
Forces affecting how marriages are arranged, changing 
levels of educational attainment and many other factors 
reviewed in chapter 5 impinge upon the age at first 
marriage. Table 5.4 shows the survey results for the mean 
age at marriage for males. This was 25.6 years while for 
females it was only about 19 years. The youngest male 
found in the sample was married at the age of 14 years as 
compared with the youngest female who married at the age of 
12 years. The highest mean for male age at marriage was 
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found in the city middle class area (27.6 years) reflecting 
male ambitions to reach a higher standard of living prior 
to marriage. By contrast the high mean age at marriage 
amongst the city's lower class (27.7 years) must be 
attributed to the financial difficulties faced by males who 
need to save money in order to be able to pay the demanded 
bride price. 
Table 5.4 
Mean age at marriage in different areas. 
Area Men Women 
Average Standard Average Standard 
deviation deviation 
Small villages 24.8 5.7 19.1 3.5 
Towns 25.3 5.7 19.4 4.2 
City lower class 27.7 5.7 18.0 3.5 
City middle class 27.6 6.9 18.9 3.5 
City upper class 25.6 5.8 18.7 3.6 
Refugee camps 24.3 5.0 17.8 3.1 
Total population 25.6 3.1 19.0 3.8 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
Among females, the mean age at marriage fluctuated 
between 17.8 years in refugee camps and 19.4 years in the 
towns. The mean age at marriage in rural areas appeared to 
be higher than in urban areas. This may be due to the 
greater importance of marriage between relatives. As a 
result females normally wait for their male relatives to 
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come and ask for their hands. 
Figure 5.1: Mean age at marriage. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 5.4. 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 examine the distribution of age at 
marriage in different sub areas. It is noted from the 
table that about 40% of women in the sample were married 
before reaching the age of 18 as compared with 2.4% for 
men. The proportion of women who married after the age of 
25 years was less than 6%, compared with nearly 40% of 
men. Regarding the differences between sub areas, it can 
be noted from table 5.5 that males in rural areas married 
at earlier ages than their urban counterparts. The 
proportion of males in rural areas who married before the 
age of 20 years is 11% (12.3% in small villages and 9.2% in 
towns) compared with 6.3% in urban areas. The highest 
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percentage of late marriages were found amongst the city's 
middle and lower classes (10% and 13% respectively). On 
the other hand, the proportion of urban women who married 
before the age of 20 years was 67.4%, higher than amongst 
rural women (57%). The highest percentage of females 
marrying before the age of 20 years was found in refugee 
camps (78%) while the lowest percentage was found in towns 
(55%). 
The differences in age at marriage between male and 
female can be attributed to cultural influences which 
favour women being younger than their husbands. Women are 
also encouraged to marry early for reasons associated with 
their honour. The differences between the different areas 
can be explained by some of the following factors: 
1. Marriage costs are higher in cities than in towns and 
villages. 
2. In cities, a wife is unlikely to dwell with the family 
of her husband, unlike wives in towns and villages 
where the majority of them do not object to living with 
the husband's family. 
3. The standards of living are higher in cities than in 
towns and villages, and this may be due to the 
structure of cities, which required more saving of 
money for facing the high demands of city life. 
4. In the villages or towns, wives may co-operate with 
their husbands viz a viz work in agriculture. 
Therefore, the bride is considered to be additional 
labour force to the family. 
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5. The availability of higher educational institutions in 
the city. 
5.4.2 Education and age at marriage 
The demographic literature reviewed in chapter 1 
revealed that there is a direct relationship between level 
of education and age at marriage: i. e. the lower the level 
of education the lower the mean age at marriage. Table 
5.7 shows that this relationship holds for the West Bank 
population under study. This relationship is examined 
using statistical tests of association later in the 
chapter. The proportion of uneducated and poorly 
educated men who married before the age of 22 was about 
27%. This percentage decreased to 15.9% among people with 
medium levels of education and to 5.7% among males with 
higher levels of education. About 50% of uneducated and 
poorly educated females were married before reaching the 
age of 18 as compared with 20% of wives who achieved medium 
levels of schooling and 5% of females with higher levels of 
education. 
After marriage, West Bank females usually discontinue 
their education. This is mainly due to the fact that 
pursuit of further education and employment are regarded by 
some as incompatible with marriage. Women's attitudes 
towards the education and marriage of their sons and 
daughters is discussed later in the chapter. The survey 
showed a clear gender split in people's aspirations for 
their children's future. More than 80% of wives wanted 
their sons to achieve higher education prior to getting 
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married. In contrast, about 66% of wives favoured early 
marriage for their daughters. Therefore, it is clear that 
most wives in the sample desire higher levels of 
educational attainment for their sons than for their 
daughters. Only 13% of wives supported the idea that their 
sons should be married before entering employment. 
5.4.3 Respondents age and their age at marriage 
Age at marriage in the West Bank is clearly a feature 
of society which is changing rapidly. To examine this 
it 
was decided to evaluate the age of marriage of men and 
women from different cohorts in the population (Table 5.8). 
From the table it can be noted that the proportion of men 
between 30 and 50 years who married before the age of 22 
was lower than for other age groups. This may be so 
because the older generation had lower levels of education 
while the younger generation has gained limited wealth 
because of the accessability of the Israeli labour market. 
The relatively high salaries in the Israeli labour market 
(A1-Araj, 1989) has encouraged these young adults to leave 
school early and to earn sufficient money to permit their 
marriage. The lower proportion of middle aged respondents 
who married at an early age (less than 22 years) in part 
is a result of the scarcity of jobs which existed during 
the period of control by the Jordanian regime This 
scarcity forced the majority of males to pursue their 
education so that they could scale better and more 
prestigious jobs. In the West Bank, as in Jordan, anyone 
209 
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seeking a government sector or professional job must 
produce a secondary examination certificate (Tawjihi). 
Since women in the West Bank do not have any 
financial responsibility with regard to their marriage, 
their distribution of age at first marriage is very 
different from that of men. The proportion of wives in the 
younger generation who married at an early age (before 
reaching 18 years) was 30% as compared with 43% and 52% for 
middle and older generations respectively. This suggests 
that female age at marriage has increased through time and 
as a result the period of female childbearing has become 
shorter, thus influencing potential family size. 
As table 5.12 shows, later in the chapter, more than 
half of the wives in the sample strongly favoured early 
marriages for their daughters, while only one third 
discouraged their daughters from marrying at an early age. 
For the purpose of the attitudinal questions an "early age 
at marriage" was defined as 16 years old or younger. It 
is difficult to determine the precise reasons for the high 
proportion of wives who supported an early marriage for 
their daughters. It might be attributed to the wives' fear 
of their daughters not finding a suitable partner. 
In West Bank culture a husband is normally some 
years older than his wife. This can be explained by the 
following reasons: - 
1. Husbands believe that younger wives will be more 
obedient. 
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2. Younger wives are believed to be more capable of 
bearing more children. 
3. Younger wives are judged to be physically more capable 
of looking after their husbands, especially when they 
become old. 
4. Younger wives are more sexually appealing to their 
husbands. 
These factors are reinforced by a female preference 
for older husbands. Over 80% of women in the study 
believed that husbands should be older than their wives. 
5.5 Marriage between relatives 
The practice of maintaining family ties through 
kinship marriage has been common in most Arab countries. 
In the West Bank there is a general concensus that marriage 
between relatives is preferable to exogamous counterparts 
(Ata, 1986). Kinship marriages within Arab society pre- 
date Islam. Until this century, in most Arab countries 
most marriages take place within a tribe or clan between 
relatives, and in many cases marriages being organised by 
parents at the time of their children's birth. In spite of 
Islamic teaching which encourages marriage from outside 
the extended family, traditional marriage behaviour remains 
dominant even in the late 20th century. 
Preference for endogamous marriage is most prevalant 
amongst certain social groups in the West Bank. Studies of 
marriage customs in Arab society, including those of 
Palestinian society, have found that few if any changes 
have taken place in the search behaviour of people seeking 
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spouses (Goode, 1963; Grangvist, 1935). 
The differences of marriage patterns between 
Palestinian camps, villages and cities relate to the 
different basis of social organisation of each of these 
areas. Villages and camps often have a highly cohesive 
structure and the extended family is still the basis of 
social life (Sirhan, 1977). This is not true of the city. 
Shamir (1980) found that intermarriage between 
refugees and non-refugee Palestinians was almost non- 
existent because non-refugees refused to marry off their 
daughters to men from refugee camps as they were regarded 
as inferior because of their low standards of living and 
their insecure financial and economic situation. 
In spite of the relative stability and continuity of 
kinship marriages, some changes have emerged. The 
reduction in the practice of endogamous marriage may be 
partly explained by the increased scale of emigration of 
young people to more economically stable and better social 
environments. When male workers have become more free in 
their movements and actions, they have also become more 
independent in making personal decisions. The diffusion of 
education for both males and females has also made the 
younger generation more flexible and less obedient to their 
families especially with regard to the aspects of marriage. 
Nevertheless, kinship marriages constitute a salient 
feature of the Palestinian society. Grangvist (1935) in 
his study on Palestinian villages found that 33.7% of his 
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sample were kinship marriages of whom 23.5% had married 
relatives from the same village. Fifty years later the 
figures on kinship marriages derived from the author's 
survey show only slight differences. 
Apart from being from the same religion, there are 
other criteria that can be used in determining the 
appropriateness and compatibility of a wife. Such criteria 
include the wife's social class and personal qualities. 
The usual pattern is to marry the daughter of an uncle, 
that is the daughter of ones father's brother. If, 
however, this is not possible, then the closest cousin will 
be considered. 
Many reasons have been provided for this preference 
pattern: - 
1. Marriage between cousins is believed to cause fewer 
personal and social problems for the husband and his 
family. 
2. Marriage between relatives helps to maintain and 
strengthen the existing kinship ties and cohesiveness 
between families. 
3. It helps preserve property rights within the family 
(Michaelson and Goldschmidt, 1971). 
4. The dowry in case of kinship marriages is lower than in 
other cases. 
Marriage preference between cousins is best expressed 
in Arab proverbs such as "a 'male cousin comes first" and 
"the wife who is a cousin can put up with austerity but a 
wife who is not kin needs to be looked after". These 
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proverbs are used in order to provide support for kinship 
marriages. 
5.5.1 Kinship marriages and place of residence 
To examine the differences between the different sub 
areas, Table 5.9 indicates that marriages between close 
cousins are viewed as more advantageous than marriages 
between other people in an extended family. More than one 
quarter of the couples in the sample were married to close 
relatives. The lowest percentage of relative marriages was 
found in the city upper classes (29%) of whom 23% married 
close relatives and 6% other relatives. The highest 
percentage of couples who married from within the extended 
family ("hamulah") was found in rural areas (48%). 
Urban people are more likely to marry other urban 
residents to whom they are not related. In the upper 
classes marriage takes place between rich families while in 
the middle classes people usually seek highly qualified 
partners. As for the people in the lower classes a high 
proportion were married to people from other regions of the 
West Bank. 
The results in Table 5.9 support the observations 
made earlier with respect to kinship marriages. Kinship 
networks and extended family structures were, not 
unexpectedly, stronger in rural areas than in urban one's. 
The figures shown in Table 5.9 are different from those 
obtained by Rosenfeld (1957) in a study of Palestinian 
villages living in Israel. Rosenfeld found that about 60% 
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of marriages were between cousins. Therefore, one can 
conclude that kinship marriages have become somewhat less 
important. 
Table 5.9 
Relationship between married couples by place of residence. 
(Percentages). 
KINSHIP RELATIONSHIP NO KINSHIP RELATIONSHIP 
COUSINS OTHER SAME LIVING ANOTHER 
RELATIVES AREA REGION 
Total 
population 27.3 15.0 30.1 27.5 
Small 
villages 27.3 18.3 15.0 39.3 
Towns 27.0 23.3 36.0 13.7 
City, lower 
class 30.0 - 32.0 38.0 
City, middle 
class 27.0 7.0 50.0 16.0 
City, upper 
class 23.0 6.0 46.0 25.0 
Refugee 
camps 30.3 12.1 20.0 17.0 
Chi2 = 142.26 d. f. = 15 significant at 0.001 
The chi square test was carried out on absolute data and 
not on the closed ratio statistics listed in the table. 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
5.5.2 Differences of kinship marriages 
It is important to measure the influence of some 
variables on kinship marriages for both husbands and wives. 
The results are shown in Table 5.10. It is noted from the 
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table that kinship marriage is negatively associated with 
the educational levels of both men and women. It seems 
that womens' level of education has an influence on the 
likelihood of kinship marriage but this is not the case 
with regard to mens' education attainment, where the 
proportion of husbands who married relatives decreased 
gradually from 47.1% among illiterates to 37.9% amongst the 
highly educated wives respectively. One can conclude that 
marriage from outside the kinship group is more probable 
amongst educated couples. 
Figure 5.2: Relationship between married couples. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 5.9. 
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The age of men and women has a negative relationship 
with kinship marriages. The proportion of men who married 
relatives increased with age from 37.3% amongst younger men 
to 48.1% amongst the elderly. This same pattern also holds 
for women. The chit test was applied to both data sets and 
Cosin 
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Villages Towns City, L. C City, M. C City, U. C Camps Total Pop. 
indicated the greater statistical significance of the 
relationship between the ages of wives and marriage of 
relatives. The chi2 calculated value was 27.21 with 2 
degrees of freedom, while the value of chi2 for husbands 
was 6.93, which is only significant at a low level of 
confidence. 
Table 5.10 
Relationship between married couples relative to education, 
current age and age at marriage. (Percentages). 
HUSBAND WIFE 
From Outside From Outside 
Kinship Kinship Kinship Kinship 
Education level 
Illiterate 47.1 52.9 48.8 51.2 
Low 42.1 57.9 41.0 59.0 
Middle 41.1 58.9 40.4 59.6 
High 37.9 62.1 30.1 69.9 
Respondent's age 
More than 50 48.1 51.9 55.7 44.3 
Between 30-50 39.6 60.4 41.5 58.5 
Less than 30 37.3 62.7 34.9 65.1 
Respondent's age 
at marriage 
Less than 19 54.3 45.7 44.6 55.4 
Between 19-28 45.1 54.9 40.4 59.6 
More than 29 29.8 70.2 21.4 78.6 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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Table 5.11 
Chit tests of association with kinship marriages. 
Variables Chi2 d. f. Level of significance 
Husbands education 3.0 3 0.091 (not significant) 
Wives education 12.4 3 0.006 (significant) 
Husbands age 6.9 2 0.030 (significant) 
Wives age 27.2 2 0.001 (significant) 
Husbands age at 
marriage 20.3 2 0.001 (significant) 
Wives age at 
marriage 4.5 2 0.103 (not significant) 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Husbands and wives age at marriage is also negatively 
associated with kinship marriages. It is noted from Table 
5.10 that about half of the couples who married at an early 
age (less than 19 years) got married to relatives. The 
proportion of men is higher than that of women. This 
confirms the idea mentioned earlier that parents decisions 
are more influential in marriages occurring at an early 
age. On the other hand, only about 2% of couples who 
married after reaching 29 years of age were relatives. 
The statistical results in table 5.11 indicate that 
husbands age at marriage is statistically significant at a 
level of 0.001 with 2 degrees of freedom, while wives age 
at marriage is not statistically significant, which could 
be interpreted as suggesting that husband's age at marriage 
is more important in determining kinship marriage patterns. 
This is true because marriage is usually initiated by men 
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and not by women in West Bank society. 
5.6 Parental preference towards children's marriage 
It is important to measure and investigate the 
parental preference towards their children's marriage. As 
a result of cultural norms and values, it is worth 
measuring the preferences of men and women separately 
towards their son's and daughters marriage arrangements. 
Table 5.12 indicates that less than 20% of parents 
wanted their children to marry relatives. Husbands are 
more supportive of kinship marriages because most kinship 
marriages happen within the father's family in order to 
help maintain the family structure. Wives favoured 
independent marriages to a greater extent with 92% of wives 
suggesting that kinship marriages reduced the wife's 
freedom (Table 5.13). 
Changes in parental attitudes towards kinship 
marriages may be attributed to several reasons. 
1. Most wives are likely to have suffered in some way from 
the extended family system (Rosenfeld, 1957). 
2. In particular the survey confirmed particular problems 
and difficulties arose in relation to exchange (swap) 
marriages between families. It was frequently reported 
that one wife paid the price for the unpleasant 
behaviour of the other. Table 5.13 indicates that more 
than 90% of those surveyed were not in favour of 
exchange marriages. 
3. It has been proven that kinship marriages have an 
adverse effect on children's health. The degree of 
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risk increases the closer the pattern of inter- 
marriage. 89% of wives agreed that marriage between 
relatives had a negative effect on children's health. 
Islamic teachings and the "Sharia" also urge people to 
marry non-relatives. The Prophet Mohammad made this 
clear in his "hadith" when he said: - "Marry strangers 
so as not to pine" (Khan, 1978). 
Table 5.12 
Parental preference towards children's marriage 
arrangements (percentages). 
From From From Free 
relatives same living another to choose 
area region 
Husband 
His sons 21.1 29.3 8.4 41.1 
His daughters 22.3 38.4 8.9 30.3 
Wife 
Her sons 13.3 28.1 11.6 46.9 
Her daughters 17.0 38.1 12.8 32.0 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
It can be seen from Table 5.12 that parents are 
likely to grant their sons more freedom in marriage 
selection. This is understood to be as a result of 
cultural values and norms and due to the Arabs obsession 
with honour and reputation. Table 5.12 shows that parents 
preferred their children to marry from within their 
residential areas more than from other regions. The 
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findings show that parents particularly favour marriage by 
their daughters to partners from the same residential areas 
(38%). For sons the equivalent proportion was only 29%. 
The reason behind this is probably parent's greater 
commitment towards their daughters after marriage. 
Table 5.13 
Wives attitudes towards marriage issues (%). 
Marriage issues Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly 
agree disagree 
Favour early female 
marriage 52.7 13.2 15.6 18.4 
Male higher education 
is better than marriage 69.5 12.3 12.3 5.8 
The wife should be older 
than her husband 8.9 8.5 42.8 39.7 
Sons should marry before 
entering employment 8.1 4.9 43.0 43.9 
Kinship marriages reduce 
wifes freedom 73.2 18.8 2.5 5.5 
Favour exchange marriages 4.1 4.6 49.2 42.1 
Marriage between 
relatives negatively 
affect childrens health 74.3 14.2 6.8 4.8 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the influence of socio- 
economic and cultural factors on marriage patterns. More 
specifically, it discussed the three major issues of 
marriage patterns: marriage arrangement, age at marriage 
and marriage between relatives. It is evident from the 
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discussion that marriage arrangements are less influenced 
by social and economic development than by the norms of 
Islamic teaching regarding segregation between the sexes 
and patterns of family structure and authority. Men appear 
to have a greater freedom than in the past in their choice 
of partners. Women on the other hand, are still under 
considerable pressure to accept their family's choice of 
partner. 
The survey revealed, however, that most West Bank 
families would like to give their children more freedom to 
select their partners. This may well have direct 
repercussions on future patterns of childbearing and family 
planning. 
Age at marriage has witnessed substantial change in 
recent years. Male and female age at marriage has 
increased as a result of education, changes in parents 
aspirations, urbanisation, economic development, social 
change (most couples now prefer to live separately from 
their parent's families), and the increased value of 
dowries and expenditure on marriages. The data indicate 
significant differences in age at marriage between 
different levels of educational attainment and between 
different age groups. 
Dramatic changes have taken place in the prevalence 
of marriage between relatives. These changes have been 
brought about by a range of factors such as the transition 
from extended to nuclear family structures, the shift from 
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agricultural work to other sectors, and changes in social 
and health problems. All these factors make marriage 
between relatives less favoured among young and educated 
people. The survey of family attitudes confirms these 
changes with most families preferring their children to 
marry non-relatives. 
Inevitably, changes in marriage patterns will be 
followed by changes in fertility levels through the 
shortening of the potential childbearing span. This trend 
in turn makes a couple's decisions with regards to 
childbearing more critical and may favour more independent 
and more rational decision making in the future. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CHILDBEARING BEHAVIOUR: DETERMINANTS AND ATTITUDES 
6.1 Introduction 
Human reproductive behaviour is a complex phenomenon, 
and it varies greatly within a population. The mechanisms 
underlying this variation are difficult to distinguish. 
However, there are substantial differences in fertility 
related attitudes and behaviour between developing 
countries with their high fertility, and developed 
countries with their lower fertility rates. Moreover, 
factors causing variations in fertility behaviour are 
difficult to ascertain and require an explanation of socio- 
economic and cultural dimensions and their 
interrelationships (Saleh, 1987). 
This chapter has two main aims. The first part is 
devoted to the discussion of the surveys findings of the 
main determinants of a couples childbearing behaviour. The 
second part of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of 
couples attitudes towards their own children's childbearing 
decisions. This comparative analysis permits analysis of 
the differences between parents behaviour and the future 
behaviour of their children. 
6.2 Childbearing behaviour and cultural norms 
Cultural factors and norms play an important role in 
shaping people's decisions in almost every aspect of life, 
especially in traditional societies. Childbearing 
behaviour and the decision to have children are considered 
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to be central issues in traditional societies. High levels 
of fertility have tended to be supported and praised by 
traditional societies and religious teaching (Carvajal and 
Geithman, 1976). The rationale for this is easy to find 
in the desire to preserve family lineage and to reproduce 
society under conditions of high levels of mortality. 
Cultural norms can be regarded as rules setting out 
how people ought to behave, act and feel in particular 
circumstances or social conditions. Ryder (1973) 
indicated that the concept of cultural norms serves as a 
basic explanation for peoples behaviour. On the other 
hand, some studies (Blake, 1972; Lee, 1974) have argued 
that family size norms are determined by the type of family 
structure and the degree of cohesiveness between family 
members since the continuity and strength of kin groups is 
dependent on the size of the group. 
Most people in developing countries respond to the 
cultural norms subconciously with little regard for the 
other considerations (Goldberg, 1980) such as costs and 
benefits and the actual economic family situation. Many 
studies (Gustavus and Nam, 1970; Gustavus, 1973; Frohardt- 
Lane et al., 1977) indicated that attitudes toward 
childbearing and family size are learned at very early 
ages. It is worth mentioning that the question of 
childbearing behaviour sometimes reflects all the 
individual characteristics, decisions, motives and the 
impact of cultural norms on respondents behaviour. 
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Traditional norms are challenged by two main 
factors: - 
1) Rapid population growth has led to pressures on limited 
resources particularly in the absence of adequate 
socio-economic development. 
2) Modernisation that tends to undermine the role of 
traditionalism in life by making people more aware of 
alternative life style, particularly with regard to 
fertility behaviour. 
The cultural norms are often used to explain, predict 
and interpret trends and variations in reproductive 
behaviour according to both time (between periods) and 
location (between regions). Factors causing such 
variations in childbearing behaviour are difficult to 
ascertain and require explanation of the complexity of 
socio-economic and cultural determinants and their 
interrelationships (Saleh, 1987). 
The value given to childbearing in the West Bank has 
its roots deep in Arab culture which encourages couples to 
have large families. Marrying and having children have 
been strongly emphasized both in pre-Islamic and post 
Islamic eras. The importance of a large family has been 
advocated not only on religious grounds, but also for 
socio-economic and psychological reasons. 
Islamic teaching constituted the basic and important 
source of the cultural norms in most Arab and Islamic 
societies, the fertility level in these societies is 
remarkably high as shown by the result of the World 
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Fertility Survey. Also, Weeks (1988) indicates that the 
average level of childbearing in the Islamic world is 6 
children per woman. This resistance of fertility decline 
in some Arab and Islamic societies may be due to several 
factors, such as: 
1) The childbearing norms considered to be part of Islamic 
teaching. 
2) The use of contraceptives is unfavourable in Islamic 
teaching. 
3) The modest level of socio-economic development which 
failed to create substantial social changes. 
4) Political force has often given people a sense of 
insecurity about the future. The effect of this factor 
appears more clear in the case of the West Bank. 
6.3 Evaluating costs and benefits of children 
Economic analysis of childrens costs and benefits 
which are approriate to western societies might be 
misleading if applied intact to the developing countries 
(Cleave, 1974). Economic analysis should consider factors 
such as social setting, cultural norms and values of having 
children. In developing countries, parents expect to 
receive significant support from their surviving sons in 
old age. In addition, children may provide a cheap labour 
force and investment with relatively low level of 
consumption (Vlassoff and Vlassoff, 1980; Bulatao, 1982). 
There has been a considerable disagreement as to whether 
children incur benefits or burdens on their parents in 
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developing countries and traditional societies. Many 
studies argued that children give more than they take 
(Cain, 1977; Nag et al., 1978). Other studies suggest that 
children's costs are higher than their benefits (Vlassoff, 
1979; Lindert, 1983). 
Childrens' costs include an input of financial costs 
such as feeding, clothing, health care, education and the 
maintenance of children for almost two decades, and non- 
monetary costs such as time, social mobility and problems 
associated with children's adolescence. However, it is 
necessary to emphasize that all non-monetary costs in 
developing countries are of less significance as compared 
with similar costs in developed countries. One significant 
reason for such variation in the cost value is attributed 
to the low ratio of women entering the labour force. 
Moreover, childrens' benefit to their parents are numerous, 
some of which may take the form of economic rewards, while 
others are of a different nature and sometimes are 
difficult to measure (i. e. social and psychological 
rewards). 
In the West Bank the costs and benefits of having 
children are difficult to measure. This is so for several 
reasons: 
1) Variations in parents' perception of the benefits of 
having children. For example, what parent (X) 
considered to be of benefit might not be considered so 
by parent (Y). Cost and benefits are "relative 
measures" depending on family income, children's 
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consumption patterns and family aspirations. For 
example, the high cost of child rearing to a poorer 
family may be regarded as a low cost in a rich one. 
2) Measuring costs and benefits in numerical terms is 
extremely difficult given the qualitative nature of 
many dimensions of childrearing. 
3) It is doubtful whether survey respondents are able to 
either conceptualise childrearing in purely economic 
terms or to expresss their views on the topic in a 
consistant and logical fashion. Responses often 
reflect rationalisation of events given respondent's 
hindsight. 
In most developing countries, the net rewards of 
children relative to their parents greatly exceed the 
costs. Many studies have attempted to explain and examine 
inter-generational the wealth flows and their effects on 
the fertility transition (Caldwell, 1976b; Maani, 1990). 
To evaluate the level of rewards (children's support 
of their parents), all wives in the survey were asked if 
their children were currently more supportive of their 
parents than children in the past (last generation). The 
results as shown in table 6.1 reveal that more than half of 
all wives thought that children in the past were more 
supportive of their parents. Only about 15% of the wives 
believed that current support was close or equal to that of 
the last generation. A high proportion of wives (32.6%) 
did not give a precise answer to the question because many 
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of them had young children or no children at all. 
The differences in response between the various areas 
was quite clear (table 6.1). A higher proportion of wives 
in rural areas (and to some extent wives in refugee camps), 
believed that child support of parents had been greater in 
the past. These geographical differences can be attributed 
to the differential changes in family structure and 
educational aspirations which have taken place. The 
differences between the areas was statistically significant 
at the 0.001 level. 
Table 6.1 
Children's support of their parents: present and past 
generations (percentages). 
AREA LESS EQUAL/MORE NO ANSWER 
Total population 51.6 15.7 32.6 
Small villages 64.6 14.7 20.7 
Towns 77.0 12.3 10.7 
City, lower class 16.0 23.0 61.0 
City, middle class 20.0 20.0 60.0 
City, upper class 19.0 11.0 70.0 
Refugee camps 36.4 22.2 41.4 
Chi-square = 277 (based on absolute figures) 
df = 10 Significance 0.001 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
6.3 Reasons for "benefit" reduction 
Only the wives who responded by saying that support 
by children of their parents was less than in the past, 
were asked about the reasons behind this change. The 
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responses were grouped into four main categories as shown 
in table 6.2. This shows that the main reason given was 
the increase in the standards and cost of living, which 
made it more difficult for children to support their 
parents. The high cost of living was a particular problem 
for low income families who also favoured early marriage. 
None of the wives in the city upper classes gave this as a 
cause. 
The second most important reason was that children 
had become less concerned about traditional norms and 
customs. The diffusion of education, increased mobility, 
increased access to the mass media and the current 
political situation had all militated against the survival 
of traditional patterns. Those that gave this response 
were not drawn from any particular area. 
The third reason given by wives was that many 
children now lived far away from their families (outside 
the West Bank) as a result of migration (voluntary and 
compulsory) and that this had inevitably undermined 
patterns of child support. This was particularly the case 
because: 
1) It was difficult for migrants to transfer money to 
their parents inside the West Bank, because of the 
absence of Arab banks in the area and because of the 
Israeli authorities restrictions on the transfer of 
money. 
2) Some of the sons who lived in non-oil countries were 
unable to provide support for their families in the 
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West Bank. 
3) The sons who lived outside the Arab world (western 
countries) were becoming less and less concerned with 
the support of their parents. 
The results are contradictory with the findings of 
Vlassoff and Vlassoff (1980) who indicate that migrants 
sons have provided their families with better support than 
non-migrants sons. Their views may be true for a stable 
situation. 
The fourth major reason given was their son's wives 
discouraged them from supporting their parents. About 4% 
of the wives thought that this was the case. Most of 
these responses were from women in the refugee camps and in 
small villages. 
To examine the validity of these responses about the 
children's benefits to their families, the researcher 
investigated the effect of changing perceptions on the 
demand for children. He asked all women who had completed 
their childbearing period to answer the question "If you 
returned to the beginning of your married life, would you 
like to have more, less or the same number of children? " 
Some 17.4% of wives would like to have had more 
children, compared with 30.6% of wives who would have liked 
to have had less children, while some 46.6% of wives were 
satisfied with their family size. Only 5.6% of wives 
responded that they did not know. 
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Table 6.2 
Reasons for a reduction in childrens support of their 
parents (percentage). 
AREA CHANGES IN LESS AWAY WIFE PLAYS 
STANDARD CONCERN FROM NEGATIVE 
OF LIVING ABOUT FAMILY ROLE 
CULTURAL 
NORMS 
Total population 39.3 30.7 25.7 4.3 
Small villages 43.3 41.2 9.3 6.2 
Towns 45.3 16.3 35.8 2.6 
City lower class 12.5 31.2 56.3 0.0 
City middle class 15.0 40.0 45.0 0.0 
City upper class 0.0 57.9 36.8 5.3 
Refugee camps 25.0 47.2 19.4 8.4 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
This result supports the conclusion that childbearing 
behaviour will change in the future and that the womans 
decision may become more influential in determining demand 
for children and family size, especially as most of the 
wives who responded to this question were old aged, poorly 
educated and had a more restricted view of their 
traditional culture. 
Despite these findings, however, it is important to 
emphasize that couples awareness of childrens costs and 
benefits in the West Bank remains firmly in favour of a 
pro-natalist position. This pro-natalism has been based on 
reasons other than purely economic ones. 
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6.3.2 Decision making 
Fertility decision making is the central focus of 
many fertility theories (Becker, 1960; Easterlin, 1978) 
which assume that reproductive behaviour is the response to 
underlying tastes and constraints. The term "taste" which 
has been emphasized in economic theories of fertility 
behaviour (Easterlin, 1975; Leibenstein, 1974) covers a 
wide range of psychological factors, social norms, culture 
pressure and personal satisfaction and dissatisfaction. 
Because of the difficulty in measuring tastes directly, 
researchers usually choose to inquire into parents 
perceptions of forces affecting decision-making. 
In developing countries decision making on fertility 
involves many assumptions about the family formation 
process. In some cases the notion of individual decision 
making should be ignored and the focus should be 
concentrated on social decisions (kin group decisions, 
etc. ). In other cases, individual decision making may be 
very important and effective. This kind of decision often 
takes the costs and benefits of having children into 
account under the influence of cultural norms which define 
the individual's position (Rasul, 1987; U. N. 1981). 
The findings of the author's survey indicated that 
nearly 73% of couples claimed to make their own decisions 
about childbearing behaviour. 5.6% of the decisions were 
made by the husbands alone whilst 1.5% of the decisions 
were made by the wives. In contrast, about 27% of couples 
regarded their behaviour as reflecting socially determined 
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norms. This proportion is interesting since it is exactly 
in line with the proportion of husbands who were against 
the use of contraceptives by their wives. 
Three possible stages exist in fertility decisions; 
the perception stage, decision about pregnancy and post 
natal decision making (Hass, 1974). In each of these stages 
the fertility decision differs because of the complex 
interaction of different personal and socio-economic 
conditions accompanied by the demographic circumstances of 
each decision. It is worth mentioning that couples may 
pass through some of these stages without taking any 
decision (for example in the case of childless couples and 
in the case of couples who bear unwanted children). 
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss 
all these stages in detail. In what follows below, only 
the couples perceptions of childbearing and child rearing 
will be discussed and analysed. 
6.4 Couples perception of the next generation's 
childbearing behaviour 
Family members, especially parents, have a direct 
and indirect effect on their own children's childbearing 
behaviour through: 
a) intervention in their decision 
b) intergenerational transmission of fertility behaviour 
norms and values 
Gecas (1979), amongst other researchers, has stressed 
the importance of the relationship between a couples 
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behaviour and their parents background. 
To measure a couples perception towards their own 
children's childbearing behaviour, all respondents 
(husbands and wives) were asked the question "How many 
children would you prefer your children (sons and 
daughters) to have in the future as compared with your own 
experience? " Table 6.3 presents the findings. The table 
shows that about 55% of all husbands in the survey wanted 
their sons to make their own decisions. It is clear that 
both husbands and wives were willing in particular to give 
their daughters more freedom with regards to their future 
childbearing decisions. It is of course true that in West 
Bank culture parents have less influence on their married 
daughters than on their married sons. 
A striking feature of the table is that the 
proportion of men who wanted their own children to have 
smaller families than they had had was about half the 
proportion of these who want their children to have more. 
On the other hand, no such trend was evident amongst the 
women who were questioned. 
The results in table 6.3 lead to the conclusion that 
children will have more freedom in making childbearing 
decisions than has been the case in the past. If this 
proves to be the case, the demand for children may be 
reduced as a result of the slackening of pessure to conform 
to social norms set by relatives and parents. 
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Table 6.3 
Couples attitudes towards their children's behaviour as 
compared with their own experience (percentages). 
PREFER PREFER PREFER UP TO THEM 
MORE LESS EQUAL TO DECIDE 
CHILDREN CHILDREN NO. OF 
CHILDREN 
HUSBAND 
Sons 16.6 8.0 23.6 51.7 
Daughters 14.3 5.9 15.7 64.0 
WIFE 
Sons 8.9 8.6 19.3 63.1 
Daughters 6.6 9.0 15.2 69.7 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
6.5 Childbearing motives 
Information on reproductive attitudes and motivation 
may be helpful in understanding the factors affecting the 
demand for children (Easterlin, 1978). Motives for having 
children are the result of the complex interaction of a 
large number of social, economic, cultural and sometimes 
biological factors. However, Hoffman (1975) has pointed 
out that motives for having children differ from one group 
to another and even with the same individual from one time 
to another. Meade and Singh (1973), for example, has 
suggested that social considerations proved more important 
in his analysis of the Indian population, while economic 
factors were more highly weighted in the childbearing 
motives of people in developed countries. 
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Pohlman (1969) has argued that motives in general are 
determined by cultural norms on one hand, and on the other 
hand personal evaluations of the value and utility of 
children. It has been argued, for example, that security 
in old age in developing countries remains the most 
important motive for high fertility (Leibenstein, 1974). 
The findings of the author's study confirm this argument 
with a high proportion of women (31.1%) indicating child 
support to elderly parents is a main motive for having 
children. By contrast Lindert (1980; 1983) considered this 
motive to be of negligible importance. Nugent (1985) has 
argued that security in old age can be expected to be a 
strong influence under some conditions such as those 
existing in the most underdeveloped countries, where the 
absence of insurance systems, social security and pensions 
all greatly increase parental dependence in old age on 
their children (Kelly et al., 1976; Hohm, 1975). 
To determine womens motives, all women in the West 
Bank survey were asked to indicate the importance of a 
range of motives for having many children. The author 
then analysed the most important motive given by each 
respondent by classifying reasons into four main categories 
as represented in table 6.4. It can be seen that 58.1% of 
women attributed having children to socio-economic reasons, 
such as old age security (31.1%), family cohesiveness 
(17.9%), improvement of family status (5.3%) and gaining 
peoples respect (3.8%). 
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By contrast, 29.2% of wives related their decision to 
have children mainly to cultural reasons (e. g. 17.9% wanted 
to have children in order to keep the family name alive; 
11.3% of women wanted children so as to inherit family 
property). Rural women and rich urban families tended to 
emphasise this kind of motive. 
Only 9.9% of women stated that their religious 
beliefs were the prime factor in child bearing. These 
women perceived children as a gift from God, and thought 
the birth of a child would bring blessings, happiness and 
prosperity. It is important to mention that most religious 
women thought that Islamic teaching encouraged large 
families and discouraged the use of contraceptives. 
Finally, a small proportion of women (3%) reported 
having their children because of political reasons. While 
many may view this as a subsidiary justification about 3% 
felt it was of primary importance and a national obligation 
to have more children so as to outnumber the Israeli 
population, thus giving the Palestinians an advantage in 
the demographic struggle. 
Table 6.4 
Motives for having children. 
MOTIVE NUMBER 
Socio-economic 580 58.1 
Cultural 292 29.2 
Religious 99 9.9 
Political 28 2.8 
TOTAL 999 100 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
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6.6 Value of children 
The perceived value of children can be measured by 
examining desired family size. This indicator responds 
faster than actual fertility levels to changes in fertility 
intentions (Lee, 1974). Changes in the perceived value of 
children to their parents constitutes a key element in many 
theories of fertility transition (Caldwell, 1976b), 
especially when linked with the modernisation process. 
In the author's West Bank survey a number of 
different approaches were considered for measuring 
respondents' attitudes towards childbearing behaviour. It 
is possible, for example, to ask respondents how other 
people evaluate fertility behaviour and not how they feel 
about it themselves (Mason, 1983). Secondly, respondents 
can be asked about their approval and disapproval of 
particular types of behaviour. This approach is very 
common in studying respondents attitudes (National Opinion 
Research Centre, 1980). This latter approach was adopted 
with respondents being asked to express their attitudes 
towards childbearing behaviour. All respondents were given 
ten statements and were then asked for each statment to 
choose a response that most fully represented their 
attitude on a scale ranging from 1 to 4- "strongly agree" 
to "strongly disagree". 
The ten statements and a summary of the results are 
listed in Table 6.5. 
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6.6.1 Traditional beliefs 
One important motive for having children is the 
belief that by having children the family name is kept 
alive, maintaining lineage continuity and preserving family 
property: without this the family experiences what may be 
termed "true death". Table 6.5 shows that almost three 
quarters of wives in the sample agreed with this 
traditional belief. This is one fact encouraging husbands 
to divorce childless wives and to re-marry. 
For this and other reasons which will be discussed 
later, women in the past found themselves bearing as many 
children as possible as a result of the - 
a) High infant and child mortality rate. 
b) Social prestige and economic benefits of children quite 
apart from their low costs. 
c) The unavailability of contraceptives. 
Despite changes in these circumstances, table 6.5 
reveals that 43% of wives agreed and strongly agreed with 
the belief that women should have as many children as 
possible. 
In West Bank culture it is believed by many that a 
lot of pregnancies have no effect on a wifes health. 
Inversely, it is thought that if women stop having children 
for a long time then their chances of becoming pregnant 
again will be very low. However, due to the increase in 
education and health awareness, womens views on these 
matters have changed dramatically. The findings in table 
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6.5 indicate that only 5% of women agree with the latter 
belief. 
Islamic teaching and cultural norms restrict the 
womens role to the home (Chowdhury, 1980), while the role 
of men is exercised outside the house in providing support 
for their families. Compatible with this view, in the West 
Bank childbearing is, by many, considered to be the main 
duty of women in addition to their domestic duties. Table 
6.5 shows that more than half of the wives surveyed agreed 
with the belief that "childbearing is the womens main 
function". 
6.6.2 Children and womens role 
Many cultural reasons were given to explain women's 
childbearing behaviour. Apart from having children as a 
symbol of joy, children could be regarded as an economic 
investment as well as bringing social prestige. This 
section will be devoted only to the relation between having 
children and the improvement of a woman's position. 
It is argued that one way that women can improve and 
strengthen their position in West Bank society is through 
having more children, since a woman with many children will 
have a more secure relationship with her husband. Women 
start sharing decisions and therefore their status becomes 
stronger in the husbands family, especially relative to her 
mother-in-law. In addition, it is observed that West Bank 
society shows more respect for women with many children. 
Table 6.5 shows that about 70% of women concurred with 
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these views. 
In addition, the simplest way for women to evade the 
pressure and anxiety of a threatened divorce is by having 
many children. In most cases, children are thought to be 
the main obstacle to a fathers re-marriage. The results in 
table 6.5 reveal that about 60% of wives agreed with this 
and of these about 50% strongly agreed with the statement 
"children prevent their fathers from marrying again". 
6.6.3 Benefits of having children 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, children's 
costs and benefits to their parents are relative to a 
couples childbearing behaviour and circumstances. it is 
expected that the perceived net value of children will 
decrease as the development process increases (Lee and 
Bulatao, 1983). This development process encompasses 
changes in family structure, work sectors, and attitudes 
towards the use of time and family wealth. 
Table 6.5 shows that about 70% of wives reported that 
children cost more than the rewards which they brought. 
The vast majority (99%) strongly agreed with the view that 
the rewards of children decreased with time. These 
attitudes make it clear that the economic returns to 
parents will through time make parents less motivated to 
having children out of economic motivations. Thus, it is 
to be expected that the demand for having children in the 
future will decrease and fertility rates will decline as 
the "modernisation" process advances. 
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The only true substitute for having more children is 
having children of a different "quality". "Quality" is 
used in this study following Becker's (1960) definition. 
Becker considers "high quality" children to be those from 
whom parents drive higher utility, because of additional 
expenditure per child. Given a fixed budget and time, 
parents may make the choice between more children or higher 
quality children in their decision about ideal family size 
(Carvajal and Geithman, 1976). 
Despite the returns which arise from having children, 
each child is also an extra mouth to be fed, clothed and 
educated before entering the labour force and starting to 
provide for his family and himself. The survey results 
show that Palestinian women increasingly share this view 
that the quality of children is more important than the 
quantity. 90% of wives agreed with this view. 
Table 6.5 indicates that 75% of women think that male 
children are more supportive than females. This positive 
attitude towards sons may reflect the expectation that sons 
will be better able to support parents in their old age. 
The discussion of women's attitudes towards the 
benefits provided by children makes it easy to conclude 
that if women had the chance to become more effective 
decision makers, then the number of women who would 
practice family planning would increase rapidly in order to 
limit the number of children. 
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6.7 Factors influencing women's attitudes 
Having examined and discussed women's attitudes to 
childbearing behaviour, the researcher finds it imperative 
to examine the major factors affecting women's attitudes 
and thinking. For the purpose of this study, the 
researcher used seven variables, including: a woman's age, 
education, age at marriage and work status, while other 
variables included their husband's educational level, 
family income and place of residence. It is necessary to 
give a brief introduction to the technique used to analyse 
the relationships between these variables and to define the 
major statistical terms which will be used throughout the 
analysis. 
6.7.1 Discriminant analysis: An Introduction 
Discriminant analysis is a multivariate technique. 
Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is relatively new but 
is increasingly being used by statisticians and social 
scientists. Its use is well established in the academic 
research literature (Hair et al. 1984). 
The biggest advantage of MDA over regression analysis 
is that the parametric assumptions of independent 
variables, a normal distribution and equal variance are 
avoided. MDA is designed to work with nominal dependent 
variables which can classify cases into three or more 
nominal categories, a task that least squares regression 
analysis cannot handle. However, one limitation of MDA is 
that it cannot handle well situations where the dependent 
variable has a large number of values (Hedderson, 1987). 
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Hair et al. (1984) have argued that MDA is the 
appropriate statistical technique when the independent 
variable is categorical and independent variables are 
metric. The value of using MDA is in determining which 
independent category a dependent variable is most likely 
to relate to (Hedderson, 1987). 
The main objectives of using discriminant analysis 
as indicated by Klecka (1980) are: - 
1) To determine if statistically significant differences 
exist between the average score profiles of two or 
more a prior defined groups. 
2) To examine which of the independent variables account 
most for the differences in the average scores of the 
two or more groups. 
For the purpose of this research the discriminant 
functional analysis is used as analytical predictive 
technique. Following Hedderson (1987) some of the key 
terms used in the analysis include: 
Eigen value: An Eigen value measures the variance between 
groups divided by within group variance. Eigen values are 
used for evaluating the worth of discriminant analysis. 
Because the size of the eigen value is related to the 
discriminating power, then the larger eigen value, the 
greater the discrimination (Hair et al., 1984). 
Conical correlation: This is the ratio of the between 
groups variance in scores of the function to the total 
variance in these scores. The scale ranges from 0.0 to 
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1.0. 
Wilks lambda: Called the U statistic. This measures the 
within group sum of squares divided by the total sum of 
squares. This ratio ranges from 0.0 to 1.0. The lower the 
value of Wilks lambda the better is the discriminating 
power of the model. 
Chi-square is a theoretical probability distribution which 
measures the probability that a difference in observed 
group values in a sample is due to chance sampling 
variation when, in fact, there is no difference in the 
population. Each distribution will have a different shape 
depending on the "degrees of freedom" associated with the 
particular problem. One must know the degree of freedom 
before consulting a table to determine the probability 
level associated with the computed chi-square. 
Standardised discriminant function (SPFC): This indicates 
that each variable score is standardised before it is 
multiplied by the coefficient. In standardising a variable 
score, the mean for that variable is subtracted from the 
score, and then the differences are divided by the standard 
deviation of the variable. 
6.7.2 Discriminant findings 
The findings in table 6.6 indicate that the criteria 
values for using the statistical model are statistically 
acceptable and the approach is useful in accounting for 
women's attitudes towards childbearing behaviour. 
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Table 6.6 
Women's attitudes towards cultural 
childbearing. 
norms about 
ATTITUDES Eigen PCT Canon- Wilks Chi- df Sig. 
value vari- ical lambda square 
ance corre- 
lation 
Traditional 0.2831 92.07 0.4934 0.7321 102.0 21 0.001 
beliefs 
Children & 0.22520 87.68 0.43357 0.7733 175.0 21 0.001 
womens role 
Benefits of 0.2670 89.06 0.4580 0.744 40.77 14 0.01 
children 
Source: Author's calculation. 
The results in table 6.7 are represented graphically 
in figure 6.1. They indicate that wives' traditional 
beliefs are mostly influenced by their educational level 
with a SDFC value of 0.48. A woman's age (SDFC value of 
0.33) and her husband's education level (SDFC = 0.30) are 
also a statistically significant influence. 
A second factor represented in the model (figure 6.1) 
is the influence on childbearing attitudes of women's 
perceptions of their role in childbearing and child 
rearing. The statistical analysis suggests that women's 
beliefs that children strengthen and support their role in 
the household is influenced mainly by their education 
level, employment status and their husbands educational 
level with SDFC values 0.22,0.44 and 0.60 respectively. 
Finally their attitudes towards the benefits of having 
children are influenced mainly by their age, employment and 
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level of family income. Of these variables a wife's age 
was the most significant in accounting for variation in 
attitudes (SDFC = 0.85) while employment status was the 
least significant. 
The overall findings are not surprising. It is 
interesting that the only representative of Bongaart's 
(1978) proximate determinants of fertility included in the 
analysis (age at marriage) had no statistically significant 
influence. In terms of Compton and Coward's (1989) model 
represented in Figure 1.2 the author's analysis confirms 
the greater importance of contextual variables such as 
education and income in affecting attitudes to fertility, 
which ultimately determine fertility through proximate 
determinants such as the use of contraceptives. 
Clearly a wife's educational level will affect her 
likelihood of adapting to new ideas and to being influenced 
by other cultures, and thus of her being less concerned 
about the norms set by traditional society. Also, better 
education makes a woman more confident, and enhances her 
work opportunities and feeling of independence. Therefore, 
unlike poorly educated women, well educated women are less 
likely to believe that children constitute a major source 
of security. 
A wife's age is an important factor affecting 
attitudes towards traditional beliefs. As was to be 
expected, younger wives are less influenced by traditional 
cultural values. Moreover, younger women expected to 
receive less benefits from their children compared with 
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older women. It can be expected that the perceived benefit 
of having children will continue to decrease with time due 
to factors such as increased female activity rates, the 
role of the political situation and the increase in costs 
of having and rearing children. 
Figure 6.1: Variables affecting child bearing attitude 
(having the most contribution on the function). 
Child bearing attitude 
Wives' education Husbands' education Wives' age 01 
Children Benifit 
Wives' age Tradition Wives' employment and Family Income of 
beliefs woman having 
role children 
Husbands' education Wives' education Wives' employment 
Wives' employment is considered as a sign of women's 
emancipation from traditional culture which confined women 
to the home. Thus, it is not surprising to find a strong 
statistical relation between this variable and women's 
perceptions of their status. Also, employment is an 
important factor affecting women's attitudes towards having 
children. Employment strengthens womens status by making 
them more receptive to privilages from work than from 
children (Kupinsky, 1971). On the other hand the effect of 
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Table 6.7 
Standardized canonical discriminant function co-efficients. 
VARIABLES Traditional Children and Benefits 
beliefs womens role of having 
function function children 
Wives' educational 
level 0.4759* 0.2248* 0.2602 
Wives' age 0.3273* 0.0322 0.8531* 
Wives' age at 
marriage 0.0255 0.1438 0.2330 
Wives' employment 
status 0.1321 0.4467* 0.4220* 
Husband's educ- 
ational level 0.2989* 0.5953* 0.1079 
Family income 0.1848 0.0293 0.4759* 
Place of residence 0.1994 0.1144 0.1804 
*Three variables contributing most to the discriminating 
power of the function. The higher the score the greater 
the contribution of the variable. 
work on wives attitudes is immense. Children are 
considered to be the main competitors to women's 
employment. If wives believe that waged work gives them 
a better position in their society, then working wives may 
feel that they do not need more children or large families 
to secure their status (Sweet, 1979). 
Husband's educational level appears to influence 
womens attitudes mainly towards traditional beliefs and 
towards the benefits rendered from having children. The 
effect of husbands on the attitudes of wives may become 
obvious through the following channels: - 
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1) Directly. More educated men tend to marry more 
educated women. 
2) Indirectly. Through their lives and communication, 
less educated women may be influenced by their 
husbands ideas and ways of thinking. Hence it is 
believed that a husband's educational attainment is 
more important than his wife's. Moreover the 
aspirations of highly educated husbands towards future 
life styles, type of work and the family's social and 
economic status, makes them and their wives less 
concerned about traditional culture and its influence 
on having many children. It is also believed that 
wives will be given a stronger role by such men and 
may gain more freedom if they are married to highly 
educated men. 
Family income only seemed to have a significant 
effect on wives' attitudes towards the net benefit of 
having children. Poorer families expected more financial 
benefits from their children than richer ones. This may be 
as a result of their pressing financial needs. Therefore, 
it is not surprising to find that children in these 
families contributed more support to their families at a 
younger age. It is also important to note that children of 
rich familes are more costly as compared with children of 
poorer ones. 
Finally, it should be noted that Table 6.7 attributes 
very little explanatory power to locational factors: place 
of residence did not register as of major importance in any 
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of the three discriminant analyses undertaken here. 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter it was found that cultural norms do 
constitute an important factor in shaping couples' 
decisions and attitudes towards their reproductive 
behaviour. Changes in traditional culture which have taken 
place as a result of development have had a partial effect 
on wive's attitudes and perceptions towards childbearing 
behaviour. Therefore, the diferences in responses to 
socio-economic development may increase the variation in 
fertility attitudes within the society. West Bank culture 
as well as the majority of Islamic societies, is rooted in 
Islamic teaching which emphasises the importance of large 
familes and in most cases has resisted external views about 
childbearing. 
Changing demand for children is considered to be the 
most important factor in explaining fertility change. The 
costs and benefits of having children are less important 
variables than other factors in determining a couples 
decision in developing countries about family size. In 
this context attitudes to the traditional norms are often 
still the dominant influence. The findings of this study 
reveal that changes in couples attitudes are occurring in 
the West Bank and that this may cause some changes in the 
childbearing behaviour of the younger generation. 
The findings of this study also show that parents are 
more willing to give their children greater freedom in 
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decision making. Also, the proportion of parents who would 
like their children to have less children than they had is 
greater than those who want their children to have more 
than what they had. Discriminant analysis is a 
statistical technique which was employed to study 
differences between groups in the survey population with 
respect to their attitudes towards cultural norms about 
childbearing. The findings indicated that women's attitudes 
are influenced mostly by factors such as a wife's age, 
educational level, employment status and husbands education 
level and family income. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENDER PREFERENCE 
7.1 Introduction 
The subject of parental attitudes and aspirations 
concerning the gender of children has attracted 
considerable analytical attention by demographers in the 
past few decades. This attention has been aroused mainly 
by the suggestion that strong gender preference may be one 
factor sustaining high levels of childbearing. This is so 
because couples may continue childbearing beyond their 
overall desired family size in order to achieve some 
favoured number of boys and girls. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate parents preference for male 
children in relation to other underlying determinants of 
fertility in the West Bank and in other developing 
countries. Coombs and Sun (1978) argue that such preference 
will become more salient in cases where contraceptives are 
used and where parents may prefer small families. 
Ironically as fertility declines through increasingly 
effective control of fertility it may be that gender 
preferences become even more important in explaining 
differentials between desired and final family size in 
certain cultural contexts. 
Not only demographers, but also economists have taken 
an interest in researching male child preference as a 
determinant of fertility (Repetto, 1972; Williamson, 1974; 
Prachuabmoh et al., 1974; Stinner and Mader, 1975; Ben 
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Porath and Welch, 1976). This is so since male preference 
has also been used as a rough estimate of the extent of 
inequality prevailing in developing society. 
This chapter uses both descriptive and analytical 
methods. The main aim is to identify the type of gender 
preference, and to examine the relationship between 
parents' gender preference, their attitudes towards family 
size and the observed trends in reproductive behaviour. 
More specifically this chapter will focus on the following 
issues related to parents' gender preference: the relative 
importance of gender preference, motives behind male child 
preference, gender preference of first and second children, 
attitudes towards male child preference and, difference 
between the views of husbands and wives with regard to 
gender preference. 
7.2 Cultural changes and male preference 
In West Bank culture, it is generally accepted that 
the most important role for the woman after marriage is to 
be a mother (Ata, 1986) (i. e. to conceive children) 
irrespective of whether she is in full time employment or 
not. Her status and position increases in her family and 
also in her father in law's family once she has become a 
mother and earns greater respect especially if she has 
given birth to male offspring, who will eventually inherit 
the family name and property. Therefore, ensuring the 
continuation of future generations is perceived to be of 
very great importance. 
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The preference for male children is actually 
engrained from cultural values which emphasize the 
importance of sons with regard to their dominant roles in 
society and in the economy. Gender preference is believed 
to long pre-date the Islamic influence in Arab culture. So 
prevalent are these views that most members of society may 
take them almost for granted. As a result gender 
preference has become a very significant factor in shaping 
fertility behaviour. 
Generally in Arab society the birth of a daughter is 
not a joyous event, nor does it call for celebration 
(Haddad, 1980). The girl is regarded as a burden to her 
family as expressed in the common saying "a girl's 
vulnerability makes her need constant protection". Thus, 
her behaviour should be supervised by family members as 
evidence of the need to maintain the image of a girl's 
upright moral character. Barakat and Daw (1968) have found 
that there has also been fear amongst Palestinian families 
of having their women assaulted by Israeli forces, and this 
was the primary reason given by 30% of those who left the 
West Bank after the military occupation of 1967. 
In spite of Islamic teaching favouring the equality of 
male and female in society, traditional values remain 
dominant, giving the impression that Islamic countries are 
inherently biased in favour of men. In some areas of the 
West Bank, especially among conservative segments of the 
population or among families with more than one daughter 
and without a male child, the birth of a female is still 
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perceived as an occasion of mourning rather than 
celebration (Hadad, 1980). To quote another Arab proverb 
illustrating cultural bias in favour of male children: "Men 
beget men". 
The patriarchal family system, with a strict division 
of labour by gender therefore strongly reinforces 
traditional views of male and female roles. This gender 
split also extends the role taking care of the old 
suggesting that age as well as sex defines positions within 
the family (Lustick, 1980). Recently, this system has been 
challenged by ideas from other Western societies, and the 
introduction of new social and economic conditions. For 
example it has become established that girls should go to 
school and receive an education, even if the reason is not 
to improve the quality of the labour force but only because 
of a realisation that educated men prefer to marry educated 
women. Individualism also appears to be gaining ground and 
challenging the traditional family system. This in turn 
appears to be affecting attitudes to marriage. Many 
families still refuse to let their daughters marry a man 
who wants to live with his family after marriage. Social 
and economic changes have also affected the traditional 
family system by reducing the dependency ratio by 
comparison with those of the extended family (Zureik, 
1980). Cultural changes and related changes in the family 
system have affected the couples independence in making 
childbearing decisions, and hence have changed the roles of 
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men and women within this decision making process. 
On the contrary, there are many factors which have 
seemed to sustain traditional perspectives in the West Bank 
and have strengthened social and economic family ties. Some 
of these factors include: 
1. The political situation in the West Bank, where the 
people have been living under Israel military 
occupation since 1967. This situation has made it 
necessary for the people to show greater familial 
solidarity, in order to counter the real and perceived 
threats of the Israeli occupying forces and in order to 
resist integration with Israeli community and the loss 
of Palestinian identity. One indicator of the revival 
of the traditional family system has been the spread of 
the Deewan, that is the place where all members of the 
extended family meet on various occasions to discuss 
matters of concern (Lustick, 1980). 
2. The deteriorating economic situation in the West Bank, 
has encouraged emigration and resulted in dependence by 
some West Bank families on the remittances sent home by 
their relatives. This economic situation has created a 
new social relationship which has consolidated the 
extended family role (Abed, 1988). This situation 
makes the family more eager to have males. 
3. Most religious families still think that the woman's 
role should be restricted to domestic work and familial 
tasks (Williamson, 1976). This role has intensified 
due to the emergence of Islamic movement in the West 
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Bank (Islamic revival). 
4. Another result of male youth emigration has been an 
increasing ratio of unmarried to married females, since 
a great number of males marry from outside the West 
Bank (Zanoun, 1985). This type of marriage makes the 
women involved more dependent on their family. The 
rising spinster ratio has of course been of very great 
concern to parents worried about their daughter's 
future. This in turn has tended to fuel further gender 
bias in favour of male children. 
5. The inheritance system, especially in rural areas, 
where the male only can inherit the fathers wealth and 
land, despite the fact that Islam gives females the 
right of inheritance as well. 
7.3 Gender preference and family size. 
The socio economic context of the West Bank dictates 
that most older people have to either live with their 
children (usually their sons), or depend on them 
financially. This along with other social and 
psychological factors might lead to parental prejudice in 
favour of male children rather than female. 
A relationship also exists between the number of 
children within the family and gender preference. This 
relationship can be explained as follows: 
1. In cultures with small family size norms and without 
strong gender preferences, the pressure to have small 
numbers of children may dominate over all other factors 
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such as gender preference. 
2. If desired family size is large, gender preference may 
not affect behaviour until later in the family cycle. 
3. If the desired family size is very large, then gender 
preference may become less important because the 
probability of satisfying the preference to have a 
child of a particular sex is much greater when there 
are more children. 
4. If desired family size is moderate as in some 
developing countries of the Islamic world, and there is 
a strong preference for males, then the effect on 
population growth may become considerable. This is 
because couples with a strong male preference may go 
beyond their desired family size in the event where 
they do not achieve the gender mix in their family 
which they want by the time their preferred number of 
children is reached. 
Sheps (1963) has shown mathematically that the 
probability of having a male child is almost the same for 
all ethnic groups. Gender preference may not affect the 
sex ratio of the population, but the expected family size 
will increase by the increasing preference for one sex over 
the other because gender control (having a boy or girl) is 
beyond parents' control. Therefore unsatisfied parents 
normally increase their number of children in order to 
fulfil their desire. 
Dawes (1970) found that in completed families more 
couples had stopped having children after the birth of a 
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son than after the birth of a daughter. Thus, the sex 
ratio for the last live birth in completed families was 
more imbalanced than for all births. Jelliffe and Jelliffe 
(1978) suggest that a family without a son in a society 
with strong male child preference shortens the period of 
lactation in order to accelerate the birth of the next 
child. Conversely, birth intervals and use of 
contraceptives should be greater following male births. 
7.4 Variables affecting male child Prefernce 
Turning to the author's survey of West Bank 
households, Table 7.1 shows that the couples interviewed 
had a strong male preference. The proportion of husbands 
who expressed a preference for a son over a daughter was 
about 91%, while the proportion for wives was 82%. This 
supports evidence of other researchers, indicating that 
husbands are more likely to express male child preference 
than their wives (Williamson, 1976; Coombs and Fernandez, 
1978). This differential between husbands and wives 
reflects differences in perspective. It is generally 
believed that sons provide greater companionship for their 
father than do daughters. The reasons for mothers 
preferring sons over daughters include the desire for 
greater security and influence. 
Differences between the urban and rural environments 
and between social groups are evident in table 7.1. It 
appears that husbands in the lower and middle classes in 
the city have a more favourable attitude towards male 
264 
children, while the husbands and wives in the city's upper 
classes favour male children less. 
Table 7.1 
Male child preference by place of residence, education, age 
and work status. 
Variables Percentage 
Husbands Wives 
Total population 91.9 82.1 
AREA 
Villages 92.3 84.0 
Towns 91.0 85.3 
City, lower class 100.0 90.0 
City, middle class 97.0 80.0 
City, upper class 82.0 58.0 
Refugee camps 89.9 84.8 
EDUCATION LEVEL 
Illiterate 94.9 90.8 
Low level of education 94.1 84.0 
Intermediate level of education 87.7 74.8 
High level of education 86.8 57.3 
AGE 
Old (over 50 years) 95.3 88.4 
Middle (30-50 years) 90.8 84.9 
Young (less than 30 years) 87.7 75.0 
WORK STATUS 
Not working 91.4 83.2 
Working 95.0 63.2 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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This could be attributed to several factors: 
1. Economic factors: parents in the lower classes may be 
more inclined to want to have male children so that 
they can be supported in their old age. 
2. Family size: middle class people are more educated. 
Therefore they have a tendency to have small families. 
Consequently gender preference will become acute for 
these groups. 
3. Fatalism: it is believed that parents in rural areas 
are fatalistic. Therefore they have a tendency to 
accept what God has given them. 
4. Labour force participation: in rural areas girls under 
the age of 15 play a major role in helping their 
parents with the agricultural work. 
It is worth considering some of these factors now in 
more detail. One would expect that formal education, which 
usually implies that people are exposed to more modern 
views would be inversely related to family size and male 
preference. It is noted from table 7.1 that the proportion 
of couples who prefer male over female children decreases 
as education levels rise (see also Figure 7.1), with the 
differences being statistically significant at the 99% 
level of confidence. The chi-square value for husbands is 
14.98 with 3 degrees of freedom and the Cramer's V equals 
0.13, while the chi-square value for the wives is much 
higher than husbands at 66.36 with 3 degrees of freedom and 
a Cramer's V value 0.26. From these results, it is easy 
to conclude that education has more influence on wives' 
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attitudes than on their husbands. 
Figure 7.1: Male preference by educational level. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 7.1. 
It might be expected that older parents would be more 
traditional and, therefore, have stronger preferences than 
younger parents, who might be open to more modern 
attitudes. Table 7.1 shows that 95.3% of the husbands in 
the older age groups preferred male children than female. 
The proportion decreases to 90.8% among the middle aged 
and 87.7% among the young. In the same manner the 
proportion of older women who preferred male children to 
female decreased from 88.4% among the old to 75% for those 
of younger ages. Parents' age and male child preference 
are negatively associated and the relationship is 
statistically significant, as shown by the chi-square test. 
The influence of work appears to be more obvious in 
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Illiterate low Middle High 
Education level 
wives' responses, since the proportion of women who prefer 
male over female children drops from 83.2% to 63.2% as a 
result of their work obligations. On the contrary, the 
proportion of husbands who are actively employed who prefer 
male over female is higher than that of non-working males. 
This may be due to the fact that most unemployed males are 
older and have come to accept the gender composition of 
their completed families. 
7.5 Gender of first child 
In many cultures there is a preference for the first 
child to be a boy while the desired sex ratio for 
subsequent children is more balanced (Markle, 1974). 
Williamson (1973) in a cross cultural analysis found that 
as well as there being a preference for male babies in 
virtually all cultures around the world, there was also a 
clear desire for the first child to be male. As for child 
bearing in the West Bank, male preference is strong for all 
children but is even stronger for the first child. The 
vast majority of those who had had a daughter wanted a son 
for their first child. 
There are at least four main reasons for this pattern 
existing in the West Bank: 
1. The first male child is of a particular significance to 
parents because parents normally carry the name of 
their eldest son. For example, parents of a child 
named "Muhammad" will be called "the father of 
Muhammed" and "the mother of Muhammed". As a result of 
this parents have a strong desire for males, especially 
268 
the first born, hence parents in the West Bank, like 
any other Arab country, dislike being called by the 
name of their daughters. This is especially true for 
the father. 
2. Parents want to ensure that the family's name will 
continue to exist after their death. Male children 
normally carry their family's name while, on the 
contrary, female children after marriage carry their 
husband's family name. 
3. For the wife the birth of the first child is often 
interpreted as increasing the security of her marriage. 
The birth of a first male child is believed to result 
in women receiving greater respect in her family, and 
that of her husband, and in society as a whole. 
Westoff et al. (1963) found that when the first child 
is a boy the interval before the second child is conceived 
is on average three months, larger than if the first child 
is a girl. Also, the tendency to practice the use of 
contraceptives after the birth of a first male child is 
greater than if the first born child is female. 
In West Bank society, as well as in many Arab 
countries, the disappointment of couples will intensify, if 
the first child is a daughter and this is followed by 
another female baby. Gender preference also affects child 
care. For example, a male child may be given greater 
attention and care in terms of longer breastfeeding, better 
nutrition and frequent medical examinations. Less 
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attention will be given by the mother if the first child is 
female. 
The present study reveals that West Bank couples have 
a particular desire for the first child born to be male. 
For example, the percentage of husbands and wives who would 
prefer any child to be male over female is 91.9% and 82.1% 
respectively, while the percentage of those who would 
prefer the first child to be male is 94.7% and 83.2% 
respectively (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 
Couples preference for the first child to be male by place 
of residence. 
Husbands Wives 
Total population 94.7 83.2 
AREA 
Villages 95.3 81.0 
Towns 92.7 80.0 
City, lower class 100.0 92.0 
City, middle class 98.0 78.0 
City, upper class 95.0 86.0 
Refugee camps 89.9 90.9 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Once again there appears to be a relationship with 
place of residence. It is interesting to find that rural 
areas are less prejudiced than some urban groups. This 
can be attributed to the following reasons. 
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(a) Couples in an urban area usually desire a smaller 
family size than those in a rural area. However, if 
the first born child is male then the probability of 
attaining the family size desired will be greater. 
(b) Couples in rural areas have strong beliefs in fate 
and divine decree and they will be more likely to be 
satisfied with their destiny if the first child 
happens to be female. 
7.6 Gender preference of the next child 
One would expect that gender preference would affect 
a couple's attitude towards the prospect of having further 
children, especially when the existing gender composition 
of their family is not in line with their preferences. 
It can be assumed that family size preferences are 
associated with preferences about family composition 
(number of male and female children desired). The 
influences of gender preferences on the family formation 
process would seem to be threefold, affecting: 
1. future use of contraception. 
2. the birth interval and likelihood of stopping having 
children. 
3. desired family size, resulting in re-evaluations of the 
ideal size. 
Prachuabmoh et al. (1974) and Pohlman (1969) have 
found that couples may continue childbearing beyond their 
desired family size in order to achieve a favourable number 
or a different distribution of sons and daughters. Also 
Repetto (1972) found a strong correlation in Morocco 
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between the strength of son preference and the total number 
of live births. 
Table 7.3 shows for both the husband and wife the 
gender preference for the next child in the West Bank 
sample, in relation to the existing number of sons and 
daughters. It shows that husbands had a greater desire 
for the next child to be male almost regardless of their 
current family composition. Virtually all couples who 
had more daughters than sons wanted the next birth to be a 
male. Where current family composition had a male 
dominance the differences between husbands and wives was 
much greater. 
Table 7.3 
Male preference for the next child for those couples who 
wanted an additional child, in relation to their current 
family composition. 
Current family composition Husbands wives 
More sons than daughters 76.4 48.9 
Same no. of sons as daughters 93.3 84.9 
Fewer sons than daughters 100 98.8 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Differences in outlook relative to current family 
composition proved, both for husbands and wives to be 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level (chi-square 
value = 50.7 with 2 degrees of freedom). The differences 
were much greater for women than for men with the chi- 
square calculated value = 127.9 with 2 degrees of freedom 
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and with significance level of 0.0001, and Cramer's V= 
0.5. 
7.7 Classification of gender preference 
Couples preferences take many forms. Among the more 
visible are (a) the desire for at least one child of each 
sex, (b) a desire for a minimum number of children of a 
particular sex (e. g. at least two sons) or (c) for an 
approximately equal numbers of male and female children. 
These and other possible desiderata may co-exist in a 
complex manner. For example, taking two women who both 
desire three sons, a researcher may find that one woman 
wants in total only three children, while another wants 
five children. It is therefore impossible to assume that 
their preferences are the same since the likelihood of 
obtaining their objectives in these two situations are 
unequal. 
A couples gender preferences may change over time, 
depending not only on the gender composition of their 
family but on the order of the births. For example, an 
individual may want the first and second children to be 
male and the third to be female. In addition couples may 
hold preferences with regard to the spacing of births, 
multiple births and the physical characteristics of their 
children. 
Table 7.4 presents the preferred distribution of sons 
and daughters recorded for women and men interviewed in the 
survey. It can be noted from the table that the percentage 
of husbands who preferred all their children to be male was 
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1.9% by comparison with only 0.1% who desired all their 
children to be female. Only 9.7% of husbands wanted an 
equal number of male and female children. Most husbands 
(36%) wanted a majority of their children to be male (more 
than 2 boys) but to have only two daughters. 
Table 7.4 
Husbands' preferred distribution of sons and daughters 
(absolute numbers). 
No. No. of daughters 
of sons 01234567 8+ Total 
0 1 1 
1 2 6 1 9 
2 4 48 37 3 2 1 95 
3 3 44 112 19 1 179 
4 21 88 31 7 147 
5 10 55 41 12 19 137 
6 1 10 39 42 32 2 5 131 
7 2 8 12 65 12 9 11 110 
8+ 7 16 53 29 33 38 10 13 190 
Total 19 163 397 231 98 70 16 23 999 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Table 7.5 shows that the proportion of wives who 
wanted an equal number of male and female children was only 
about 21% of the total while the proportion of women who 
wanted all their children to be male was about 2.5%. None 
of the wives wanted all their children to be female. 
Similar to their husbands, most women (34%) wanted to have 
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two daughters and more than two sons. 
Table 7.5 
Wives' preferred distribution of sons and daughters 
(absolute numbers). 
No. 
of sons 
No. 
0 
of daughters 
123 4 5 67 8+ Total 
0 
1 811 10 
2 38 84 4 1 127 
3 1 46 117 66 1 231 
4 2 27 70 55 22 176 
5 2 25 65 46 9 24 171 
6 2 5 38 18 28 1 7 99 
7 4 7 14 45 3 5 2 80 
8+ 14 15 38 14 13 9 2 105 
Total 25 171 427 249 77 39 92 999 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Comparing the data in tables 7.4 and 7.5, one can 
conclude that husbands are more extreme in their preference 
for sons. Despite this husbands and wives have a strong 
preference for male children. 
Table 7.6 is derived from tables 7.4 and 7.5 and 
summarises the information in another way. 
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Table 7.6 
Overall gender preferences of husbands and wives (%). 
Types Husbands Wives 
All male births 1.9 2.5 
All female births 0.9 0.0 
Equal number of male and femal e children 9.7 21.3 
More male than female children 89.4 77.9 
1 daughter and more than 1 son 15.7 16.3 
2 daughters and more than 2 sons 35.9 34.2 
3 daughters and more than 3 sons 20.8 17.8 
4 daughters and more than 4 sons 8.9 5.3 
5 daughters and more than 5 sons 4.9 1.5 
6 daughters and more than 6 sons 1.1 0.2 
7 daughters and more than 7 sons 0.1 0.0 
More female than male children 0.9 0.8 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
7.8 Gender preference scale 
There is no recognised or standard scale for the 
measurement of sex preferences. Some studies have used the 
sex ratio as a method of measuring the differences in 
preferences. Coombs (1974) developed a scale to measure 
sex preference and desired family size (I. S. and I. N. 
scales). However, it is difficult to implement this scale 
in this study because the sample size is rather large to 
study all the probabilities of birth and gender order. 
Instead the researcher used the following categorical 
divisions: 
1. Female preference: a term for the small number of 
people who preferred daughters to sons. In the survey 
this scale would range from -3 to -1. 
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2. No preference; a term describing the situation where 
the number of male children preferred equals the number 
of female. 
3. Mild male child bias; for situations where the number 
of males is more than the number of females by only one 
boy. 
4. Moderate male child bias. Males exceed females by 2. 
5. Strong male child bias. Males exceed females by 3 or 
4. 
6. very strong male child bias. Males exceed females by 
five or more. 
The categorical scale proposed above makes it 
possible to draw comparisons between various countries, and 
indeed between areas in the same country and between groups 
with different characteristics. The main criticisms of 
this scale can be summarised as follows: 
1. This scale does not take into consideration overall 
desired family size. 
2. It is difficult to distinguish between the couples with 
no preference but who want children and those who do 
not want any children at all. 
3. Another shortcoming of this scale, and others like it 
is the inability of measuring unspecified answers, such 
as "don't know", "up to God", etc. 
It can be noted from table 7.7 that more than 20% of 
couples in the West Bank have strong or very strong 
preferences for males over females. With regard to the 
differences between husbands and wives, it is clear from 
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the table that the proportion of wives who prefer an equal 
number of sons and daughters is more than double that of 
their counterparts. This reinforces the view that husbands 
have an extreme bias in favour of male children. 
Table 7.7 
Classification of gender preference on the researcher's 
categorical scale (percentages). 
Female No Mild Moderate Strong Very 
Prefer- Prefer- Strong 
ence ence 
Husbands 1.0 9.6 20.9 22.4 
Wives 0.8 21.3 22.0 19.6 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
26.6 19.4 
23.0 13.4 
Given the importance of cultural factors in 
determining levels of bias in sex preferences, it is useful 
to deal here briefly with a range of variables (such as 
place of residence, education and age for both husbands and 
wives) which could contribute to explaining the level of 
bias. This is done in relation to the categorical scale 
introduced in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.8 shows that there is a big difference 
between sub areas. A high percentage of husbands (26%) in 
small villages had a very strong male preference compared 
with lower percentages in the urban middle classes (12%). 
Husbands preference for an equal number of sons and 
daughters was most common in the urban upper classes (18%), 
while none of the husbands in the city's lower class 
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admitted to this preference pattern. The geographical 
variation of male birth preferences may be due to several 
reasons, such as the fluctuation of family income, 
education levels, level of aspirations, perceived value of 
children, the cost and benefit of each sex, and the level 
of social and economic development in each particular area. 
Table 7.8 
Percentage distribution of husbands' preferences regarding 
the gender of their children by place of residence, 
education and age. 
Scale More No Mild Moderate Strong Very 
Female Prefer- Strong 
ence 
Small villages 1.7 7.7 20.3 20.7 24.0 25.7 
Towns 0.7 14.0 18.3 21.7 28.7 16.7 
City: 
Lower class - - 18.0 33.0 32.0 17.0 
Middle class 1.0 3.0 28.0 21.0 35.0 12.0 
Upper class 2.0 18.0 24.0 19.0 22.0 23.2 
Refugee camps - 10.1 23.2 24.2 19.2 23.2 
Education: 
Illiterate - 0.7 9.6 15.3 35.5 38.9 
Low 1.2 6.3 16.4 23.8 31.9 20.4 
Middle 1.8 12.9 31.4 20.2 22 11.7 
High 0.6 18.4 34.5 27.0 13.2 6.3 
Age: 
Old generation - 6.5 10.5 20.3 30.8 32.0 
Middle gentn. 1.6 10.3 23.0 24.3 26.9 14.0 
Young gentn. 1.8 14.1 36.4 23.2 18.6 5.9 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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Table 7.8 shows that education has a strong influence 
on husband's gender preference. For example, the 
proportion of husbands with no male preference increased 
from 0.7% among illiterate husbands to 18.4% among husbands 
with higher education. This means that education reduces 
the desire for a strong and very strong male preference. 
For instance, the proportion of husbands who had a very 
strong male preference decreased from 39% for illiterate 
husbands to 6% for husbands with higher education. 
Table 7.9 
Percentage distribution of wives' preferences regarding the 
gender of their children by place of residence, education 
and age. 
Scale More 
Female 
No 
Prefer- 
ence 
Mild Moderate Strong Very 
Strong 
Small villages 0.3 17.3 19.3 22 26.3 14.7 
Towns 0.3 18.0 21.3 24.3 20.0 16.0 
City: 
Lower class 1.0 20.0 26.0 21.0 19.0 13.0 
Middle class 2.0 31.0 28.0 14.0 19.0 6.0 
Upper class 3.0 38.0 22.0 12.0 21.0 4.0 
Refugee camps 0.8 18.2 22.2 10.1 32.3 17.2 
Education: 
Illiterate 0.6 12.3 10.7 18.1 20.8 25.5 
Low 0.4 19.3 22.9 23.9 23.4 10.0 
Middle 0.9 29.1 38.4 13.2 12.6 4.0 
High - 46.6 30.1 16.5 5.8 1.0 
Age: 
Old generation - 13.4 10.8 19.0 30.6 26.3 
Middle gentn. 0.7 17.6 21.8 20.8 24.6 14.4 
Young gentn. 1.4 30.5 29.4 18.7 16.5 3.6 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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Husband's age appears to have had a similar effect as 
education on preference patterns. Younger husbands were 
more likely to be classed as having no preference, or being 
mild or moderate in their child preference than middle aged 
and older husbands. The proportion of husbands who held 
strong and very strong male child preferences decreased 
from 63% for older men to 41% for middle aged husbands to 
only 24% for younger husbands. These variations can be 
explained largely by differences between generations in 
their educational achievement and outlook. 
Table 7.9 shows a similar distribution for wives. 
Wives in rural areas and in the refugee camps had the 
greatest desire to have a high proportion of male children. 
As with the male pattern, there are differences between the 
varying classes in the urban areas relating to the social 
and economic contexts of these groups. For example, the 
women in the lower classes may have had quite logical 
reasons for having a strong male preference where wealth 
flows from children to parents are significant. Male 
children provide the greater potential for economic support 
for their families, while daughters may be perceived as a 
net burden. 
As with table 7.8 for husbands, so also for wives the 
most obvious variable determining differences in responses 
was their educational level. The proportion of wives who 
held a very strong male preference decreased from 25.5% 
among illiterate women to 1% among highly educated women. 
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Comparison of tables 7.8 and 7.9 might be taken to 
support the view that wives are more open to new ideas from 
other cultures (and in particular Western culture) than 
their husbands. One reason for this may be that 
traditional Arab culture has been more constraining with 
regard to women's roles and consequently may have induced a 
greater desire for change amongst Arab women. 
7.9 Testing factors affecting gender preference 
In order to examine some of the hypotheses listed 
above statistical methods were used to determine which 
variables had the greatest influence on gender preference. 
The variables examined included place of residence, 
education, age, age at marriage, duration of marriage, work 
status, family income, house size, actual family size and 
actual family composition. Once again discriminant 
analysis was used to determine which of these variables had 
the greatest effect on the dependent variable. 
Discriminant analysis was able to account for 74% of 
the variance in husbands attitudes and 45% of wives. In 
other words the percentage of cases adequately classified 
for gender preference categories by this technique was 74% 
for husbands and 45% for wives. 
Discriminant analysis maximises the between group 
differences on discriminant scores and minimises the within 
group differences. However, many measures are used to 
evaluate the importance of the functions. Table 7.10 
presents these measures and their values. 
282 
Table 7.10 
Measures of evaluating the importance of functions. 
EIGEN CANONICAL WILK'S SIGNIFICANCE 
VALUE CORRELATION LAMBDA 
HUSBANDS 
Function 1 0.25 0.45 0.78 0.000 
WIVES 
Function 1 0.25 0.44 0.76 0.000 
The eigen values for husbands and wives were similar 
(25%). An eigen value of 0% would mean that the 
discriminant analysis had no power. The analysis 
undertaken here can be judged in terms of the eigen value 
to be of some significance, although failing to explain all 
the variation in the data set (Hair et al., 1984). 
As noted in the last chapter, canonical correlation 
is a good measure of how well the function discriminates 
between groups. Once again it can be noted from the table 
that canonical correlations for the husbands and wives are 
very similar (0.45 and 0.44 respectively) and that the 
statistical model is operating moderately efficiently. 
Wilk's lamda measures the discriminating power of the 
model. The Wilk's lambda for husbands was 0.78 and 0.76 
for the wives, when all functions were included in the 
analysis. These values means that the differences between 
groups accounted for 22% of variance for husbands and 24% 
for wives. 
Standardised discriminant function co-efficients are 
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used to evaluate the importance of variables since 
discriminant analysis produces discriminant function co- 
efficients for each predictive variable. The discriminant 
function co-efficients are calculated to maximise the 
differences between groups in discriminant function scores. 
The term "standardised" indicates that each variable score 
is standardised before it is multiplied by the co- 
efficient. In standardising a variable score, the mean for 
that variable is subtracted from the score and then the 
differences are divided by the standard deviation. 
Standardised variables have a mean score of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1.0. Standardised variables are used 
in order to remove the effects of differing means and 
standard deviations. 
Table 7.11 shows the three variables with the biggest 
effect on wives' attitudes towards gender preference. 
These are education (57%), family size (31%) and family 
composition (25%), while the results for husbands indicate 
them to be family size (62%), duration of marriage (51%) 
and education (30%). 
It is clear that husbands' and wives' attitudes 
towards male preferences are influenced to some extent by 
similar variables which include actual family size and 
educational level. 
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Table 7.11 
Standardised discriminant co-efficient. 
VARIABLES HUSBANDS 
Function 1 
WIVES 
Function 1 
Family income 0.101 0.20 
Respondents age 0.059 0.198 
Educatiönal level 0.301 0.566 
Age at marriage 0.024 0.015 
Place of residence 0.129 0.048 
Work status 0.049 0.139 
House size 0.077 0.023 
Duration of marriage 0.512 0.017 
Actual family size 0.619 0.311 
Actual family composition 0.102 0.251 
The signs of coefficients in discriminant analysis have no 
special meaning because the dependent variable is treated 
as a nominal variable. 
Figure 7.2: Variables affecting gender preference (having 
the most contribution on the function). 
Couples attitudes 
Wives Husbands 
Education Family size 
Family size Gender Duration of marriage 
preference 
Family composition II Education 
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7.10 Reasons for male child preference 
Male child preference seems to be rooted in Arab 
culture because of economic, social, cultural and 
psychological factors. This part of the chapter aims to 
discuss qualitative and quantitative evidence which may 
explain why parents are more eager to have more male 
children. 
In the West Bank society where there is strongly 
defined gender segregation in waged work, it is possible 
to assume that males may be considered more productive 
economically than females. Therefore, male children are 
considered to be a source of future financial support, 
security and an insurance against the risks associated with 
ageing. Consequently, parents desire to bear male 
children. 
Son preference has long been recognised as typical of 
many traditional societies and to be deeply embedded in 
religious teaching and social practice (Williamson, 1973). 
Table 7.12 reports some of the important reasons given by 
those wives interviewed by the author for their child 
preferences. Respondents were allowed to select several 
different reasons from a range of possibilities on the 
questionnaire. 
It is noted from the table that a very high 
proportion of wives (52.3%) attributed their male child 
preference to the various pressures resulting from their 
own experience as a woman. These pressures include: 
First: A parents' responsibility towards their daughters 
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is perceived to extend beyond their marriage. Therefore, 
females constitute a continued source of worry and 
responsibility. In Arab societies for example when a women 
is faced with problems such as divorce or maltreatment by 
her husband, she eventually returns to her fathers house 
asking for support. This situation may be due to the 
cultural values which makes the womens position weak and 
always in need of familial support. This is more obvious 
in rural areas where the proportion of women who selected 
this as a reason was higher than in urban regions. Such a 
belief is supported by the Arabic proverb which says "Ham 
Al-Banat Ela Al-Mamat": that is, "the burden of having a 
girl remains even after her death". 
Second: Social pressures - in the West Bank, as in most 
Arab and Muslim societes, the reputation of the whole 
family will be put at risk when any deviation from 
cultural norms and values occurs. Such deviation is likely 
to bring dishonour and disgrace (Fadiha or Ar) to the whole 
family. 
Third: An unmarried girl is likely to constitute a 
continued source of pressure and threat to her family. 
This is because of the speculations behind the reasons for 
her not being married. In the West Bank people start to 
wonder about the reasons for a girl not getting married 
even at quite young ages. 
Fourth: Costs/benefits. Girls are thought to be more 
costly than boys, especially because girls normally get 
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married at times when they are capable of helping their 
parents (working ages). After marriage, girls normally 
disassociate themselves from their parents in any financial 
sense. 
The second most important reason given by respondents 
was that sons carry on the family name while daughters 
carry only their husband's family name. This is in line 
with May and Heer (1968) who found that the majority of 
people in rural India explained their preference for male 
children as a response to the need to insure the survival 
of the father's lineage after his death. In Arab society 
this reason was more important in the past, when mortality 
rates were higher. It is noticeable that a higher 
percentage of women in rural area's and in the refugee 
camps gave this as an explanation perhaps reflecting the 
higher levels of infant mortality. Regarding the urban 
social classes, a high proportion gave this answer in the 
upper class areas (25.9%). This may be due to the fact 
that: 
a) these women desire to have small families compared with 
women in other social areas. 
b) most of the cities upper class families are from 
respectable families with social and economic power in 
the West Bank, and with a strong family tradition to 
maintain. 
The table also shows that 13.4% of the women prefer 
male children because of all the reasons mentioned. 
However, a high proportion in lower class urban areas 
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(42%), expressed the belief that male children are 
necessary in order to improve the family's social and 
economic status. 
Economic reasons constituted 11.4% of wives 
responses. The highest proportions of wives indicating a 
son preference for economic reasons were found in the urban 
middle and upper classes . The economic value of sons as 
agricultural labourers is not as crucial as in some 
societies, because many Palestinian families have either 
lost their land during one of the conflicts with Israel or 
have switched voluntarily to working in the urban sector. 
Table 7.12 
Reasons given for male child preference by wives by place 
of residence. 
Social Econ- Inher- Female All 
omic itance pressure reasons 
Total population 16.3 11.4 6.6 52.3 13.4 
Small villages 17.5 11.5 6.0 57.2 7.8 
Towns 14.8 12.1 7.8 54.3 11.0 
City, lower class 6.7 6.7 1.1 43.4 42.1 
City, middle class 13.6 16.0 11.1 50.6 8.7 
City, upper class 25.9 19.0 6.9 41.4 6.8 
Refugee camps 23.8 4.8 6.0 50.0 15.4 
Chi-square = 115.3 d. f. 20 Significance = 0.001 
Source: Author's data, 1 988. 
The nature of economic support from sons to the 
family was identified as changing through time: 
1. Some economic benefits occurred when they were still 
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children since, especially in the agricultural sector, 
they could help with household production activities. 
2. Financial support was clearly greatest when the 
children entered the labour market. 
3. In some respects, however, the most important benefits 
were perceived to be the financial and emotional 
support received by parents in their old age. 
4. The provision of a place of residence for parents in 
their old age. 
The value of an adult son is a matter of some 
controversy. In the author's survey about 52% of wives 
believed that children in past generations had provided 
more support to their parents than nowadays, while only 
about 6% of women thought that son's currently provided 
more economic support. 
It is difficult to propose any kind of policy to 
reduce parental preference towards having male children 
over female, although clearly the survey has indicated the 
potential for indirect action in this direction via 
measures to favour increased educational attainment, 
economic development by introducing new work opportunities 
for women and social developments such as establishing a 
system of social security would also contribute to a 
reduction in this particular gender bias. On the contrary, 
and in the West Bank, there are many factors which 
encourage male preference, such as the influence of the 
extended family on couples decisions with regard to 
childbearing, and the political situation where to have 
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daughters under occupation constitutes a continuous worry 
for parents. 
The contribution of sons to their parental household 
income seemed to be especially small amongst married sons. 
It can be noted from Table 7.13 that more than 80% of sons 
did not contribute to the parental family budget, while 
less than 10% of sons contributed more than half of the 
family's income. The differences between married and 
unmarried sons is very clear. Given the relatively low 
financial contribution made by sons, it is quite surprising 
that so many mothers declare this as a reason for son 
preference. 
Table 7.13 
The contribution of sons to parental family income. 
Proportion of parential family income (%) 
Nothing Less 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% More 
than than 
20% 80% 
Unmarried son 72.2 5.7 9 
Married son 86.6 6.6 4.3 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
3.5 1.3 2.2 
1.7 0.5 0.3 
Another argument which should be taken into 
consideration, is parental desire for their sons to receive 
higher education. About 85% of parents wanted their sons 
to have opportunities in higher education (University and 
post-graduate studies). Thus the cost of raising children 
is becoming higher as a result of increased educational 
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costs. It is therefore obviously the case that the 
financial benefits of having sons are becoming very small, 
if not negative, as a result of changing economic and 
social circumstances. 
Only 6.6% of wives gave familial inheritance as their 
reason for holding a male-child preference. Without a son, 
family property would be transferred to the families of 
their daughters after marriage. This reason was of more 
concern to women in rural areas where land inheritance was 
an important issue. 
In spite of the strong level of male-child 
preference, parents still wanted at least one daughter to 
help them with household work or to provide companionship 
for the mother. Since in the West Bank boys despise 
women's work, especially if there is a daughter in the 
family, it is not surprising to find that male-child 
preference is not to the exclusion of having daughters. 
7.11 Male-child preference attitudes 
Parental gender preferences cannot be seen as an 
isolated set of attitudes, but as attitudes which fit into 
a broader social setting. These attitudes often affect and 
modify parents' views on desired family size. Attitudes on 
these key factors evolve over time reflecting on the one 
hand the momentum in society of traditional cultural 
perspectives, and, on the other hand, the experiences of 
individual households affected both by the views of the 
last generation and by new ideas infiltrating as a result 
of social and economic change processes. The final part of 
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this chapter will focus on wives's responses to traditional 
attitudes to male-child preference. Analysis of the 
interaction of these two influences on decision making 
(societal and household) is critical in the search for 
explanations of fertility change in developing societies. 
In order to test the nature of the interaction in West Bank 
society a four point scale was used to measure wives' 
responses to societal and household pressures to conform to 
the norm of male-child preference. 
In the survey wives were presented with a number of 
value laden statements and were asked to give their 
reactions. Table 7.14 measures their responses using a 
four point Likert scale ranging from 1= strongly agree, to 
4= strongly disagree. The table shows that the majority 
of wives were in agreement with the societal norms 
favouring male-child preference. In no case was a mean 
score of over 2 recorded. The highest level of agreement 
corresponded with the statement that parents live on after 
their death through their male children (mean = 1.35) while 
there was less agreement with the statement that "families 
with only female children are considered to be barren" 
(mean score = 1.96). 
The results of table 7.14 would seem to support the 
view that traditional societal attitudes are very dominant 
and may strongly affect wives' childbearing behaviour in 
favour of having more sons than daughters. 
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Table 7.14 
Wives' responses to statements about male-child preference. 
Level of agreement Mean score Rank 
1234 
NNNN 
Parents live on through 
their male children 
after death (LD) 743 173 70 13 1.35 1 
True death is when 
parents die without 
any sons (TD) 468 279 170 82 1.87 5 
Only familes with 
male children are 
considered lucky (FL) 587 155 187 70 1.74 3 
Sons support their 
families more than 
daughters (MS) 528 216 168 87 1.81 4 
Under the conditions 
of the occupation 
daughters cause their 
parents more concern 
(OC) 470 342 165 22 1.67 2 
Families that only have 
daughters are regarded 
as barren (FB) 412 170 162 155 1.96 7 
Male children result 
in a wife gaining 
respect (WR) 501 184 215 99 1.91 6 
1= strongly agree 
2= agree 
3= disagree 
4= strongly disagree 
Source: Author's data, 198 8. 
However, wives' responses to each of the statements 
in Table 7.14 were far from homogeneous, and varied 
according to characteristics such as level of education, 
age, work experience and place of residence. Table 7.15 
examines the influence of these behavioural determinants. 
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The chi-square test indicates that all these 
characteristics, with the exception of age, had a 
statistically significant association with attitudes to 
male-child preferences. 
The strongest negative relationship was found between 
level of education and the degree of agreement with 
societal norms. For example, the proportion of wives who 
thought that families without male children were considered 
barren decreased from 83% among illiterate women to 36% for 
women with higher education. 
Age was negatively associated with some attitudes, 
but not all. For instance, the proportion of wives who 
believed that daughters provided more or equal support to 
their familes as sons increased from 18% for wives aged 
over 60 years to 30% for younger wives (aged under 30 
years). No significant relationship with age existed 
however relative to scores on the statement about "parents 
living on through their sons". 
There were big differences between working wives 
responses and women who were not in waged employment. For 
instance, the proportion of wives who were strongly in 
agreement with the idea that "a family with more male 
children is a lucky one" decreased from 61% among non- 
salaried women to 21% among women in wage employment. The 
proportion of wives who voiced disagreement with the 
statement "families without male children are considered 
barren" increased from 30% among non-working wives to about 
70% among wives in waged employment. Despite the small 
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proportion of working wives (7%) employment was shown to 
have an influence on child gender preference. This may be 
due to the fact that most working women are in the younger, 
more educated age groups. 
Working women also enjoy a larger degree of 
independence from their husbands and families and therefore 
are more likely to have formed their own opinions on family 
size and child gender preference. Working women are 
certainly much less constrained by traditional cultural 
perceptions of their societal roles. 
Finally, as far as place of residence was concerned, 
there is a considerable difference between wives responses 
in different sub areas with regard to male preference 
attitudes. These differences between the different sub 
areas are statistically significant at the 0.0001 level. 
These strong geographical differences could be 
attributed to several factors: 
First: Couples education. In general couples in urban 
areas are more educated than their rural counterparts. 
Second: Better opportunities. Female children of urban 
areas are likely to have better educational and working 
opportunities. 
Third: Outsiders influence. Parents in rural areas are 
likely to be influenced by outside influences when making 
decisions, mainly as a result of the close family 
relationships that chatacterise rural society. 
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Table 7.15 
The chi-square test of the significance of the relation 
between behavioural characteristics** and wives' attitudes 
towards social norms listed in Table 7.14. 
Statements*** 
L. D. T. D. M. S. F. L. O. C. F. B. W. R. 
Education 
X2 calc. 46.8 38.4 58.7 105.0 72.0 100.0 77.0 
d. f. 9999999 
significance . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 . 
0001 . 0001 . 0001 
Age 
X2 calc. 21.0 11.1 17.4 26.5 
d. f. 6666 
significance . 002 *. 085 . 007 . 0001 
Work 
X2 calc. 50.7 22.0 24.1 62.1 
d. f. 3333 
significance . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 
Area 
X2 calc. 106.0 209.0 119.0 194.0 
d. f. 15 15 15 15 
significance . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 . 0001 
14.2 36.4 17.2 
666 
*. 027 . 0001 . 009 
62.2 43.3 32.1 
333 
. 0001 . 0001 . 
0001 
220.0 220.0 115.0 
15 15 15 
. 0001 . 0001 . 0001 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
L. D. = parents live through their children after death 
T. D. = true death is when parents die without having male 
children 
M. S. = male children support the families more than female 
children 
F. L. = only families that have male children are lucky 
O. C. = under the occupations female cause more concern 
F. B. = families that have only females are regarded as 
barren 
W. R. = male children result in a wife gaining more respect 
* Not significant at level 0.01 
** Definitions of categories: 
Education = Illiterate, Low, Middle, High. 
Age = Young, Middle, Old. 
Work = Employed, unemployed. 
Area = Village, Town, City lower class, City middle 
class, City upper class, Refugee camps. 
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Fourth: Inheritance. Couples in rural areas prefer male 
children to inherit their land after their death in order 
to maintain family property under the same family name. 
Fifth: Cultural diversity. The close knit society that 
characterises rural areas causes parents to be more strict 
and conservative especially in dealing with issues 
pertaining to their daughters. 
Finally, it might be concluded that the modernization 
process, which has made the deepest impact in urban areas, 
also has a negative association with male child gender 
preference. 
7.12 Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter indicated that the vast 
majority of West Bank couples prefer to have more male than 
female children. 47% of husbands and 36% of wives have 
strong and very strong male-child preferences as compared 
with 9.6% of husbands and 21.7% of wives who prefer to have 
an equal number of males and females. It is of 
considerable importance to West Bank families for the first 
child to be male, mainly due to social and cultural 
factors. Gender preference becomes more strong and obvious 
especially if the family has fewer males than females or is 
without male children. Therefore, great attention should 
be given in fertility analysis in the Arab world to actual 
family composition. 
Williamson (1976) found that women in Arab countries 
have a stronger male preference than elsewhere in the 
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world. While this may be true, the findings of this 
chapter show that husbands are more concerned about male- 
child preference than their wives. As the chapter has also 
shown, West Bank couples may have stronger male child 
preferences than other Arabs because of their perceptions 
of the political situation. 
Socio-economic and demographic variables such as 
urbanisation, age, educational level and work status, have 
significant influence on couples opinions, attitudes and 
beliefs towards gender preference. Yet cultural factors 
still influence peoples attitudes towards male child 
preference, despite the fact that females are sometimes 
more supportive of their families than males. 
Gender preference is an important factor in 
sustaining high fertility levels because: 
1. Couples will exceed their desired family size in order 
to achieve the desired number of male children. 
Sometimes the gap between desired and actual family 
size may therefore be attributed to gender preference. 
2. A couples willingness to use contraceptives may 
increase, especially when they have achieved the 
desired number of male children. It is also to be 
expected that the birth interval will be wider after 
the birth of a son than the birth of a daughter. 
3. Families with strong male child preference normally 
prefer to start and end their childbearing period with 
a male child. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE DATA 
8.1 Introduction 
Desired family size is considered to be one of the 
most important measures of fertility preference. This 
variable has attracted the attention of the researcher 
because of the importance of understanding the factors 
moulding reproductive behaviour and the circumstances and 
cultural norms and values which influence decision making 
on this issue. The analysis of desired family size lies at 
the interface between fertility attitudes and behaviour 
(Lightbourne, 1985). 
The analysis of desired family size reveals the 
operation of several factors pertinent to parental decision 
making such as family structure, family system, marriage 
relationships, power structures in decision making, and 
attitudes to the value of children. Investigation of 
desired family size, however, faces some drawbacks that 
influence the quality and the kind of data which can be 
obtained and which are used in making inferences and 
drawing generalisations about the topic. 
This chapter commences by evaluating the theoretical 
basis of analysing family size preferences, and the 
criticisms of the methods used by others which have in some 
cases produced misleading results. This chapter also 
contains some recommendations which may help future 
researchers overcome some of these difficulties. The final 
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part of the chapter will examine the consistency of female 
responses to the authors survey questions on desired family 
size. This is done by examining responses for women in the 
reproductive age cohorts to questions about additional 
births and about whether the last birth was "wanted or 
unwanted". This chapter, therefore, forms the basis on 
which evaluation of survey results reported in Chapter 9 is 
based. 
8.2 Importance of family size desired 
Family formation is undoubtedly a sequential process 
carried in relation to a complex set of expectations and 
preferences about many aspects of life, of which preference 
for a certain number of children is only one aspect. 
Questions on desired family size have routinely been 
incorporated in fertility questionnaires in most developing 
countries. The concept of desired family size is generally 
believed to be meaningful to most respondents, and offers 
some distinct benefits to researchers studying a society 
undergoing socio-economic and cultural changes, where 
voluntary fertility control is reasonably widespread and 
effective. 
Some couples define the desired number of children at 
an early stage of their married life, and condition their 
reproductive behaviour to achieve their target. Others 
delay the decision or do not even make any decision at all 
as to the number and sex of the children they want, until 
they already have a certain number of children (boys and 
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girls). Kiser and Whelpton (1958) speculate that 
collecting data from young people before marriage would be 
valuable, because the concept of desired family size may 
develop at an even earlier stage. Research suggests that 
for most couples the desired number of children is not 
immutable, but changes over time according to their 
circumstances. Studies of the stability of short and long 
run expectations remain too few. Campbell et al. (1974) 
have suggested, however, that highly educated respondents 
are likely to have more stability in their responses to 
studies on fertility preference than less well educated 
couples. 
The gap between preferences and actual behaviour 
differs from one society to another and between one area 
and another in the same country. Many factors play a role 
in increasing or decreasing this gap, such as the level of 
compliance with social norms and couples ability to make 
independent decisions, the dominance or otherwise of 
religious teaching, on attitudes to family size and family 
planning, the nature of marital relationships and couples 
communication within different family structures, personal 
characteristics and the availability and efficiency of 
contraceptive usage in controlling births and in avoiding 
unwanted conceptions. 
To identify the factors which affect the gap between 
what the family size is which couples would prefer, and the 
number of children actually born in each family, is very 
useful for the policy maker. It helps in the planning and 
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implementation of family planning policies. 
If the gap between desired and actual family size is 
either not too great and is consistent with known 
parameters, then desired family size can be used as a 
predictor of fertility behaviour (Bumpass and Westoff, 
1970). Campbell et al. (1974) found that the expectations 
expressed by a sample of women in the reproductive age 
cohorts were remarkably accurate in making aggregate 
predictions of the actual fertility rate for the cohorts 
for the next five year period. 
Detailed analysis of family size preferences may 
therefore help to give a better understanding of the 
factors which will affect future fertility patterns on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, may in fact provide a 
reasonably good predictive base of the usage of 
contraception. Studies in Bangladesh and Thailand have 
shown that women who have already reached or exceeded their 
desired family size are more likely to report the use of 
contraception than women who have families less than their 
desired size (Ahmed, 1981; Knodel and Prachaubmoh, 1973). 
To summarise the discussions so far, one can suggest 
four main benefits from the analysis of desired family 
size: 
1. It may give a better basis for predicting fertility. 
2. It may help in giving a better understanding of the 
decision making process with regard to fertility 
behaviour. 
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3. It helps clarify the concept of wanted and 
unwanted children. 
4. It provides a better understanding of the connection 
between desired family size and motives for 
contraceptive use. 
8.3 Desired family size: Criticisms 
Despite the importance of studying desired family 
size, the validity of such studies have been criticised by 
some researchers (Hauser, 1967; Ryder, 1973; Monnier, 1988) 
on the basis of the poor reliability of the measures used. 
Researchers must therefore make great efforts in order to 
get sufficiently good quality data to make their analysis 
of any value. 
Some researchers (Hauser, 1967; Kirk, 1972) have 
argued that the concept of family size preference is a 
meaningless notion in developing societies because 
respondents in traditional societies and in some developing 
countries may be unable to give a numerical answer or 
meaningful quantitative response to the question "How many 
children would you prefer to have during your life? " 
Sometimes responses may be qualitative or uninformed, such 
as "I dont know; its up to God; as many as I can". This 
may be due to the fact that people in these societies 
believe that the number of children is not for them to 
determine. 
In West Bank culture as well as in most of the 
Islamic world, many people are not used to thinking of 
these issues and may be unaccustomed to thinking of future 
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family developments. The majority believe that having or 
not having children is out of their control. This applies 
especially to family composition and the gender mix of 
their children (Ata, 1986). The high proportion of 
illiteracy in many developing societies and the low portion 
of people using contraceptives supports this view and may 
make responses lack any intrinsic meaning (Hauser, 1967). 
Despite this kind of criticism, Morsa (1966) found 
from a survey conducted in Tunisia that only 5% of 
respondents were not able to give numerical answers. Also 
Stycos (1965) in Peru found similar results with only 4-6% 
of respondents refusing to give a numerical answer. The 
author found in his study on the West Bank that only 6% of 
respondents declined to answer all the questions in the 
questionnaire and a further 4% refused to answer some 
questions. The main reasons for their objections were, 
however, political rather than conceptual (all incomplete 
questionnaires were eliminated from the study). 
The second main criticism of family size preference 
studies is that the total number of children preferred 
tends to be a reflection of de facto family size. This 
will especially be a problem among those who have 
completed their families and are no longer in the 
reproductive cohorts. No one can deny that actual 
childbearing experience as well as changes in circumstances 
will lead couples to adjust their preference as time 
passes. Monnier (1988) found that women who revised their 
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intentions downwards tended to have more children than 
women who revised their intentions upward. Ryder (1973) 
has also suggested that desired family size is 
indeterminate in meaning because it combines varying 
factual components (number of living children) with varying 
attitude components (number of future children wanted). 
A third cause of confusion is the wording of 
questions on desired family size. Respondents may simply 
evaluate their responses and select one which he/she 
believes presents a favourable image to the interviewer 
(Cook and Selltiz, 1964). 
Fourth, different people have different objectives 
and furthermore, the same individual may have different 
objectives at different points in time, since objectives 
are always in flux (Leibenstein, 1981). Some respondents 
may even choose a random answer, especially if they have 
never thought about their future reproductive behaviour. 
Fifth, most fertility and fertility attitudes surveys 
focus on women in reproductive age responses, neglecting 
the husband who may have the authority and final say in 
family decisions. The necessity of researching husband's 
opinions is especially important in fertility attitude 
surveys in developing countries. Thus it is important to 
allow marriage partners to express their opinions 
separately and if possible without being influenced by 
their spouses. It is important for studies to be carried 
out on all types of couples: i. e. couples with and without 
children, couples in the childbearing period and couples 
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who have finished their childbearing span. Such studies 
are important in order to draw comparisons and conclusions 
about trends in attitudes and behaviour. 
8.4 Consistency of Responses 
It is possible to measure the consistency of 
responses on desired family size in two ways. Firstly, one 
can use follow up surveys over different periods. 
(Monnier, 1988) checked the consistency of desired family 
size data in France by using this method. The data was 
consistent in 80% of cases. Over the period of his surveys 
(1974,1976 and 1979) the consistency decreased with people 
generally raising their responses to questions on desired 
number of children. It is to be expected that the 
consistency of data in developing countries will be lower 
and it is also to be expected that the consistency will 
decrease the greater the period between the initial survey 
and the follow up survey. 
A second approach is to use different measures of 
desired family size such as asking whether the last birth 
was wanted or not wanted and comparing this with 
participants response regarding desired family size. The 
researcher will use this latter type of measure in this 
thesis to examine the consistency of the data for women in 
the reproductive age in the West Bank. 
Reliability and validity of data has become one of 
the first and most essential steps in any attempts to study 
fertility preferences, particularly in developing 
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countries. Freedman et al. (1975) found considerable 
consistency in their study between stated desires and 
further behaviour. Higher levels of consistency help to 
increase confidence in a surveys findings and the use to 
which a study can be put. If a survey has proven 
consistency, and if women's preferred family size is much 
greater than that achieved, then it is to be expected that 
their expressed desires will be reflected in responses to 
questions about having additional children and whether the 
last child was wanted. Checking consistency of preference 
data in this way is a reasonable test to see whether the 
responses really reflect the couple's opinions and 
attitudes or are merely random answers given by 
respondents without any thought. 
Inconsistency between responses may not, however, 
imply that random answers are being given. It is possible 
for example that a women may not want anymore children, yet 
may become pregnant. This may be due to two factors: 
1. The husband wants more children and proves to be the 
key decision maker in the family. 
2. The women fails to use contraceptives efficiently. 
If either of these are the case then children may 
continue to be born, while female survey respondents 
continue to state that the last birth was an unwanted 
child. 
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8.5 Consistency of West Bank survey responses on desired 
family size 
Table 8.1 summarises the consistency of the authors 
survey data gathered from women in the reproductive ages in 
the sample. The table indicates a remarkable pattern. It 
can be seen from the table that almost 90% of respondents 
who said that they wanted more children, also stated their 
desired family size as greater than their actual family 
size. On the other hand, the table also indicates that 
about 32% of respondents said they wanted no additional 
children yet gave a desired family size which exceeded 
their total number of living children. The relationship 
between spouses, the authority of husbands, the pressure of 
social norms and religious teaching, women's health and the 
political situation all play a part in accounting for the 
presence of inconsistancies in the author's survey. 
In fact inconsistencies appear in several cases in 
Table 8.1. There are those respondents who wanted no 
additional children yet reported desired family sizes in 
excess of their actual family size. Second there are those 
respondents who stated that they wanted additional children 
yet gave preferred family sizes less than or equal to their 
actual family size. These sources of inconsistency are in 
numerical terms relatively small compared with the high 
proportion of consistent responses. 
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Table 8.1 
Percentage of the women of fecund age, who would like an 
additional child, by number of living children. 
Prefer Prefer Prefer Total 
less equals exceeds % 
than living living 
living 
More children 5.3 (I) 4.7 (I) 90 100 
wanted 
No more children 30.3 37.3 32.4 (I) 100 
wanted 
(I) indicates inconsistent combination. 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
The question whether wives wanted additional children 
or not was easy to answer. It was answered even by wives 
who had given little thought to the number of children they 
might want. Table 8.2 shows that the existence in each 
sub-area of a high percentage of married women in the 
fecund ages who did not want any additional children. The 
proportion rises from low levels in the towns (about 24%) 
to high proportions in the city upper class areas (about 
40%) . 
In addition the table cross tabulates responses by 
the number of living children in the family. This helps to 
counteract the impression of an unlimited desire for 
additional children in all sub areas. For example, in 
families with four children and less, between 11% to 27% of 
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women wanted no additional children, while in cases where 
women already had more than 8 children the proportion of 
wives who wanted no additional children actually declined 
and ranged from 6.4% in the lower class areas to about 27% 
in middle class areas. 
Table 8.2 
Percentage of women not wanting additional children in each 
sub-area classified by number of living children. 
Area Number of living children All 
1,2 3,4 5,6 7,8 9,10 10+ Women 
Total 1.7 13.9 31.3 27.0 17.8 8.3 30.7 
Small villages 2.8 9.7 25.0 29.2 19.4 13.9 31.3 
Towns 2.1 10.4 16.7 33.3 22.9 14.6 23.8 
City, lower class - 19.4 35.5 32.3 6.4 6.4 37.8 
City, middle class - 18.2 40.9 13.6 27.3 - 27.2 
City, upper class - 26.7 50.0 16.7 6.7 - 40.0 
Refugee camps 3.7 7.4 40.7 25.9 22.2 - 34.2 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
There has been an increasing amount of evidence to 
support the notion that a large number of women wish to 
restrict childbearing long before reaching the stopping 
point. Postponing rather than terminating childbearing is 
one major force behind the substantial number of 
contraceptive users who state that they want more children. 
The main conclusion which can be drawn from Table 8.2 is 
that in general the proportion of women not wanting any 
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additional children increases with the number of living 
children in the family up until a threshhold of 7 or 8 
children. Beyond this the relationship seems to break 
down. 
Table 8.3 shows the average number of women in sub- 
areas who want additional children whether they used modern 
contraceptives or not. The table shows that two thirds of 
women who want additional children never used any kind of 
modern contraceptives, while the remaining women used 
contraceptives in order to increase the birth interval. 
The percentage varies greatly with each sub area. 
The majority of women who had used contraceptives were 
found in city upper class areas (66.3%) while the lowest 
percentage was found in the towns (21.8%). contraceptives 
to increase the birth interval. The table shows that more 
than five out of ten women who had ever used 
contraceptives, said they also wanted additional children. 
This percentage varies greatly by different sub-areas. 
However, the majority of the women who had ever used 
contraceptives were found in the city's middle class (68%), 
while the lowest percentage was found in the towns (47%). 
Table 8.3 indicates that the proportion of women who 
used contraceptives and want more children increases with 
the urbanisation process. From the table it is apparent 
that the proportion of women in urban areas who used 
contraceptives and want more children is almost twice the 
proportion of rural women (25%). 
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Figure 8.1: Wives who want additional children by 
contraceptive use. 
80 
60 
f 40 
a 20 
0 
0 Ever used 
© Never used 
Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 8.3. 
The differences between the sub areas may be 
attributed to several factors such as culture norms, social 
pressures, availability of and accessibility to 
contraceptives, educational level, womens work and the 
woman's role in making decisions on the use of 
contraceptives. 
The existence of a widespread female desire to 
postpone births introduces the question of the timing of 
births. Table 8.4 summarises the survey results with 
regard to this issue and indicates that half of the women 
in the survey who wanted another child, would prefer to 
have the next birth within a two year time interval, while 
the other half would prefer to delay the next birth for 
more than two years. 
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Table 8.3 
Percentage of women who want additional children in 
different sub areas, by their use of modern contraceptives. 
Area Ever used 
contraceptives 
Never used 
contraceptives 
No. of women 
Small villages 26.6 73.4 154 
Towns 21.8 78.2 147 
City, 
lower class 45.1 54.9 51 
City, 
middle class 45.8 54.2 59 
City, 
upper class 66.3 33.3 45 
Refugee camps 42.3 57.7 52 
TOTAL 34.4 65.6 508 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Table 8.4 
Percentage of women who want the next child within two 
years, by place of residence. 
Area Small Towns City, City, City, Refugee Total 
villages lower middle upper camps 
class class class 
Within 
2 yrs 66.2 59.9 39.2 33.9 37.8 40.3 52.9 
Not within 
2 yrs 33.8 40.1 60.8 66.1 62.2 59.7 47.1 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Table 8.4 shows considerable spatial variations in 
attitudes to child spacing. For instance, the proportion 
of women in small villages who want another child within 
two years is twice the proportion of those who want to 
delay births. In city lower class areas the results are 
quite the inverse to the rural situation. Table 8.3 and 
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8.4 reflect the relative importance of contraceptive use 
particularly in the city and the refugee camps, to control 
the birth interval. 
It is interesting to investigate in more detail the 
attitudes of women who want their next child within two 
years relative to their number of living children and by 
sub-area. It would be expected that a high percentage of 
the women who want their next child soon would either not 
have any children, or would have few living children. 
Table 8.5 confirms this pattern. Within most sub-areas 
more than 95% of women without children wanted to have 
their first baby within the next two years. In West Bank 
culture it is important to have the first child immediately 
after marriage. The lower percentages in rural and city 
middle class areas may be due to some responses by 
infertile women. More than two thirds of women who had 
only one child preferred to have the next birth soon, while 
among women who already had between two and six living 
children about one third stated a preference to have the 
next birth soon. The proportion of women who wanted their 
next child soon, drops steadily with increased family size 
(Table 8.5), but increases again in families with more than 
five living children. Gender preference, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, may be one reason explaining this 
reversal in responses. 
There are two points that should be taken into 
consideration with regard to the desire for postponement of 
having additional children. They are: 
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1. If the desired period of postponement is relatively 
short, and the number of children desired is low, then 
contraception to delay the birth may have less 
influence on fertility, but it makes women more likely 
to use contraceptives successfully to stop the birth 
when they achieve the desired number of children. 
2. If the women desire a large number of children and 
start using contraceptives after having their first or 
second child so as to postpone other births, then this 
might have a greater impact on fertility (by delaying 
births) than it does have on the case already outlined 
above. 
8.6 Consistency of last birth measurements 
To examine the consistency between preferred family 
size and whether the last birth was wanted or unwanted, the 
percentage distribution of responses by wives in the fecund 
ages was examined. The results in Table 8.6 show that 91% 
of those who wanted their last birth had attitudes 
consistent with their behaviour. By contrast, of the women 
who did not want their last birth, only 29.2% gave 
consistent attitudinal responses. 
There are several possible explanations for the high 
proportion of women who gave inconsistent responses. One 
of them is "after the event" rationalisation of their 
responses by upward revision of their desired family size. 
These people nevertheless admitted in terms of their 
responses that they had stopped wanting additional 
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children. Direct evidence of rationalisation comes from 
Stycos (1964) in his study in Haiti, where he found that 
preferred family size increases by one child among 72% of 
women whose desired family size equalled the actual size at 
the time of his first interview, but who then had further 
children before being re-interviewed. It is difficult to 
measure the level of decision makers rationality in the 
West Bank through only one survey, but the researcher 
expected that a high proportion of women (may be more than 
in Haiti) would have rational views on desired family size. 
Table 8.5 
Proportion of women wanting the next child within 2 years, by number of living children, classified by sub-area. 
Number of living children 
01234,5 6,7 8+ 
Total 
Small villages 
Towns 
City, lower class 
City, middle class 
City, upper class 
Refugee camps 
96.8 
95.8 
96.7 
100 
92.9 
100 
100 
64.6 
81.5 
77.3 
66.7 
36.4 
83.3 
10.0 
39.1 38.8 
58.8 61.9 
45.4 42.9 
14.3 33.3 
20.0 - 
40.0 8.3 
23.1 66.7 
29.9 
42.4 
50.0 
7.1 
6.7 
9.1 
30.0 
38.6 54.8 
41.2 86.7 
52.2 16.7 
- 50.0 
16.7 - 
66.7 50.0 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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Table 8.6 
Attitude to the last birth classified in relation to 
desired number of children. 
Desire Desire Desire Total 
less than equals exceeds 
actual actual actual 
family family family 
size size size 
Last birth wanted 9.2 (I) 18.2 72.6 
Last birth not wanted 29.2 3.9 (I) 66.9 (I) 
(I) indicates inconsistent combination. 
Source: Author's data. 
As with Table 8.1, Table 8.6 includes results which 
seem irrational or inconsistent. Compared with Table 8.1, 
the level of inconsistency seems greater in comparing the 
data on last birth with desired family size. Some 
respondents may have misconstrued what was meant by the 
question about desire for the last birth, and may have 
thought the question referred to whether they wanted 
additional children at that time, so that some of the 
"unwanted" last births were mis-timed rather than 
permanently unwanted. This, howeover, can only partly 
explain the anomaly. 
The investigation of the consistency of responses to 
questions about the last birth suggest other factors are 
also important: 
1. The timing of births: if a women would have preferred 
to postpone the last birth, and the last birth occurred 
sooner than planned, then it may have been reported as 
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unwanted even if desired family size had not been 
reached. 
2. If the family wanted the last birth to be male because 
the family had an equal number of sons and daughters or 
more girls than boys then the last birth may have been 
unwanted if a daughter was born. 
3. It is also true that most families in the West Bank 
prefer the first born child to be male, whereas if it 
was a girl again, the "last" birth may be defined as 
unwanted, even although the couple intended to have many 
more children. 
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed and examined the possibility 
of using desired family size as a measure of demand for 
children and as a predictor of future fertility in the West 
Bank, as well as in many developing countries. The 
material presented found no evidence to preclude 
considering measures of desired family size as a measure of 
demand. 
In order to examine the reliability and validity of 
data on the desired family size, both the desire for more 
children and the favourable attitudes towards the last 
birth are used for the analysis of consistency of wives 
responses. The results reveal that most inconsistencies 
were found amongst those women whose desired family size 
exceeded their actual number of living children, but who 
wanted no more children (32.4%), compared with only l0% for 
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women who wanted more children despite their actual number 
of living children being equal to or exceeding their 
desired family size. This result may be considered as an 
indication of a decreasing demand for children. It points 
to the need for couples to use efficient contraceptive 
methods to close the gap between intentions and practice in 
family planning. 
It was found that a high proportion of the women 
(70ö) who did not want or favour their last birth were 
those whose desired family sizes more or equal to their 
actual number of living children. Less than 10% of women 
who had exceeded their desired family size, suggested that 
they want their last birth for other reasons such as 
gender preference, birth order, conflict between spouses 
attitudes to family size and to the changing of life 
patterns. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE MEASUREMENT 
9.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter the consistency of desired family 
size data was investigated. Several approaches can be used 
in estimating desired family size. The first section of 
this chapter will discuss the three main approaches. Since 
each of these approaches may produce different results it 
is necessary to compare the results of each of these 
various approaches with the total marital fertility rate 
(TMFR). The second part of this chapter, using one of the 
measures discussed above, analyses the differential between 
desired average family size and TMFR in relation to several 
economic, socio-cultural, demographic and geographic 
variables. 
9.2 Measurements of desired family size 
There is no one standard method of measuring family 
size preferences (Lightbourne and MacDonald, 1982). The 
three approaches used in this research are as follows: 
1. The conventional approach. This approach depends on 
direct questioning of all respondent's preferences. 
The measure is flexible and can be addressed to both 
husbands and wives of different ages. There has often 
proven to be a strong correlation between the results 
and actual family size where contraceptive methods are 
used effectively. However, for any given family the 
results have been shown to be unstable with estimates 
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of desired family size being revised in line with 
reproductive behaviour. 
2. The stopping point approach. This is restricted to 
married women in the fecund cohorts (15-49), and 
estimates desired family by indirect methods. The 
calculation rests on the preferred family size of women 
who have stopped having children and who have no 
intention of having further children in the future. 
Different approaches can be used in order to estimate 
the stopping point. For example, Rodrigues and 
Trussell (1981) have estimated the number of children 
respondents would have before stopping childbearing, 
while Lightbourne (1977) measured it through the 
estimation of the number of living children respondents 
would prefer to have in order to allow for the 
probability of child mortality. The researcher, 
however, based his estimation on the actual family size 
at which a woman would not want any additional 
children, in order to avoid the problems that might 
arise as a result of gender preference. Rodrigues and 
Trussel's (1981) approach leads to a higher estimation 
of desired family size relative to the researcher's 
method. 
3. The total desired fertility rate. This approach is 
also restricted to the analysis of women's perceptions. 
Estimates of desired family size are calculated 
relative to the stated total desired fertility rate for 
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women who do not want additional children and who also 
hold a negative attitude towards the birth of their 
last child. This is the most appropriate method that 
can be used by researchers who are interested in 
fertility implications. 
These three alternatives are the main approaches used 
in measuring desired family size and can be used in 
examining variations in results, and in comparing these 
results with the total marital fertility rate. 
9.3 Results of the three approaches when tested on the 
West Bank 
Table 9.1 indicates the mean desired family size 
achieved using the conventional approach. The average size 
is substantially lower among younger women aged 15-19 than 
amongst older women aged 30-34 and over. Substantial 
geographical variations are also evident. The results 
suggest that younger women really prefer less children than 
older women, and if younger women succeed in using 
contraceptive methods effectively then fertility reductions 
in the West Bank can be expected in the near future. 
Comparing the conventional approach and the stopping 
point method is possible by comparing columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 9.1. Column 5 shows that the average family size 
using the stopping point method is about 5.7 children. The 
figure ranges between 6.45 children in towns and 4.51 
children in the city's middle class. The average appears 
lower than the actual family size for all women in the 
sample, and also for the average family size in each sub 
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Table 9.1 
Desired family size, measured by direct and indirect 
methods; conventional, stopping point, total desired 
fertility rates and marital fertility rates. 
12345678 
Age Age Age All 
15-19 30-34 45-49 women 
Total 5.69 6.60 8.22 7.18 5.68 7.10 6.44 6.24 
Small 
villages 6.43 7.00 8.57 7.94 6.31 7.53 6.97 6.71 
Towns 6.67 6.69 8.45 7.36 6.45 7.28 7.10 7.00 
City 
lower class 4.50 7.31 6.88 6.81 5.34 6.53 6.26 6.01 
City 
middle class 5.33 6.19 8.67 6.86 4.51 5.98 5.98 5.98 
City 
upper class 4.00 5.86 5.43 5.27 5.06 5.04 4.22 3.87 
Refugee 
camps 6.25 5.73 8.80 7.59 5.02 6.50 4.90 4.44 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Notes: 
Column 1-4: Average desired family size using the 
conventional method 
Column 5: Average family size using stopping point 
approach (do not want additional children). 
Column 6: Total marital fertility rate (TMFR). 
Column 7: Desired total fertility rate - birth deleted 
if actual exceeds desired 
Column 8: Desired total fertility rate - births deleted 
if last birth was unwanted 
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area. The figures are also all consistently lower than the 
estimates generated by the conventional approach. The 
stability of the average figures generated by the stopping 
point method depends on the efficient use of contraceptives 
to prevent any unplanned births. The researcher was 
doubtful about the accuracy of the figures generated by 
this approach for this reason, since a large number of 
women in the West Bank do not make efficient use of 
contraceptives. 
For example the survey findings indicated that only 
41% of all women in the fecund age cohorts made efficient 
use of contraceptives. This percentage increased to only 
58% amongst women who did not want additional children. 
On the other hand, the proportion of women who do not want 
additional children and do not use modern contraceptives is 
almost 42%. Of this group, 33% did not use contraceptives 
because of religious reasons, 14% because of their 
husbands' objections and the remainder due to various 
reasons such as cost and health reasons. Of those who had 
used contraceptives 28.3% had subsequently stopped using 
them because of health and social reasons. These results 
imply that contraceptives are not strongly favoured by 
women in the West Bank and even where they are used they 
are often ineffective. As a result family planning is 
often beyond the control of Palestinian women. 
Two measures of desired total fertility rate are 
presented in columns 7 and 8 in table 9.1. These have been 
calculated relative to the TMFR in relation to unwanted 
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births. By contrasting the desired total fertility rate 
with the actual total fertility rate it can be seen how 
much fertility would decline if unwanted births were 
prevented. In most cases the differential is of the order 
of one child. This result emphasises the importance of 
effective family planning programmes to reduce fertility 
levels. 
Figure 9.1: Measurement of desired family size. 
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The desired total fertility rate in column 8 is lower 
than that of column 7. This reflects the large number of 
women who did not want the birth of their last child. 
The discussion above has described three methods for 
analysing desired family size: conventional, stopping 
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point and total desired fertility rate. Several conclusions 
have emerged from comparing the results of the different 
methods. These conclusions are: 
1. The stopping point approach seems to give results 
substantially lower than the conventional approach. 
2. Comparing the total fertility rate and the average 
family preferred size revealed by the conventional 
approach (column 8 and column 4), would lead to the 
expectation that little change in fertility levels will 
take place in the near future, since the total 
fertility rate is very similar to the average desired 
family size (7.10 and 7.18 children respectively). 
However, a change might be expected in fertility 
levels, if the total desired fertility rate of young 
women aged 15-19 is achieved and not exceeded. 
3. Rural areas and refugee camps have a higher desired 
number of children than city dwellers, regardless of 
the approach used, and as shown by table 9.1. 
4. The results reveal the importance of efficient 
contraceptive use in bringing the desired fertility 
rate in line with the total marital fertility rate. 
9.4 Differentials of desired family size 
As outlined in the literature review, socio-economic 
and cultural forces are fundamental determinants of desired 
family size. Analysis of these forces can yield 
considerable insights into the causes of the trends 
observed in the West Bank. This section of the chapter 
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presents data on the average number of children desired by 
husbands and wives and relates this information to other 
characteristics of the West Bank population. Differences 
in desired family size will be examined relative to: 
a) Socio-cultural factors such as religion and education 
levels of both husbands and wives. 
b) Economic factors; family income, home size and work 
status of both husbands and wives. 
c) Demographic factors; age of respondents, age at first 
marriage, duration of marriage and child mortality. 
d) Geographical factors relating to type of residence. 
Substantial geographical variations exist throughout 
the West Bank in the level of socio-economic development 
and in the extent of the cultural changes which have taken 
place. The analysis of these differences is related only to 
information about desired family size from using the 
conventional approach illustrated above. 
It is known that most socio-economic and cultural 
variables are highly inter-related, and sometimes the 
effect of one variable may impact on another. For example, 
there are known to be strong relationships between age of 
respondent, age at marriage and duration of marriage. 
These strong inter-relationships make it difficult to 
determine precise causality. 
9.4.1 Socio-cultural variables 
The educational level and religion of husbands and 
wives was investigated. The impact of male and female 
educational levels on their desired number of children has 
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been much researched. Table 9.2 shows that the expected 
relationships hold also on the West Bank. The table shows 
that the gap in aspirations between illiterate couples, and 
couples with a high level of education is very large. The 
average; number of children desired declines sharply from 
10.22 children to 5.47 children, and from 8.46 to 4.71 
children for the husbands and wives respectively in these 
educational categories. Further improvements in 
educational levels, particularly female education would 
tend to reduce the preferred number of children, and thus 
reduce future fertility levels. 
Figure 9.2: Desired family size by socio-cultural 
variables. 
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Although the West Bank survey does not permit deeper 
analysis of the causal links, the literature would suggest 
the following relationships. The influence of the 
education level is expected to be greater when a husband 
with higher education marries a woman with the same level 
of education. It is assumed and expected that increased 
levels of education in the population and expansion of 
schooling will lead to fertility decline by reducing the 
number of children desired. 
Table 9.2 
Socio-cultural variables and average family size desired by 
husbands and wives. 
Variables Husbands Wives 
Average desired Average desired 
family size family size 
Education 
Illiterate 10.22 8.46 
Lower education 8.47 7.01 
Middle education 6.64 5.44 
Higher education 5.47 4.71 
Religion 
Muslim 7.94 7.02 
Christian 4.86 5.28 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
The effect of education on fertility levels thus may 
appear in the following forms: 
1) Education will increase the value of parents time, thus 
increasing the opportunity costs of raising children. 
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2) Education may have an influence on peoples' perceptions 
of traditional values and accelerate the process of 
social change. 
3) Education helps women achieve their ambitions, and 
exposes them more to western values. 
, 
4) Education reduces the children's financial contribution 
to the household by delaying their entry to the labour 
market and increases the cost of children through the 
transformation of children's roles (Schultz, 1973; 
Fargues, 1989). 
5) Education delays the age at first marriage for both 
males and females, consequently, reducing the supply of 
children. 
Schultz (1973) found that education diminished 
fertility preferences for all ages. Chenery and Syrkin 
(1977) also found an inverse relationship between school 
enrollment and desired fertility. 
A second socio-cultural variable investigated was 
that of religion. As was expected, and as has been 
confirmed by data from the World Fertility Survey in most 
Islamic Countries, Muslims have a higher level of fertility 
and a higher desired number of children by comparison with 
other religious groups (Lightbourne & Macdonald, 1982). 
Table 9.2 shows that a big difference existed in the 
author's survey between Muslim and Christian couples' 
attitudes to average family size. This exists despite the 
couples being drawn from the same culture and the same 
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physical environment. The table also shows that Christian 
husbands desired on average three children less than their 
Muslim counterparts. Muslim wives desire on average two 
children more than their Christian counterparts. 
Therefore, it is interesting to note that Muslim husbands 
desired more children than their wives, while on the 
contrary, Christian husbands preferred fewer children than 
their wives. 
9.4.2 Economic factors 
Economic factors in this section are represented by 
various variables such as family income, house size, and 
the work status of husbands and wives. 
Income levels have been shown to be associated with 
the peoples' attitudes to the importance and value of time 
and consequently with couples attitudes to family size 
(Bulatao and Lee, 1983). Couples tastes change with 
increases in income, resulting in a desire to have fewer 
children (in whom they invest more effort). Table 9.3 shows 
the relationship identified in the author's survey between 
the level of family income and the average number of 
children desired by the husband and wife. As expected 
family income appears to be negatively associated with the 
average desired number of children. The spread of values 
for women is greater in relation to income levels. 
The size of house as measured by number of rooms is 
one means of examining the economic status of a family, and 
can be used as an indicator of family income. The reason 
behind using this variable as well as that of family 
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income, is that the author was concerned about the data 
reliability on all income questions given the West Bank's 
unusual situation which involves Israel imposing high taxes 
on all incomes. This inevitably has encour aged people in 
the occupied territories to give inaccurate figures to all 
household income surveys (as the researcher observed during 
his field study in 1988). 
Table 9.3 
Economic variables and av erage desired family size for both 
husbands and wives. 
Variables Husband Wife 
Average desired Average desired 
family size family size 
Income (in Jordanian 
Dinars per month 
Low, income less than 100 8.15 7.44 
Medium, between 100-200 8.16 7.16 
High, between 200-400 7.53 6.62 
Very high, more than 400 6.62 5.63 
Home size 
1 room 6.8 6.22 
2 and 3 rooms 7.8 7.04 
4 and 5 rooms 8.3 7.13 
More than 5 rooms 8.6 7.21 
Work status 
Unemployed 9.29 7.15 
Employed, with wages 7.35 4.56 
Self-employed 8.25 - 
Employer 7.96 - 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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Table 9.3 suggests that there is a slight increase in 
the average desired number of children with increases in 
the size of house. This conclusion seems to contradict 
the previous findings that poorer families tend to desire 
higher numbers of children. It is, however, inevitably the 
case that income and house size are not perfectly 
correlated. It is important to keep in mind, for example, 
the fact that most couples living in single room 
accommodation are at the beginning of their married life. 
Equally a distorting influence is the fact that some 
relatively poor families have been allowed by absent 
relatives to use their houses in order to keep the 
Israelis' hands off their property. This phenomenon is 
particularly obvious in rural areas due to the strong 
social ties within extended families, and the strong threat 
which is felt in these areas of land and property 
expropriation by the Israelis. 
Table 9.3 also shows that the average number of 
children desired by a couple is also affected by the work 
status of the husband and wife. The highest desired number 
was given by unemployed males (9.29 children). The majority 
of the unemployed were over 60 years of age, and most of 
them were from traditional cultural backgrounds. These two 
facts alone strongly influenced this result. 
The next highest figure was for the self-employed 
group. This was not surprising because the majority of 
them were working on their own land and consequently saw 
high levels of fertility as being beneficial in providing 
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future family labour. This is entirely in line with the 
findings of other demographers. Schultz (1973) for example 
found a consistent positive association between the 
proportion of males in agriculture and age specific 
fertility rates. Also Mauldin and Berelson (1978) found a 
positive correlation between the proportion of males 
employed outside agriculture and fertility decline. 
Figure 9.3: Economic variables and desired family size. 
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The lowest desired number of children was found 
amongst husbands receiving monthly salaries. Again this 
may be partially explained by the fact that the majority of 
them also had a high level of education. The table shows 
that there is no big difference in the average desired 
number of children of employers as opposed to employees. 
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Several studies have suggested that working women 
have lower fertility and preferences for a smaller number 
of children, compared with their non-working counterparts. 
This negative relation between women's work and desired 
fertility has been recorded in most developing countries 
(Goldstein, 1972; U. N., 1973; U. N., 1985). Table 9.3 
confirms this position with working women wanting fewer 
children than non-working women (4.56 and 7.15 children in 
respectively). Most working women received monthly 
salaries so once again the effect is a complex one relating 
to other determining variables. It is important to mention 
that the majority of women in rural areas of the West Bank 
recorded as having no waged employment in fact share their 
husband's agricultural work, but they prefer to report 
their status as "housewives". In general, employment rates 
amongst Arab women are amongst the lowest in the world 
(Fargues, 1989). 
Why should the relationship described above emerge? 
Woman's work reduces fertility levels in a number of ways: 
1) Waged work by women changes their perceptions of the 
value of time and raises the opportunity cost of 
childbearing and rearing children (Ridker, 1976). 
2) Women's work changes traditional roles and increases a 
woman's influence in family decision making. 
3) Women's work increases household income, which leads to 
some changes in tastes, ambition and attitudes to 
having more children. 
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4) Women's work leads to an increase in the proportion of 
women making effective use of contraceptives, 
subsequently, increasing the degree of birth control 
(Mason, 1983). 
5) Women's employment and childbearing may be in 
competition with one another, particularly if the place 
of work is away from home. 
Some researchers suggest that increases in the rate 
of female participation in the labour market, will lead to 
substantial reductions in fertility (Davis, 1967; Fawcett, 
1970). Whether this will be the case in the Arab World 
remains to be seen. 
9.4.3 Demographic variables 
Three purely demographic factors are usually 
introduced into the analysis of fertility: Marriage 
duration, present age of respondents and age at first 
marriage. This part of the chapter attempts to explain the 
effect of these variables on the average desired family 
size of both husbands and wives. 
It has been observed that Islamic culture, as it is 
in the West Bank, encourages people to marry at an early 
age. Marriage is regarded as desirable by the Islamic 
religion (Weeks, 1988; May, 1980). Age at marriage has a 
significant effect on childbearing behaviour, because 
having children outside marriage is forbidden by Islam and 
is socially unacceptable. Any delay in age of marriage 
could therefore reduce completed family sizes (McDonald et 
al., 1980). 
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In most Arab societies, the man's age at marriage is 
higher than the woman's. Fargues (1989) reported an 
average difference between the age of spouses in Jordan, of 
5.2 years. The findings of this study indicate an average 
gap in the West Bank of about 7 years. Reducing the gap 
between the age of couples may lead to a decrease in their 
desire for large families as a result of greater mutual 
understanding between them. Therefore, age at marriage is 
an important factor in determining family size. 
Table 9.4 shows that average family size is 
negatively associated with age at marriage. The average 
desired number of children decreases slightly as age at 
marriage increases. For instance, the average number of 
children desired decreases from 8.64 among husbands who 
married at the age of 17-20 years to 7.12 children among 
those who married at the age of 29 or more; while the 
average number of children desired by women who married at 
the age of 29 or more is 6.11 children and increases to 
7.71 children among women who married at an early age (less 
than 16). 
Many factors can explain the effect of age at 
marriage on the average desired family size. These factors 
are: 
1) Early marriage is often accompanied by a low level of 
education in both partners. 
2) An early age at marriage for the husband implies that 
he is more likely to be influenced by his family's 
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opinions. Usually men who marry at an early age live 
in their family's home after marriage. 
3) An early age at marriage for men is common practice 
among families with only one son. In order to maintain 
the family, they usually want to have many children. 
4) Most early marriages are arranged between close 
relatives, and as mentioned in previous chapters, the 
existence of a blood relationship between spouses is 
positively associated with the number of children 
desired. 
5) An early age at marriage for the woman puts the husband 
in a strong position in decision making. 
6) An early age at marriage for women has a direct effect 
on fertility, particularly for women who do not wish to 
use contraceptives. 
7) The political situation in the occupied territories 
(West Bank and Gaza strip) may also lead to early 
marriages and hence high fertility. Again it is 
therefore had to determine the direction of causality. 
The political context favours a high fertility regime 
and an early age at marriage may be both cause and 
consequence. 
Regarding marriage duration, Table 9.4 shows that 
there is a positive relation between the average number of 
children desired and the length of marriage duration. The 
differences between partners in the relationship between 
average desired family size and duration of marriage shows 
that husband's desired family size increases more rapidly 
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than wives with increased duration of marriage. The average 
family size desired increases from 5.55 children to 9.08 
children for the husbands while for wives the increase is 
from 5.28 to 7.85 children. 
The relationships evident in Table 9.4 may reflect 
the view that couples, who have been married for a long 
time period, are more likely to be influenced by actual 
family size. Development processes are also more likely to 
have affected newly married couples rather than older ones. 
It is to be expected therefore that duration of marriage 
will be associated positively with the average desired 
number of children. 
When standardised by age, desired family size is one 
of the best measures of the changing demand for children. 
For example Chang et al (1981) have shown that the average 
desired family size fell from 4.0 to 2.8 children in Taiwan 
between 1965 and 1980. Data from Korea shows that the 
average desired family size fell by about half from 5.0 to 
2.5 children over the last decade (Cho, 1978). In these 
countries, the fall in the average desired family size was 
accompanied by a remarkable fall in the total fertility 
rate. 
Table 9.4 shows that the average desired family size 
in the West Bank fell from 10.12 for men over 60 years of 
age to 5.65 among the men aged 20-29 years. A major 
reduction is also evident with womens age. Many other 
studies have shown a strong negative relationship between 
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the respondent's age and average number of children desired 
(Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973; Freedman and Coombs, 1974). 
Table 9.4 
Demographic variables and average desired family size for 
husbands and their wives. 
Variables Husbands 
Average desired 
number of 
children 
Wives 
Average desired 
number of 
children 
Age at marriage 
Less than 16 years *- 7.77 
Between 17-20 years 8.46 6.96 
Between 21-24 years 7.95 6.29 
Between 25-28 years 7.51 6.23 
29 years and more 7.12 6.11 
Duration of marriage 
Less than 3 years 5.55 5.28 
3-5 years 6.01 5.70 
6-8 years 6.62 6.23 
9-11 years 7.22 6.24 
More than 11 years 9.08 7.85 
Age 
Less than 20 years *- 5.48 
20-29 years 5.65 5.55 
30-39 years 6.94 6.61 
40-49 7.72 8.00 
50-59 9.19 8.39 
60 years or more 10.12 8.71 
*- Less than 10 cases. 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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The differences between younger and older couples 
desires can be attributed to the fact that older couples 
are generally more traditional in their outlook and hence 
have a stronger preference for large families than younger 
couples who are more responsive to "modern" attitudes. 
Figure 9.4: Respondent's age and average desired family 
size. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 9.4. 
The' most important conclusion however concerning the 
relationship between age of respondents and desired number 
of children is that a large decrease in desired family size 
by the respondents age has not been accompanied by an 
actual decrease in family size. Most fertility estimations 
in the West Bank do not indicate any very significant 
changes in fertility levels within the last two decades. 
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While attitudes may have changed, translating these 
attitudes into practice has not occurred. There is, 
therefore, scope for useful research to discover why this 
divergence between perceptions and behaviour has arisen. 
9.4.4 Geographical factors 
The survey also revealed that significant differences 
existed between places in desired family size. This has 
resulted from' the unevenness of the ways in which the 
development process has operated between one area and 
another. Traditional culture is inevitably more dominant 
in rural areas where the majority of residents work in the 
agricultural sector, while in urban areas development 
processes have had different effects on the social classes. 
Assessment of the costs and benefits of having children and 
indeed the yard sticks used to evaluate these concepts are 
also geographically differentiated. For instance, the cost 
of children in rural areas may be perceived to be less than 
in urban areas because child labour may be a greater 
benefit. In rural areas help is also provided by members 
of the extended family in raising children. 
Freedman and Slesinger (1961) studied the attitudinal 
changes among rural migrants towards fertility and found 
that their attitudes were influenced by the attitudes of 
people in urban areas. It may be that through time the gap 
in perceptions between rural and urban areas will decrease 
as a result of increased spatial interaction, and the 
effect of the mass media in diffusing a broader societal 
perspective on desired family size. Table 9.5 shows as 
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expected, that differences exist in the desired number of 
children. The mean number of children desired falls from 
7.6 in towns to 5.6. children for women in the city's upper 
class, and from 8.6 among husbands in towns to 6.6 children 
for husbands in the city's upper class. The differences 
between husbands and wives desires are obvious in all sub 
areas. 
Figure 9.5: Desired family size by place of residence. 
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Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 9.5. 
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As for the refugee camps, the average desired family 
size for both husband and wife is higher than that of urban 
areas, but slightly lower than that in urban ones. One 
possible reason for such differences is the fact that the 
vast majority of refugees are immigrants from rural areas 
of Palestine, and as a result of the geographic location of 
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refugee camps being adjacent to cities, the influence of 
urban sub culture and life style on the attitudes of the 
refugees is substantial. 
Regarding the urban social groups, Table 9.5 shows 
big differences between the city's social classes. These 
differences could be attributed to the wide gaps in the 
socio economic levels among the various classes and to the 
varying perceptions in couples' attitudes towards 
the value of children. 
Table 9.5 
Average number of children desired by place of residence. 
Area Husbands Wives 
average desired average desired 
family size family size 
Total 7.92 
Small villages 8.58 
7.00 
7.61 
Towns 8.17 /"L6 
City, lower class 7.68 6.64 
City, middle class 6.94 6.21 
City, upper class 6.62 5.62 
Refugee camps 7.75 7.02 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated and analysed the most 
common approaches used in measuring desired family size. 
The highest average desired family size (7.10) was produced 
by using the conventional approach. The lowest average was 
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given by the stopping point approach (5.68 children). It 
is believed that the average desired family size obtained 
from the stopping point approach was affected by the 
increase in the number of women using efficient 
contraceptives. In societies where birth control is widely 
and effectively practiced the differences between the 
different approaches should be very small. 
The results indicated that husbands in the West Bank 
desire on average about one child more than their wives. 
This may be attributed to cultural norms. West Bank women 
appear more eager to control births than their husbands. 
Socio-cultural, economic, demographic and 
geographical factors have had a substantial influence on 
both husbands and wives perceptions of desired family size. 
The average desired family size steadily decreased with 
increases in a couples level of education, family income, 
level of urbanization and age at marriage. On the other 
hand, the average family size increased with increase in a 
couples age, duration of marriage and house size. 
The effect of women's work on the average family size 
is more significant than that of their husbands. Also it 
was found that religion does have a significant effect on 
the average desired family size. For example, Christian 
couples prefer less children than their Muslim 
counterparts. However, a most interesting finding is that 
Christian wives prefer more children than their husbands. 
346 
CHAPTER 10 
IDEAL FAMILY SIZE 
10.1 Introduction 
For many years, demographers have been analysing data 
on ideal family size (Freedman and Sharp, 1954; Whelpton et 
al., 1966; Westoff, 1963; Blake, 1966; Gustavus, 1973). 
This kind of information has proved useful for projecting 
trends in births in relation to other socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics (Freedman & Sharp, 1954). 
In most developing countries, surveys have shown 
that the average number of children desired increases with 
the total number of living children (Mousa, 1987; Pullum, 
1980). However, survey respondents have tended to report an 
ideal family which is smaller than their declared 
preference for their own family. Compared with developed 
countries, ideal family size therefore tends to be higher 
than peoples own actual or desired family size (Pullum, 
1980). 
In the West Bank survey carried out by the author, 
the question about ideal family size was restricted to 
husbands for two reasons: Firstly, husbands were 
considered to have the final say about the number of 
children the family should have. Secondly, the topic of 
ideal family size in Arab countries has been virtually 
ignored by researchers and the few studies which have been 
carried out relate mainly to women. 
Following a brief introduction to the concept of 
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ideal family size, this chapter turns to giving an 
evaluation of the survey results, relating ideal family 
size to the husband's characteristics. It also explores 
the relationship between actual, desired and ideal family 
size. 
10.2 The Concept of Ideal Family Size 
Researchers and demographers should be cautious when 
asking respondents their opinions of actual, desired and 
ideal family size all within one questionnaire. By 
collecting data on all three measures at once respondents 
may default to giving the same answer for all three 
questions rather than considering the distinctive nature of 
each of the three terms. 
The concept of ideal family size seeks to identify 
what a person or married couple consider to be a suitable 
number of children per family in a particular society 
independently from their personal situation and their 
perceptions of social norms (Freedman et al., 1959; 
Stycos, 1965). 
An "ideal family size" question, therefore, neither 
measures the number of children that a respondent has in 
his or her family at a particular point in time nor the 
final number of children which a respondent expects will 
make up his or her completed family size in the future. 
Hence the concept of ideal family size is of vital 
importance in providing a distinctive picture of peoples 
views of the relationship between fertility behaviour and 
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future attitudes to childbearing (Girard and Roussel, 
1982). 
10.3 Survey Results: Ideal family size in relation to 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
In the analysis which follows responses about ideal 
family size have been grouped into four categories: small 
(less than four children), moderate (four or five 
children), large (six to eight children) and very large 
(nine children and more). Table 10.1 shows the 
distribution of responses cross tabulated against other 
respondent characteristics. It shows that average ideal 
family size for the whole sample was 5.66 children. More 
than 80% of husbands defined their ideal in terms of a 
moderate to large family size (four to eight children). 
The political situation in the West Bank (with the area 
continuing under Israeli occupation) may play a 
considerable role in accounting for the high ideal family 
size. Responses by different sub-area's are markedly 
different from one another. For instance, the proportion of 
urban husbands who chose small families was higher than in 
rural areas and refugee camps. There was also greater 
variation in the declared ideal family size between various 
classes in urban areas than between the inhabitants of 
village, town and refugee camps. 
Differences in ideal family size according to the 
husband's age are quite clear. Younger people tend to 
classify the ideal family size as being less than older 
generations. The average ranges between 4.56 for the 
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Table 10.1 
Percentage distribution and average ideal family size by 
place of residence, husband's age, education and actual 
number of children. 
Ideal family size 
Small Moderate Large V. Large Mean 
(% of total) 
Total population 10.3 41.1 41.0 7.5 5.66 
Area 
Small village 8.9 43.0 35.7 12.7 5.98 
Towns 9.7 37.3 44.7 8.3 5.79 
City lower class 11.0 36.0 50.0 3.0 5.45 
City middle class 17.0 47.0 35.0 1.0 4.97 
City upper class 17.0 39.0 41.0 3.0 5.10 
Refugee camps 3.0 48.5 43.4 5.1 5.80 
Husband's aae 
Less than 20 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 6.00 
20-29 21.2 55.9 21.8 1.1 4.56 
30-39 12.0 52.6 31.7 3.6 5.18 
40-49 7.1 43.8 41.4 7.7 5.77 
50-59 6.7 30.1 53.1 10.0 6.12 
60 and over 4.7 22.0 57.6 15.7 6.70 
(chi2 = 148 d. f. = 12 Significant = 0.001) 
Husband's Education 
Illiterate 4.5 14.6 61.8 19.1 7.03 
Lower education 6.1 40.6 45.1 8.1 5.86 
Middle education 16.6 52.1 29.4 1.8 4.90 
Higher education 21.8 56.3 21.3 0.6 4.53 
(chi2 = 171 d. f. =9 Significant = 0.001) 
Actual family size 
Childless (0) 18.2 56.6 21.1 4.0 4.66 
Small (1-3) 19.2 50.6 27.8 2.4 4.85 
Moderate (4-5) 11.8 51.3 30.8 6.2 5.36 
Large (6-8) 4.4 30.0 58.9 6.7 6.11 
V. Large (9+) 1.6 26.3 53.7 18.4 6.88 
(chi2 = 177 d. f = 12 Significant = 0.001 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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husbands aged between 20-29 years, to 6.70 for husbands 
aged 60 years and over. These findings contradict work by 
Freedman and Sharp (1954) who found a positive relation 
between age and the ideal family size. Freedman and Sharp 
(1954) attributed this to the effect of social norms which 
he claimed affected the older respondents more than the 
younger ones. The association of ideal family size and 
husband's age proved statistically highly significant for 
the West Bank survey carried out by the author with the 
chi-square value being significant at 0.001 confidence 
level. In the same way, the survey showed that education 
has an influence on ideal family size. Ideal family size 
declines amongst those with higher levels of education. As 
shown in the table, the value of chi-square are higher in 
relation to education than to age. These findings are not 
surprising and corroborate the findings of other studies of 
the determinants of fertility behaviour (Chenery and 
Syrkin, 1977; Schultz, 1973; Fargues, 1989). 
The number of children considered as ideal also 
increased proportionately with the number of children in 
the respondent's family (Table 10.1). The mean ideal 
family size increases gradually with increase in actual 
family size. Consider, for example, the difference between 
ideal family size among those who had no children (4.66) 
and those who had very large families (6.88). Once again 
the relationship proved statistically highly significant. 
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Figure 10.1: Percent distribution of ideal family size. 
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Figure 10.2: Distribution of ideal family size by 
educational level. 
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10.4 Ideal and actual family size 
Many studies have examined the relationship between 
peoples declared ideal family size and their actual number 
of children (Hawley and Prachuabmoh, 1965; Gille and 
Pardoko, 1966). The findings in Table 10.2 show a small 
proportion of extreme values in the distribution, with for 
example less than 2% of respondents reporting that the 
average ideal family size should be less than 3 children as 
compared with 7.5% who identified the ideal family size as 
being 8 children or more (4.6% of respondents with an 
incomplete family size and about 10% of these who had 
completed their families). 
In the author's West Bank study, two thirds of 
respondents stated an ideal family size would have four, 
five or six children. The actual number of children found 
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Figure 10.3: Distribution of ideal family size by No. of 
living children. 
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in the households surveyed was very different, reflecting 
the presence of many other influences (behavioural, 
physiological and societal) which intervene to create 
contradictions between reproductive intentions and 
behaviour. 
Drawing a comparison between the ideal and actual 
family size is vital. Therefore it is useful to compare 
ideal family size with two particular categories of actual 
family size: firstly completed family size and secondly 
the family size of families who are still of childbearing 
age and who want more children. Table 10.2 shows the 
distribution of the number of children of married couples 
who claimed to have achieved their completed family size, 
where the wife was no longer in the childbearing cohorts or 
where according to the husband the couple did not want 
additional children. A comparison of the results for this 
category with those for other families is quite interesting 
- 70% of the families which were classified as 
"incomplete", cited an ideal family size of four, five or 
six children, with responses being almost equally divided 
between these three values. About 60% of completed families 
gave these same values, but with distribution skewed 
towards the larger end of the spectrum. It is clear then 
that in incompleted families, the husband was likely to 
give a response which was lower than in completed families. 
The main reason for this may simply be that husbands in 
completed families are older. 
354 
About half of the husbands in "incomplete" families 
had less than three children, while only 2% suggested that 
the ideal family size was this small. A similar percentage 
of respondents had 3 children and identified this as the 
ideal family size. On the other hand, the proportion of 
husbands (in completed families) who classified the ideal 
family size as being two children and who already had two 
children was only 1.2% of the total. From the third to the 
sixth children there is convergence between the ideal 
number of children stated and actual family size, and 
indeed ideal family size becomes less than the actual size. 
Table 10.2 
Actual and ideal number of children (percentage 
distribution). 
No. of Incomplete families Completed families 
living 
children Actual Ideal Actual Ideal 
0 19.4 - 1.2 - 
1 16.9 0.2 0.6 - 
2 14.4 1.7 1.2 1.2 
3 12.7 11.5 4.8 6.3 
4 12.1 24.6 7.5 12.9 
5 7.3 24.2 12.1 21.2 
6 5.6 21.3 14.4 26.7 
7 4.8 7.1 15.0 13.3 
8 2.3 4.8 10.8 8.3 
9+ 4.3 4.6 32.6 10.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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There was a general association between the level of 
fertility in particular areas and the reported ideal family 
size. In spite of this, differences between areas in the 
stated average ideal family size were less than differences 
in actual total fertility rates. It is clear from table 
10.3 that the total fertility rate exceeds the ideal family 
size for the sample as a whole. In the case of rural areas 
(small villages and towns), the ideal family size in rural 
areas exceeded the overall sample average with values of 
5.98 and 5.79 respectively compared with an average of only 
5.66. The total fertility rate in these areas also 
exceeded the overall average (7.5 compared with 7.1). 
This differential is equally clear in comparing different 
classes in the city. For instance, in the urban city middle 
class areas the total fertility rate was 5.98 and the 
average ideal family size was 4.97, compared with 7.1 and 
5.66 respectively for the whole sample. In refugee camps 
the ideal family size exceeded that for the sample as a 
whole but the total fertility rate did not exceed the total 
fertility rate for the sample. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the political context and the socio-economic 
situation of the refugee camps. From the overall findings 
it is evident that the ideal family size is nearly 1.5 
children less that the total fertility rate. In towns, 
however, the total fertility rate exceeds the ideal family 
size by two children. 
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Table 10.3 
Total fertility rate and the mean ideal number of children 
in different sub-areas. 
Area Total Ave. of Col 2- Ratio % Rank order 
fertility ideal Col 1 Col. 2/ Col 1 Col 2 
rate family Col. 1 
(T. F. R. ) size 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 
Total 
population 7.180 5.66 -1.440 79.70 -- 
Small 
villages 7.525 5.98 -1.545 79.50 21 
Towns 7.515 5.79 -2.025 74.10 1 3 
City lower 
class 6.525 5.45 -1.075 83.52 3 4 
City middle 
class 5.980 4.97 -1.010 83.11 5 6 
City upper 
class 5.035 5.10 +0.065 101.29 6 5 
Refugee 
camps 6.500 5.80 -0.700 89.23 4 3 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
The ranking of the six sub-areas by total fertility 
rate is convergent parallel with the ranking on ideal family 
size. One should not attach too much meaning to minor 
differences. The average figures for the ideal family size 
for the six sub-areas lay within the range of 4.97 to 5.98, 
while the total T. F. R. ranges from 5.0 children in the city 
upper class areas to 7.8 children in towns. The table also 
shows that the average ideal family size is less than the 
total fertility rate for all areas except the city upper 
classes. 
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10.5 Ideal and desired family size 
No-one should assume that ideal family size is 
equivalent to desired family size (Stycos, 1965). It is 
important to distinguish between "generalised" ideal family 
size which refers to the number of children the respondent 
considers ideal for a family in his society, and "personal" 
family size preferences which refer to the number of living 
children the respondent would like to have in his or her 
own family. In those studies which have asked questions on 
both the general and personal perceptions of ideal family 
size (Whelpton et al., 1966; Gustavus and Nam, 1970) 
distinctive differences in both conceptual and empirical 
terms have been detected. Pullum (1980) noted that in 
Europe general views of ideal family size tended to be 
higher than personal perceptions of desired family size. By 
contrast Ryder and Westoff (1969) found no significant 
differences amongst women in the survey in the United 
States. It is to be expected that in most developing 
countries general views of ideal family size or of desired 
number of children would produce results indicating a lower 
figure than for personal perceptions as a result of the 
influence of cultural norms on the attitudes of husbands 
personal desires. On the contrary, some studies carried out 
in developed countries indicate the ideal family size to be 
higher than the desired as a result of low fertility levels 
(Ryder and Westoff, 1969). Sometimes respondents repeated 
the number of children which they have or the number of 
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children they want or expect as an ideal number of 
children. 
Differences between general and personal views may 
reflect the discrepancy between actual behaviour and future 
intentions. If behaviour does not correspond with 
intentions and aspirations, then there is clearly scope for 
policy action to reduce the gap and in the long run, 
therefore, to reduce fertility levels. 
While conducting his field work the researcher 
noticed that the major obstacles which made many families 
deviate from having what they perceived to be the ideal 
family size were: 
(a) The unstable political situation in the occupied 
territories 
(b) This in turn raised fears about the life expectancy 
of children in the area. 
(c) In addition people felt under pressure to conform to 
social norms with regard to family size. 
The pressure was seen to be particularly great 
relative to the expectations of the husband's family and 
close relatives. In the West Bank survey carried out by 
the author, some people thought that their religion forbade 
the use of modern contraceptives. 
Table 10.4 summarises the survey results for the 
different measures of family size as tabulated for the 
total population and for each area. It is clear from the 
table that the average ideal family size for society as a 
whole was lower than the desired size for people's own 
359 
families. The total fertility rate seems to be closest to 
the average desired size reported by wives. The size of 
completed family was in nearly all areas higher than both 
the T. F. R. measure and wives desired family size. 
Table 10.4 
Different measures of family size for sub-areas. 
Area Mean 
ideal 
family 
size 
(society 
in 
general) 
Mean Mean 
desired desired 
family family 
size size 
Husbands wives 
(own families) 
Total 
fertility 
rate 
(TFR) 
Average 
complete 
family 
size 
Small 
village 5.98 8.17 7.26 7.525 7.91 
Towns 5.79 8.58 7.61 7.515 7.81 
City lower 
class 5.45 7.68 6.64 6.525 6.71 
City middle 
class 4.97 6.94 6.21 5.980 6.69 
City upper 
class 5.10 6.62 5.62 5.035 6.47 
Refugee 
camps 5.80 7.75 7.02 6.500 7.44 
Total 
Population 5.66 7.92 7.00 7.180 7.22 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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Figure 10.4: Average family size. 
9 
8 
C 
d 
-O 
U 
ö6 
O 
z 
5 
4 ' 
C U U U 
ä 
ä J : E 
_ I- U 
U U Ü 
Desired by husband 
Completed family size 
Desired by wife 
Total fertility rate 
Ideal 
Source: Author's survey, 1988, Table 10.4 
10.6 Conclusion 
One of the main advantages of ideal family size is 
the measurement of attitudes towards future family size in 
the long run. In addition, it helps provide useful clues 
about the nature of family size norms. 
It can be concluded from the material presented that 
the average ideal family size for the West Bank is 5.66 
children, lower than the average desired. family size (for 
both husbands and wives) and the total fertility rate. The 
desired family size seems to be closer to the total 
fertility rate. It is found that urbanization and husbands 
educational level have a negative association with the 
average ideal family size, whilst age and actual number of 
living children are positively associated with mean ideal 
family size. 
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The findings also reveal significant differences in 
the proportion of husbands who reported the ideal family 
size to be the same as their own family size (i. e. number 
of children). For example, in incomplete families, only 
11% of husbands have 7 children and more, while 16.5% of 
total husbands chose the ideal family size to be 6 or 
greater. Moreover, in complete families, 58% of husbands 
have 7 children or more, whilst nearly 32% indicated that 
the ideal family size should be more than 6 children. 
The mean ideal family size in the West Bank (5.66) 
seems to be higher than that in some developing countries. 
For instance, in Egypt the ideal family size ranges between 
3 and 4 children (Gadalla, 1978), in Nigeria the range is 
between 3-7 children (Olusanga, 1971), while in Puerto Rico 
the range is between 2-4 children (Hill et al., 1959). 
Comparing these results, one can argue that one of several 
main reasons for the seemingly high average ideal family 
size in the West Bank is the political situation. 
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CHAPTER 11 
HUSBAND-WIFE RELATIONS AND REPRODUCTIVE GOALS 
11.1 Introduction 
Most fertility studies carried out throughout the 
world have been focussed on interviews with married women, 
particularly those who are still in the reproductive 
cohorts. Women seem to be the logical respondents for 
such surveys and the most reliable source of such 
information. This has been the case even although there 
has been long standing recognition of the importance of the 
husband's opinion and attitudes towards fertility trends, 
levels and attitudes. This is especially important in most 
Arab and Islamic societies. 
If there have been few attempts to research husband's 
views, then there have been even fewer studies which have 
sought to research the combined perspectives both of 
husbands and wives. Hill et al. (1959), Yaukey et al. 
(1965) and Mitchell (1972) were unusual in addressing 
questions about family size attitudes and family planning 
to both husbands and their wives. Most concentrated on 
the aggregate differences between couples responses, rather 
than linking the views of the marital partners or 
investigating the degree of agreement between couples and 
the effect of this on family size. 
This chapter analyses the extent of communication 
between marriage partners and considers factors affecting 
the communication process. It also assesses the 
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relationship between the similarity of a couple's profile 
characteristics and the similarity of their responses on 
matters relating to desired family size and child gender 
preferences. The chapter also seeks to shed light on the 
factors favouring agreement or disagreement between 
couples in their decisions to have additional children. 
The chapter hopes to contribute to the overall thrust of 
the thesis by showing that the nature of a couple's 
relationship may influence fertility decision making. 
11.2 Couples' relations and decision making 
Having children may biologically require two people, 
but it does not necessarily involve equal participation by 
the two marriage partners in fertility decision making with 
reference to factors such as desired family size or 
contraceptive use. In order to investigate these issues 
the researcher's questionnaire sought to measure the extent 
of communication between the husband and wife. Data on 
this was elicited from seven questions addressed to wives. 
These were phrased as follows: 
1) Who decides the desired family size (number of 
children) in your household? 
2) Have you discussed with your husband the number of 
children you want and the issue of child spacing? 
3) If you want to use, or you are already using 
contraceptives, what is the opinion of your husband on 
this? 
4) Does your husband want to have the same number/more or 
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fewer children that yourself? 
5) If you are currently using or have previously used 
contraceptives, who made the decision to use 
contraceptives? 
6) If you have used contraceptives, did you face any 
social problems? 
7) If you wish to use contraceptives i n the future, do you 
expect your husband to disagree? 
The answers to these questions are summarised and 
labelled as follows: 
Q1. - Couples themselves =1 
Others =0 
Q2. - Yes, "sometimes" =1 
Yes, "always" =2 
Not at all =0 
Q3. - "Agree" =1 
"Disagree" =0 
Q4. - Same number =1 
Less or more =0 
Q5. - Couples themselves =1 
Others =0 
Q6. - Yes =0 
No =1 
Q7. - Yes =0 
No =1 
The highest possible score which a household could 
achieve for the seven questions was eight points. This was 
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taken as an index of communication between the spouses. 
The index can be interpreted as follows: 
1) The minimum values of the index is "0". This 
identifies couples who do not communicate or who 
disagree on most matters concerning family planning. 
2) An index value of "1 or 2" was taken to define couples 
with a low level of communication. 
3) Index values of "3 or 4" were classified as moderate 
levels of communication. 
4) Values of "5 to 8" identify households where there is a 
high level of communication and agreement on fertility 
behaviour. 
However, despite its advantages in permitting some 
discussion of the widely sensitive issue of contraceptives, 
the index has also got clear limitations. For example, the 
questions were only directed to wives. 
As can be seen from table 11.1, in no case was there 
absolutely no communication. Most couples (58.3%) had 
moderate levels of communication on fertility behaviour, 
while 17.2% appeared to have high levels of communication. 
The demographic, geographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the different groups are shown in Table 
11.1. The proportion with good communication levels 
ranged from 10% in the city lower class up to about 20% in 
small villages. One explanation of the high proportions 
found in small villages is that the majority of these 
couples spend most of their time working together in the 
agricultural sector, thus allowing them the opportunity to 
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discuss all aspects of their future life including matters 
like family size and the future of their children. It is 
important to keep in mind that sometimes a high degree of 
Table 11.1 
Percentage distribution of women in different communication 
groups according to area, age, education and family income. 
LEVELS OF COMMUNICATION 
Low Moderate High Total% No. of 
respondents 
TOTAL 25.7 58.3 16.0 100 999 
AREA 
Small villages 28.4 51.3 20.3 100 300 
Towns 28.7 59 12.3 100 300 
City, lower 
class 26.0 64.0 10.0 100 100 
City, middle 
class 7.0 77.0 16.0 100 100 
City, upper 
class 18.0 63.0 19.0 100 100 
Refugee camps 35.4 47.5 17.1 100 99 
WOMEN'S AGE 
Less than 20 14.3 59.5 26.2 100 42 
20-29 8.9 67.7 23.4 100 291 
30-39 15.0 65.4 19.6 100 214 
40-49 32.3 55.0 12.7 100 220 
50-59 47.1 47.7 5.2 100 153 
Over 60 63.3 32.9 3.8 100 79 
WOMEN'S EDUCATION 
Illiterate 49.0 43.3 7.7 100 326 
Low education 19.6 64.9 15.5 100 419 
Ave. education 6.6 68.9 24.5 100 151 
High education 4.9 63.1 32.0 100 103 
FAMILY INCOME 
Less than 
100 J. D. * 32.4 59.6 8.0 100 213 
Between 
100-199 J. D. 25.6 57.6 16.8 100 512 
More than 
200 J. D. 20.8 58.4 20.8 100 274 
*J. D. = Jordanian dinar at the time of the 
survey was worth £1.64 sterling. 
Source: Author's da ta, 1988. 
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communication does not lead to agreement between husband 
and wife on family size (Bulatao and Lee, 1983). 
The distribution of responses by age shows that 
communication appeared to be less good among older couples. 
This is not a temporal trend, but instead reflects 
differences between the generations. For example, the 
proportion of women in the "high communication" group 
decreased from 26.2% among young women aged less than 20 
years to 3.8% among women over 60 years of age. 
Education is a factor which has generally been 
recognised as facilitating discussion of family planning 
between marriage partners (Campbell and Berelson, 1971). 
Thus, it is not surprising to find in table 11.1 that 
education is positively associated with levels of 
communication on these issues. Taking the column recording 
high levels of communication, the proportion of women 
gradually increased from 7.7% amongst illiterate women to 
32.0% among women with higher education. Womens' education 
therefore helps in supporting their position, and 
encouraging them to participate in household decisions. 
Husbands become more receptive to sharing decision making 
with their wives if their wives are well educated. Khalifa 
(1976) found the same result in his study of rural Egypt, 
with wives' level of education being influential in 
affecting levels of communication between marriage 
partners. 
It could also be inferred from table 11.1 that 
greater communication was associated positively with higher 
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incomes. A report by ESCAP (1974) found that couples with 
higher incomes tended to have more discussion about family 
planning than lower income couples. This may be because 
couples with lower incomes are more motivated to have 
children in the hope of raising their living standards. 
Family income may indicate the same direction of influence 
as age and education but the strength of the relationship 
according to Table 11.1 would seem to be less. It is 
important to keep in mind that the income levels may not 
only effect the level of communication directly but also 
indirectly. For example women with a high level of income 
usually also have more education, more opportunities to 
work, are less dependent on their husbands and are less 
traditional. 
11.3 The consistency of couples characteristics 
It is generally suggested by Bahr (1972) and Rosen 
and Simmons (1971) that where marriage partners are from a 
similar background and have similar characteristics, this 
reduces conflict and disagreements. This section will 
focus upon the similarity and the differences in the 
personal characteristics of married couples and how this 
can affect the decision making process regarding family 
planning. The characteristics examined are age, age at 
marriage and education. 
When the gap between the ages of the husband and wife 
is small, it enhances the feeling of equality between 
partners in the marital process and thus, increases the 
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level of communication between spouses in connection with 
the use of contraceptive methods. In traditional societies 
like the West Bank, men prefer to get married to younger 
women. One of the most important reasons underpinning this 
may be the desire to keep power and authority in their 
hands. 
Table 11.2 shows the distribution of spouses ages by 
area. The mean age of husbands was around 45 years with 
only slight differences between areas. By contrast the 
mean age for all wives was around 38 years. It is worth 
noting the remarkably high ages recorded. This may be due 
in part to the exodus from the West Bank of many young 
couples, which has affected the population structure in 
general. Husbands were therefore generally older than their 
wives (on average by about 7 years). The gap in urban 
areas was greater than in rural areas, which might be 
explained by the dominance of the extended family system in 
rural areas, allowing intermarriage between close relatives 
and encouraging earlier ages of marriage for men. 
On the other hand, table 11.3 represents the 
percentage distribution of age differences between the 
couples. It is clear from the table that there was a large 
gap (more than 9 years) in about one third of cases 
compared with a gap of less than 3 years in only 23% of 
cases. The high differential in ages stems, of course, 
from social norms about differences in the expected age of 
men and women at marriage. The average age at marriage of 
husbands was about 25.6 years and for wives 19 years. 
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Table 11.2 
Estimated mean age of husbands and wives and the mean age 
difference by different sub-areas. 
Mean age Mean age Mean age 
of husbands of wives difference 
TOTAL 45.07 38.21 6.86 
Small villages 43.97 38.00 5.97 
Towns 47.70 41.34 6.36 
City, lower class 46.17 36.29 9.88 
City, middle class 43.58 35.14 8.44 
City, upper class 44.68 37.79 6.89 
Refugee camps 41.24 34.77 6.43 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
Table 11.3 
Percentage distribution according to the age differences 
between couples. 
AGE DIFFERENCES 
Less than 3 years 
Between 3-6 years 
Between 6-9 years 
More than 9 years 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
PERCENTAGE 
22.7 
25.6 
20.2 
31.4 
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Differentials in educational attainment between 
husbands and wives also affect the likelihood of a wife 
participating in fertility decision making. Table 11.4 
shows the percentage distribution of husbands and wives by 
their level of education. It can be seen that about 78.3% 
of husbands who had no schooling had married wives who had 
no education. 72% of wives with higher education were 
married to husbands with the same level of education. The 
remainder were married to husbands with lower level of 
education. On the other hand around 43% of men who reached 
higher educational level were married to women with the 
same level of education, but with a higher proportion 
married to women with poor qualifications. There is, 
therefore, asymmetry in the relationships indicated by the 
table, with women often being the better educated partners 
in a marriage. 
It is possible to conclude from this table that 
highly educated women are more attractive to men with the 
same level of education. The data confirms the observation 
stated earlier that more educated women may have more say 
in marital decisions. On the other hand more educated men 
do not necessarily marry women with similar levels of 
education. The main reason behind these differences is 
attributed to the fact that men on balance prefer to marry 
women that make obedient wives. In West Bank culture, the 
man's role therefore remains dominant. 
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Table 11.4 
Percentage distribution of husbands and wives responses by 
their level of education. 
WIVES 
HUSBANDS Illit- Low Middle High Total 
erate education education education number 
Illiterate R 78.3 21.0 - 0.6 157 
C 37.7 7.9 - 1.0 
Low 
education R 36.6 50.3 11.1 2.0 505 
C 56.7 60.6 37.1 9.7 
Middle 
education R 7.4 51.5 30.1 11.0 163 
C 3.7 20.0 32.5 17.5 
High 
education R 3.4 27.6 26.4 42.5 174 
C 1.8 11.5 30.5 71.8 
Total No. 326 419 151 103 999 
R: Row percentage 
C: Column percentage 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
11.4 Communication and fertility attitudes 
Communication between couples often leads to mutually 
agreeable decisions with regard to fertility because family 
preference and family planning requires the involvement of 
both husband and wife in the decision making process 
through open channels of communication. It is therefore to 
be expected that couples with a high level of communication 
will have more ability to conform their reproductive 
behaviour to attitudes and desires (Figa-Talamance et al., 
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1974; Keller, 1973). Comparison of the actual and desired 
number of children can be taken to be a reasonable test of 
the effectiveness of communication. The question that this 
leads to in the West Bank context, is the extent to which 
enhanced communication between marriage partners offsets 
other forces following male dominance in decision making. 
Table 11.5 shows the relationship which emerged from 
the author's survey between the different communication 
groups and average desired family size. It is noted from 
the table that more than half of West Bank couples fall 
within the low communication group as compared with less 
than 20% of couples who have higher communication levels. 
This result may reveal that traditional culture which was 
characterised by male dominance and the big influence of 
the extended family system may still operate in a strong 
manner in the West Bank in years to come. 
Figure 11.1: Communication groups and desired family size. 
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As table 11.5 shows, a high proportion of the couples 
in the group with poor communications (83%) desired large 
or very large families, while only a small percentage 
(2.6%) desired small families. On the other hand, about 
80% of couples in the group with moderate communication 
desired moderate to large familes. A similar proportion of 
couples in the group with good communication levels 
desired a moderate and large family. But more than half of 
these couples desired medium sized families compared with 
only 35.9% of those in the moderate communication group. 
Table 11.5 
Percentage distribution of women in different communication 
groups according to desired family size. 
COMMUNICATION LEVELS 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE Low Moderate High 
Small (1,2,3) 2.6 5.6 9.5 
Medium (4,5) 14.6 35.9 53.2 
Large (6,7,8) 42.4 44.5 31.6 
Very large (9+) 40.4 14.0 5.8 
Number 508 301 190 
Total percentage 100 100 100 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
It is possible to conclude from table 11.5 that the 
desired family size of couples shifts from "very large" 
amongst those with poor levels of communication to "medium" 
amongst those with good levels of communication. It is 
evident that communication between spouses about 
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reproductive behaviour has some influence in affecting 
desired family size. 
To examine the effect of communication on actual 
reproductive behaviour, table 11.6 shows the relationship 
between actual family size and couples communication 
levels. It can be noted from the table that a high 
proportion of couples (68%) with good communications had 
small or moderate families, compared with 30% of couples in 
the poor communication group. It can be concluded from 
table 11.6 that actual family size is negatively associated 
with couples communication levels. 
Figure 11.2: Communication groups and actual family size. 
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Table 11.6 
Percentage distribution of women in different communication 
groups according to their actual family size. 
COMMUNICATION LEVELS 
ACTUAL FAMILY SIZE Low Moderate High 
Without children 4.5 18.3 11.1 
Small (1,2,3) 15.9 30.5 37.9 
Medium (4,5) 13.8 22.3 30.5 
Large (6,7,8) 35.0 21.3 14.7 
Very large (9+) 30.8 7.6 5.8 
Number 508 301 190 
Total percentage 100 100 100 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
The relation between desired and actual family size, 
when grouped together with the degree of communication, may 
be considered as an indicator of the degree of birth 
control (spacing and stopping). Table 11.7 shows that only 
a small proportion of couples in each communication group 
discussed reproductive behaviour before attaining their 
desired number of children. It can be noted from table 
11.7 that a high proportion of couples who subsequently 
exceeded the desired number of children were amongst those 
with poor communication between spouses, while the highest 
proportion of women who had not yet achieved their desired 
family size was found among those with moderate or good 
communication levels. It is evident that more discussion 
between couples with regard to future fertility behaviour 
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may reduce the proportion of couples who exceed their 
desired family size. 
The influence of communication is more evident in 
issues relating to couples use of contraceptives or 
intentions to use such methods. As mentioned earlier, 
women are more favourably disposed towards the use of 
contraceptives than their husbands. It is therefore to 
be expected that the nature of communication levels will 
have a significant influence on women who use or are likely 
to use contraceptives in the future. 
Table 11.7 
Relationship between desired and actual family size 
according to communication groups. 
ACTUAL AND DESIRED FAMILY SIZE 
COMMUNICATION LEVELS 
Low Moderate High 
Actual exceeds the desired 
Actual equals the desired 
Actual is les than the desired 
Number 
Total percentage 
15.7 6.0 7.4 
42.1 32.6 36.8 
42.1 61.5 55.8 
508 301 190 
100 100 100 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
Table 11.8 shows that about 80% of women enjoying 
good levels of communication with their husbands used 
modern contraceptives as compared with about 15% of women 
in the poorer communication group. Although the relation 
is not necessarily a causal one, this means that the number 
of women using contraceptives increased with an increase in 
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the level of communication between spouses. Mitchell 
(1972) pointed out that family planning tends to be a 
family decision rather than an individual decision and 
found a positive relationship between communication levels 
and contraceptive use in Hong Kong. 
Table 11.8 
Percentage distribution of women in different communication 
groups by contraceptive use. 
COMMUNICATION LEVELS 
Low Moderate High 
Contraceptive users 15.2 45.5 79.5 
Non users of contraceptives 84.8 54.5 20.5 
Total percentage 100 100 100 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
Table 11.9 examines the influence of communication 
levels on womens' attitudes towards the use of modern 
contraceptives in the future. It can be noted from the 
table that all women with a high level of communication 
would be willing to use contraceptives in the future as 
compared with 73.8% and 13.2% of women in the moderate and 
low level communication groups, respectively. 
Table 11.9 
Percentage distribution of women in different communication 
groups by their attitudes towards contraceptives. 
COMMUNICATION LEVELS 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONTRACEPTIVES Low Moderate High 
In favour 
Not in favour 
Total percentage 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
13.2 73.8 100 
86.8 26.2 - 
100 100 100 
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11.5 Husbands and wives similarity of responses 
There are a number of ways of measuring agreement 
between husbands and wives. The simplest approach is to 
measure agreement in terms of the similarity of responses 
to questions in terms of the statistical values. Where 
husbands as well as wives have been interviewed, this 
approach allows measurement of the proportion of identical 
responses from couples. It might be expected that little 
consistency between couples responses would occur on 
questions about fertility attitudes as a result of the 
cultural factors discussed earlier in this thesis. But in 
practice, the strength of the marital ties and of a couples 
responsibility towards their children sometimes did 
encourage good communication between them and strengthened 
female decision making. Consequently, some couples' gave 
similar responses. 
This section deals with the level of agreement 
between marriage partners in relation to their 
reproductive goals and preferences. Table 11.10 for 
example cross tabulates husbands and wives responses 
towards the number and gender of children preferred. This 
table shows that the proportion of husbands who prefer 
large and very large families is higher than their wives. 
It is clear that husbands responses were therefore more 
widely spread. This reflects the higher value of the 
standard deviation for this distribution. Table 11.10 also 
shows that wives are less likely than their husbands to 
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want to have more boys than girls. For example, the 
proportion of wives who prefer an equal number of boys and 
girls is 21.3%, higher than the proportion of husbands 
(9.6%). 
Table 11.10 
Distribution of couples' responses towards number and 
gender of children preferred. 
RESPONDENTS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
Male Gender Preference Scale* 
Female None Mild Moderate Strong Very N 
Preference Strong 
Husbands 1.0 9.6 20.9 36.4 18.0 14.0 999 
Wives 0.8 21.3 22.0 31.2 14.5 10.1 999 
Identical 
responses 0.3 11.6 23.1 41.8 11.3 11.9 311 
Desired Family Size Scale 
Small Moderate Large Very Large N 
(1,2,3) (4,5) (6,7,8) (9+) 
Husbands 4.4 21.8 31.6 40.1 999 
Wives 4.8 28.3 41.0 25.8 999 
Identical 
responses 5.7 26.4 33.1 34.8 477 
* Female = boys < girls 
None = boys = girls by 0 up to 1 
Mild = boys > girls by 1 
Moderate = boys > girls by 2,3 
Strong = boys > girls by 4,5 
Very strong = boys > girls by more than 5 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
Table 11.10 measures the identical responses towards 
the number and gender of children preferred between 
husbands and wives. It is noted from the table that the 
proportion of couples who give identical responses towards 
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family size is 47.7%, higher than the proportion of 
identical responses towards gender of children (31.1%). It 
is possible to conclude from table 11.10 that a couple's 
agreement about the number and gender of their children is 
affected dominantly by cultural norms. A secondary 
influence is the tendency for couples to agree with each 
other on the basis of rationalisation of their actions 
after the event and satisfaction with their actual family 
size. 
11.6 Identical responses and couples characteristics 
What determines the pattern of joint decision making? 
If there are systematic influences, such as age and 
education, which favour husbands and wives holding similar 
perspectives on family planning, then these in turn may 
result in spatial patterns of attitudes and behaviour. 
Table 11.11 shows that the proportion of couples 
giving identical responses range from 43.3% in small 
villages to 58.0% in city upper class areas. It is clear 
from the table that there is an association between 
identical responses and urbanisation level. Identical 
responses are higher in urban areas (52.3%) than in rural 
areas (44.8%). The same is true of attitudes to family 
size. This difference may be attributed to the fact that 
women in urban areas participate in family decision making 
more than their rural counterparts, mainly as a result of 
the differences in life style, response to cultural norms, 
family structure, access to contraceptives, education and 
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various types of activities. 
Table 11.11 
Percentage distribution of couples who gave the same 
responses about desired family size classified by place of 
residence. 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE 
Small Moderate Large Very N Proportion 
1,2,3 4,5 6,7,8 large of identical 
9+ responses 
Small 
villages 1.5 23.1 39.2 36.2 130 43.3 
Towns 2.2 18.7 30.2 48.9 139 46.3 
City lower 
class 7.8 29.4 29.4 33.3 51 51.0 
City middle 
class 8.3 33.3 39.6 18.8 48 48.0 
City upper 
class 17.2 39.7 31.0 13.8 58 58.0 
Refugee 
camps 7.8 33.3 25.5 33.3 51 51.5 
Total 
population 5.7 26.4 33.1 34.8 477 47.7 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
The couples educational level has an effect on both 
the proportion of identical responses and their 
distribution relative to desired family size. It can be 
noted from table 11.12 that any increase in educational 
level means an increase in the likelihood of spouses giving 
identical responses. The proportion of identical responses 
increased from 46.6% among illiterate wives to 51.5% among 
wives with a higher education level. Also wives 
educational level affected the distribution of responses 
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relative to desired family size. For instance, in small 
families the proportion of identical responses increased 
from zero to 18.9% among illiterate and highly educated 
women respectively, while those wanting a moderate family 
size the proportion increased from 3.3% among illiterate 
wives to 70% among women with higher education levels. 
Table 11.12 also shows the effect of husbands 
educational level on the proportion and distribution of 
identical responses. This follows the same pattern. 
Why should the probability of spouses giving 
identical responses increase with educational level? it 
may be attributed to the following factors: 
1. Younger people achieve more education than the older 
ones. As shown in table 11.13 age had an influence on 
the likelihood of couples achieving identical 
responses. 
2. Education affects couples' attitudes towards family 
size through new ideas and individual aspirations, 
consequently, encouraging them to discuss family 
planning issues. 
3. Education makes the couples less susceptible to 
the influence of traditional social views. 
4. Education enhances the woman's position in the family 
and her role in the decision making process, by giving 
her the opportunity to work and to contribute towards 
the family income. 
5. Education affects communication between couples as 
already mentioned earlier. 
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Table 11.12 
Percentage distribution of identical responses according to 
desired family size classified by husbands' and wives' 
level of education. 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE 
EDUCATIONAL Small Moderate Large Very N Proportion 
LEVEL 1,2,3 4,5 6,7,8 large of identical 
9+ responses 
Wives 
Illiterate - 3.3 26.3 70.4 152 46.6 
Low 2.9 26.0 44.1 27.0 204 48.7 
Middle 16.2 45.6 33.8 4.4 68 45.0 
High 18.9 69.8 9.4 1.9 53 51.5 
Husbands 
Illiterate - 2.8 25.0 72.2 72 45.8 
Low 2.5 19.1 34.8 43.6 241 47.7 
Middle 7.7 44.9 39.7 7.7 78 47.8 
High 17.4 50.0 29.1 3.5 86 49.4 
Total 5.7 26.4 33.1 34.8 477 47.7 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
It is important to explain the level of identical 
responses with regard to the age of each spouse. 
Table 11.13 shows that the proportion of identical 
responses decreased gradually with increases in the wife's 
age up to 40 years of age and up to 50 years of age for 
husbands. Thereafter the relationship reverses. The 
reason for this pattern may be attributed to the fact that 
most couples of 40 years of age and over have completed 
their childbearing period and tend to rationalise their 
behaviour in terms of reporting theier actual number of 
children as their desired family size. 
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Table 11.13 
Percentage distribution of identical responses of both 
husbands and wives according to desired family size by 
respondent's age. 
DESIRED FAMILY SIZE 
RESPONDENTS Small Moderate Large Very N Proportion 
AGE 1,2,3 4,5 6,7,8 large of identical 
9+ responses 
Wives 
< than 20 13.0 52.8 35.2 - 23 54.8 
20 - 29 12.9 52.1 28.6 6.4 140 48.1 
30 - 39 2.1 30.5 50.5 16.8 95 44.4 
40 - 49 2.8 7.5 34.9 54.7 106 48.2 
50 - 59 1.3 3.8 23.1 71.8 78 51.0 
60+ - 2.9 20.0 77.1 35 44.3 
Husbands 
*< than 29 14.4 55.6 28.9 1.1 90 50.3 
30 - 39 6.7 42.9 37.8 12.6 119 47.8 
40 - 49 1.4 23.3 43.8 31.5 73 43.2 
50 - 59 4.9 5.8 32.0 57.3 103 49.3 
69+ - 2.2 23.9 73.9 92 48.2 
Total 5.7 26.4 33.1 34.8 477 47.7 
*2 husbands were found under 20 years of age. 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
The conclusions which can be drawn from tables 11.11, 
11.12 and 11.13 are that couples characteristics (age, 
education and place of residence) do have an important 
influence on the likelihood of spouses holding similar 
views on family size. Where such agreement exists it can 
be expected to favourably affect desired family size and 
ultimately the number of children in the family. In 
particular, as the level of education and urbanisation 
rises in a society, one can expect changes in fertility 
behaviour to occur. 
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11.7 Couples agreement on additional children 
As mentioned earlier, one of the criticisms which has 
been raised of fertility preference studies is that they 
have been restricted to the wive's responses. In most Arab 
countries, because of strong male dominance in decision 
making, it is particularly important to examine the level 
of agreement between marriage partners on fertility 
matters. 
This section, attempts to measure the levels of 
agreement between spouses regarding their desire for 
additional children. Table 11.14 shows that about 60% of 
couples agreed with each other about the desire not to have 
another child. Less than 10% of couples disagreed, with 
one partner wanting an additional child. For example, 6.5% 
of husbands wanted additional children contrary to their 
wives wishes. A small percentage of wives (2.5%) wanted to 
have more children contrary to their husbands wishes. 
The highest proportion of couples who held different 
views towards having additional children was found in 
towns. The reason for this may be the transitional stage 
of urbanisation experienced by these families. By 
contrast, none of the city middle class wives wanted 
additional children if their husbands did not want them. 
Table 11.14 also shows that 91.5% of couples who had 
less than 4 children agree on having more children. As 
table 11.14 points out, the proportion of couples who want 
more children decreases with the increasing number of 
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children in the family. It decreased from 91.5% for 
couples who have less than 4 children to 14.8% among 
couples who already have more than 10 children. The big 
differences in couples agreement towards having additional 
children was found among those who had 4 to 6 children. 
This can be explained to some extent by gender preferences 
(see earlier chapter). 
Table 11.14 
Husbands/wives views on reproductive behaviour classified 
by place of residence and number of living children 
(percentages). 
Only Only Neither Both N 
husband wife want want 
wants wants another another 
another another child child 
child child 
AREA 
Small villages 3.4 2.6 62.7 31.3 233 
Towns 13.5 4.3 27.2 25.0 208 
City lower class 4.9 1.2 57.3 36.6 82 
City middle class 4.8 - 66.3 28.9 83 
City upper class 5.1 2.6 52.6 39.7 78 
Refugee camps 2.4 1.2 60.2 36.1 83 
NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN 
Less than 4 3.3 0.7 91.5 4.5 330 
Between 4-6 10.2 2.6 48.7 38.5 234 
Between 7-9 8.1 6.7 22.8 62.4 149 
10 and more 5.5 1.9 14.8 77.8 54 
TOTAL 6.5 2.5 59.7 31.3 767 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
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It is useful to examine the level of agreement 
amongst spouses about having additional children, relative 
to their mean desired family size, and also to compare this 
with the average desired family size in the areas in which 
they were living. Table 11.15 shows that both husbands and 
wives tend to agree to have additional children when the 
mean desired family size is less than the average desired 
family size of the area where the couples live. For 
example, the mean desired family size is 6.4 children when 
both couples agree to have additional children. This 
average is less than the general average of desired family 
size for all couples in the reproductive ages (6.9 
children). Also, husbands and wives tended to agree not to 
have additional children when their average desired family 
size was 7.9 children or more (i. e. a level higher than the 
general average of 6.9 children). 
Disagreement between husbands and wives about having 
additional children varies with the mean desired family 
size. The desire of wives for additional children seems to 
be consistent with the general trends which have been 
described. Wives prefer to have additional children 
mainly when their mean desired family size is less than the 
general average of the area in which they live. It is less 
easy to find logical explanations of husbands' desires to 
have additional children contrary to their wives wishes. 
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Table 11.15 
Mean desired family size (MDFS) of couples of childbearing 
age classified by place of residence and level of agreement 
about desire for additional children. 
MDFS 
CLASSIFIED BY AREA AND BY COUPLES VIEWS ON ADDITIONAL 
CHILDREN 
wife husband neither both 
wants/ wants/ want want 
husband wife 
does not does not 
Overall want want 
AREA 
Small village 7.3 6.4 8.9 6.9 8.3 
Town 7.3 7.6 6.6 6.7 8.9 
City lower class 6.8 6 6 6.3 7.6 
City middle class 6.2 5.6 - 5.8 7.1 
City upper class 5.5 3.9 6.3 5.2 6.0 
Refugee camps 6.9 6.5 7.5 6.3 8.1 
TOTAL 6.9 6.8 7.3 6.4 7.9 
MDFS = Mean desired family size 
Source: Author's data, 1988. 
The conclusions which can be drawn from tables 11.14 
and 11.15 are: 
1. The majority of couples (90%) agree with each other as 
to whether or not they will have additional children 
while only 10% have different opinions. 
2. The mean desired family size for couples who agree to 
have additional children is less than the average 
desired family size for all couples in the childbearing 
cohorts. 
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3. For spouses who disagree, wives' desires regarding 
additional children are easier to explain than their 
husbands' desires. 
4. Number of living children is a very important factor in 
determining a couples agreement to have or not to have 
additional children. 
11.8 Conclusion 
This chapter was dedicated to the investigation and 
examination of the effect of couples' relations on 
fertility preferences. Couples' relationships were 
measured in different ways: couples' communication, 
identical responses towards desired family size and 
couples' agreement about having additional children. 
Couples' relationships and their decision making has 
been shown to be determined by cultural factors and social 
norms. Socio-economic characteristics of couples have a 
significant influence on couples' communication, by 
reducing the husband's relative power in decision making. 
Beckman (1983) has argued that more egalitarian decision 
making reduces male dominance in relation to matters like 
the number of children preferred and contraceptive use. 
Greater communication between couples may lead to 
more success in controlling fertility behaviour (Bagozzi 
and Vanloo, 1978). The findings of the study indicate 
that more than half of West Bank couples fall into a group 
achieving moderate levels of communication. Urbanisation, 
higher education and family income are associated 
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positively with a good level of communication, while 
respondents age is negatively related to the level of 
communication. 
The majority of couples with better levels of 
communication have a desire for small and moderate family 
sizes. They are less likely to favour male child 
preference and less likely to exceed their desired family 
size. They are also more in favour of using modern 
contraceptives as compared with those with moderate and low 
levels of communication. 
The proportion of spouses who gave identical 
responses about desired family size was higher than those 
who gave identical responses towards gender preference. 
Most of those who gave identical responses about the 
desired number of children, were found among those who 
desired large and very large families. Most of the 
identical responses about gender preference were found 
among those who prefer the number of boys to exceed the 
number of girls by 2 or 3. Urban couples gave a higher 
proportion of identical responses than their rural 
counterparts. Also couple's educational levels have been 
shown to be positively related to giving identical 
responses. The findings of this chapter reveal that the 
majority of west Bank couples (90%) have reached some 
agreement as to whether or not to have additional children. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTUAL AND DESIRED FAMILY SIZE 
12.1 Introduction 
Analysis of human reproductive behaviour and the 
factors that influence a couple's decision to have a given 
number of children requires that one tries to evaluate both 
the actual fertility experience (number of living children) 
of a couple and also their preferences regarding the number 
of children desired. As has been shown earlier in this 
thesis, in Arab society it is also important to consider 
the desired number of male children. 
This chapter will focus mainly on the relation 
between desired and actual family size and the factors 
which affect this relationship. The chapter commences by 
asking how close is the association between them and 
attempts to measure the probability of a couple stating the 
number of living children as their desired family size. 
This thesis has already shown that West Bank couples 
have a strong bias towards having male children. As a 
result, part of this chapter specifically investigates the 
relationship between number of male children desired and 
the number of living male children as a determinant of a 
couple's desired family size. 
12.2 Problems of comparison 
One of the criticisms of surveys asking about desired 
family size is that respondents tend to state their desired 
number of children as the number they actually have, or a 
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figure very similar to their number of living children 
(Hauser, 1967). This means that respondents try to modify 
their response to coincide with actual family size as a 
kind of rationalisation of their actions. This avoids 
implying that any children are unwanted, especially for 
respondents who have gone on having children beyond their 
true "ideal" number (Pullum, 1980). 
The relationship between desired and actual number of 
living children has been examined by many researchers such 
as Hawley and Prachuabmoh (1965) and Cowgill (1968). The 
problem with such comparative studies is that it is 
difficult to estimate the proportion of respondents who 
modify their responses to be identical to the actual number 
of living children. The number of children desired tends 
to increase with the number of living children. Farooq 
(1985) suggests that spouses at any given time have an idea 
of the number of children desired, but that this number 
changes in relation to their actual experience. Farooq 
also found that actual fertility experience in Nigeria was 
observed to be consistent with family size preferences, 
while Knodel and Pitaktepsombati (1973) found in Thailand, 
that the vast majority of respondents preferred a number of 
children which was different to the number of living 
children. Differences between these researchers may have 
arisen due to the differences in the development level of 
the societies being studied as well as cultural variations 
between them. 
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Rationalisation of the number of children preferred 
can only account for the cases where the number of children 
preferred equals the actual number of surviving children 
(Lightbourne, 1985), especially in societies where 
contraceptives were not used effectively. Halver and 
Pardoko (1966), found in their study in East Java that 25% 
of men and women state their family size preference as 
equal to the actual number of surviving children. Knodel 
and Prachuabmoh (1973) reached a similar conclusion, 
finding that 26% of Thai women in the reproductive ages 15- 
49 gave identical responses to questions on desired and 
actual number of children. By contrast Bachi and Matras 
(1964) found in their study in Israel that only 3% of a 
group of several thousand maternity cases admitted a 
preference for the same number of children as their actual 
family size. The researcher in this study found that 17% of 
wives and 15% of husbands stated the desired number of 
children to be equal to the number of children they already 
had. The proportion of respondents who state the desired 
number of children as the same as their actual family size 
cannot be considered as equivalent to the proportion of 
couples who rationalise their desires after the event. 
Clearly some genuine coincidence does occur. it is 
therefore useful to estimate the percentage of these 
respondents are only rationalising their actions after the 
event. 
There are several direct methods that can be used to 
produce such an estimate. They include: 
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(1) Asking both husbands and wives, who have achieved or 
exceeded the desired number of children, whether they 
want additional children in the future. This is done 
to discover how many spouses give identical responses. 
Amongst partners where rationalisation was a possible 
explanation of the coincidence of their responses, the 
author's study in the West Bank showed that about 90% 
of husbands and 86% of wives who achieved or exceeded 
family size did not want additional children. 
(2) Asking women in this category whether they are using 
efficient contraceptive methods. The findings of the 
author's study showed that only about 55% of women in 
this category were using contraceptives. The low 
percentage of current contraceptive users can be 
partially explained by the fact that many of the women 
in the survey who claimed to have achieved their 
desired number of children were old and unlikely to 
have further children as a result. There was little 
point in asking husbands about the use of 
contraceptives since few men use contraceptives in the 
West Bank. The findings of the study supported this 
belief. Only 0.3% of married men used condoms. Use 
was restricted to the young and educated. Use of 
condoms was also perceived as a method of achieving 
child spacing rather than as a means of stopping 
having children altogether. 
(3) The use of follow up surveys. This could be done by 
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re-interviewing after 5 to 10 years the respondents 
whose preferred number of children was equal to their 
actual number of living children. This method of 
back-checking is perhaps the most accurate way of 
checking the validity of responses. 
It is also important to distinguish between two types 
of rationalisation behaviour which relate to the wife's 
age. The findings of the study revealed that 70% of all 
women who stated their preferred family size to be the same 
as their actual number of living children were in the 
reproductive age cohorts (under 50 years of age). On the 
other hand, only 30% of older women gave this response. 
Table 12.1 shows the relationship between desired and 
actual number of children (together) by number of living 
children for both the wives and husbands. It can be noted 
from the table that the proportion of wives and husbands 
whose preferred and actual family size were the same, 
proved to be similar to the proportion of wives and 
husbands whose desired family size was less than their 
actual number of living children. 
The vast majority of husbands (73.5%) and wives 
(65.3%) stated that their actual number of children was 
less than their desired number. The reason for this might 
be due to the high average desired family size since half 
of the wives and 63% of husbands with seven living children 
stated that their desired family size was higher than their 
actual size. The proportion of couples whose desired 
family size was higher than the actual number of children 
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decreased with increases in the number of living children. 
The decline among wives was more obvious than among their 
husbands. 
Table 12.1 shows that desired and actual family size 
are most likely to coincide for women with 6 children, 
while for men this occurs only when they have 8 children. 
The most interesting result which is shown in table 12.1 is 
that about 40% of wives and 18% of husbands with 8 living 
children reported that this actual family size exceeded 
their ideal number. By contrast only 12% of wives and 7% 
of husbands who had 5 children stated this. If these 
results are true for the West Bank as a whole it reveals a 
major challenge for the family planning programme. The 
fundamental problem seems to be not so much the need to 
teach efficient contraceptive usage, but to change couples 
attitudes towards childbearing and ideal family size. Only 
then will contraceptive use become more acceptable (Davis, 
1967) . 
Discussion of table 12.1 also leads to the argument 
that the tendency for some couples to give identical 
responses to questions about their actual and their desired 
family size is not just a product of rationalisation 
effects. It is also the product of underestimates by below 
parity couples of the number of children they will 
ultimately want. 
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12.3 Determinants of the relationship between desired and 
actual family size 
The relationship between actual and desired family 
size is affected by contraceptive use, gender preference 
and post event rationalisation. This section attempts to 
explain to what extent these factors are responsible in 
determining the relationship between actual and desired 
family size. 
12.3.1 Contraceptive use 
In developing countries there has been increasing 
interest in the factors that influence birth planning 
decisions. Most research has focussed on the socio- 
economic variables, although some studies have investigated 
the influence of cultural values and attitudes towards 
childbearing decisions (Fawcett and Arnold, 1973; Hoffman 
and Hoffman, 1973; Jaccard and Davidson, 1976). These 
studies found that attitudes are a very important factor in 
determining couples' decisions, and subsequently affect the 
relation between the desired and actual family size. Davis 
(1967) argues that closing the gap between the desired 
family size and actual number of living children basically 
depends on changing couples attitudes towards desired 
family size and contraceptive usage. 
In Arab countries contraceptives are more likely to 
be used after the third birth, while the first years of 
marriage will not be greatly affected by such methods 
(Fargues, 1989). The findings of this study were that 20% 
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of all women in the reproductive age cohorts never used 
contraceptives and did not wish to use them in the future. 
Of this group 28.3% said their views were a result of 
religious teachings and 22.6% referred to the side effects 
and risks of using such methods. 
Analysis of the relationship between the number of 
children desired and actual family size should involve 
consideration of the proportion of women using efficient 
contraceptives. Coombs (1974) argues that the best measure 
for the validity of stated family size preference is the 
proportion of women who use efficient contraceptives. Shah 
and Palmore (1979) have argued that desired fertility 
levels should always be consistent with contraceptive use 
among married women in the reproductive age cohorts. To 
clarify this further, it is expected that women who have 
already achieved or exceeded their desired number of 
children should be much more likely to use contraceptives 
effectively than others. 
It is clear that in societies where family planning 
programmes are effectively executed and where contraceptive 
use is widely practiced, one can expect fertility control 
to be the dominant influence on fertility. Desired family 
size will, therefore, influence the actual number of living 
children, with couples producing their targeted number of 
children. On the other hand, in traditional societies with 
their high fertility levels, and where only a small 
proportion of women use contraceptives, it can be assumed 
that fertility preferences play a much lesser role in 
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shaping the actual family size. Consequently, it is to be 
expected that actual family size and traditional cultural 
values will affect the desired number of children, rather 
than vice versa. In transitional societies the gap between 
attitudes and actual behaviour and between the actual and 
the desired family size will be greatest, and it therefore 
becomes of particular interest to determine whether actual 
family size affects a couples desire to have a given number 
of children or whether the inverse is the case. 
In the West Bank the proportion of women using 
efficient contraceptives is not very high, but there is an 
acceleration in development process. These forces may 
change the attitudes of couples towards number of children 
ultimately wanted. Also, cultural norms and religious 
teachings differ in their influence on different groups and 
sub-areas. It can be concluded that if contraception was 
being effectively used and the desired family size was the 
major force in influencing actual family size then the data 
from the survey should have shown no change in desired 
family size with increase in the actual number of children 
in the family. 
The problem for this researcher was to resolve which 
of these factors were responsible for the high correlation 
between desired and actual family size in the West Bank. 
The next section of this chapter attempts to solve this 
problem. 
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12.3.2 Gender Preference 
Male preference has been agreed earlier in the thesis 
to be an important factor contributing to high fertility 
rates. Despite this, it is a factor which has received 
little attention in most developing countries. Exceptions 
include the work of Dhindsa (1986) who found in his study 
that 97% of couples who were satisfied with small family 
sizes (three children or less) had at least one male child 
in their families. By contrast he found that about 91% of 
couples who exceeded their desired family size had done so 
in the hope of having male children or more male children. 
Also El-Khorazati (1985) confirmed in his study in rural 
Egypt the strength of male child preference in motivating 
couples in their desire for additional children. The same 
is true on the West Bank as has been shown earlier in this 
thesis. 
Male preference sometimes becomes an obstacle for 
female use of contraceptives. Markle (1973) found that 
the proportion of women who used birth control after having 
male children was higher than the proportion of women who 
practiced contraceptives after having female children. The 
analysis of sex preference as a determining factor of 
desired family size is therefore of particular importance 
in relation to couples who have already achieved their 
desired family size but who have not attained the desired 
sex composition. 
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Table 12.2 shows the mean desired family size for 
different combinations of children (boys and girls) in the 
West Bank. It is clear from the table that the increase in 
average family size desired with number of living children 
is stronger when the family has only female children. For 
example, the average desired family size in a family with 
only one female child was 5.5 for both husbands and wives. 
For those families with seven daughters and no sons the 
desired size increased to 8.0 children for wives and 12.0 
children for husbands. A similar but weaker effect was 
found for families with only one son (Table 12.2). 
It can also be noted from table 12.2 that at all 
levels of actual family size, the increase in the number of 
living sons is not strongly associated with the total 
desired family size. The reason for such a weak 
relationship can be attributed to several factors. 
1) A family with more male children may be encouraged to 
have or desire additional children. 
2) Couples tend to increase the desired number of 
children if the family has more female children in 
order to have at least an equal number of children of 
each sex. 
3) If there is a predominance of male children then it is 
more likely that a couple will have their desired 
family size. 
4) Families with all children from one gender normally 
want to have at least one child from the other gender. 
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The interaction between these factors makes the 
association between average desired family size and number 
of living sons less strong than expected in the West Bank. 
In general, in male dominated societies, it is expected 
that the average desired family size and the average number 
of male children preferred will increase with the 
increasing number of living children. 
From table 12.3 one can observe that in all 
categories, the average family size and the average total 
male children preferred by both husbands and wives 
increased gradually with increases in number of living 
children. The mean number of male children also increased 
in parallel with increases in average family size desired 
by each couple. The first reason for finding similarities 
between desired and actual family sizes can therefore be 
dismissed. Effective fertility control in relation to 
desired family size is not the cause. 
The average number of total children desired by wives 
ranged between 5.3 for women without children to 8.6 
children for women who had 10 living children or more. The 
tables also shows that husbands have a higher desire both 
in terms of the average number of children desired and the 
mean number of males preferred. Despite this comparison of 
husbands and wives responses reveals a similar overall 
trend. 
i 406 
Table 12.3 
Relationship between number of living children and both the 
average number of children desired and the mean number of 
male children preferred by wives and husbands. 
Wives Husbands 
No. of Mean No. Mean No. Mean No. Mean No. 
living of of male of children of male 
children children children preferred children 
preferred preferred preferred 
0 5.3 3.4 5.7 4.1 
1 5.3 3.4 5.4 3.7 
2 5.7 3.7 6.1 4.3 
3 6.3 4.3 6.4 4.6 
4 5.7 3.7 6.4 4.4 
5 6.4 4.1 7.4 5.1 
6 7.1 4.9 8.1 5.7 
7 7.8 5.3 8.3 6.1 
8 7.8 5.4 8.9 6.7 
9 8.5 6.4 9.0 6.8 
10 and 10+ 8.6 6.5 9.4 7.3 
Total 6.78 4.66 7.38 5.35 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
The average number of children desired is higher than 
the number of living children, with the exception of 
couples who have 8.0 children or more. The data in the 
table also gives grounds for the conclusion that increases 
in the average number of children desired with increases in 
the number of living children is not just a product of 
rationalisation after the event. It would seem to be a 
product of poor contraceptive use. 
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It is possible to conclude from table 12.3 that each 
addition to the number of living children is also 
accompanied by a marginal increment in the mean number of 
children desired and the average number of males preferred. 
Rationalisation effects also do not necessarily account for 
all the strong associations observed between the number of 
living children and the two averages. 
Table 12.4 shows the statistical relationship between 
the number of living children and both the average number 
of children and number of male children preferred by 
husbands and wives. It can be noted from the table that 
the correlations are positive and strong. The results are 
all statistically significant at the 0.001 level of 
confidence. 
It is of course possible that the results of Table 
12.4 simple reflect a position where younger couples have 
genuinely lower preferences than older couples 
(Lightbourne, 1985). In view of the data presented 
elsewhere in this thesis, it seems probable that the main 
reasons for the correlation are not this effect, but rather 
post-event rationalisation and adjustments in desired 
family size by below parity couples. 
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Table 12.4 
Statistical relation between number of living children and 
both mean number of children desired and average number of 
male children preferred for both husbands and wives. 
Correlated F Degree Signif- Correl- Correl- 
variables value of icant ation ation 
freedom level R Eta 
Husbands 
Between no. of 
living children 
and average 
family size 
desired 
Between no. of 
living children 
and average 
number of male 
children desired 
36.7 10 
29.4 10 
0.001 
0.001 
+0.51 +0.52 
+0.47 +0.48 
Wives 
Between no. of 
living children 
and average 
family size 
desired 
Between no. of 
living children 
and average 
number of male 
children desired 
39.1 10 
29.4 10 
0.001 +0.52 
0.001 +0.48 
+0.53 
+0.50 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
On average couples with an equal number of sons and 
daughters want 0.39 of a child more than is suggested by 
actual family size. Those with an excess of daughters want 
0.5 of a child more than is suggested by actual family size 
(0.8 by husbands and 0.2 by wives). These values are 
obtained by weighting the differences between the mean 
stated desired family size and the expected mean desired 
family size shown in table 12.5. 
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Thus it appears that while the sex composition of 
existing children does have an influence on the mean 
desired family size, it is expected that the gap between 
the actual and desired family size increased/decreased 
depending upon the gender of living children and the gender 
of expected new children. 
12.3.3 Rationalisation 
It is possible to measure the extent of 
rationalisation by an indirect method. For example, by 
asking each couple about the number of children they want 
their children (sons and daughters) to have. Equally one 
can ask the question "if your neighbours or some relatives 
ask for your advice with regard to the number of children 
they should have, what is the number you would suggest? " 
This kind of question gives greater freedom to respondents 
(Cowgill, 1968). By comparing their responses with their 
desires, it is possible to estimate the rationalisation 
effect. Also, such comparison between the ideal and 
desired family size can give an estimate to the 
rationalisation effect. This approach was, however, used 
by the author in his survey. 
From the findings of the author's study, it is clear 
that the ideal family size and the average number of 
children that parents would wish their own children to 
have, is less than the number they prefer for themselves. 
For example, the average ideal family size (5.66) was less 
than the average desired number of children by husbands 
(7.92) and by wives (7.0). Only 18% of husbands and 12.5% 
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of wives preferred their children to have the same number 
or more children than they themselves had. This finding 
is supported by Stycos (1965), who found that the mean 
desired family size that respondents chose for themselves 
was slightly higher than the mean number which they chose 
for their children. This gives a clear indication that 
couples rationalise the desired number of children to suit 
their high fertility level. 
12.4 Probability of stating actual number of children as 
the desired number 
This section attempts to measure the probability 
values for husbands and wives with a given number of living 
children declaring any given number of children as their 
ideal. Given the results of Table 12.6 it is not 
surprising that the highest probability is for couples to 
state identical values for their desired and actual number 
of children. The probability for couples to state the 
number of living children as the desired number is higher 
than the couples who have less or more than that number. 
For instance, the probability values in columns 2 and 5 are 
higher than the values in columns 3 and 6. 
Table 12.6 also shows that the probability values for 
wives with x living children, and state X as the desired 
number, increases gradually with increases in the number of 
living children up to a threshold of 6 children. The 
probability values decrease beyond this point for wives who 
have 7,8 and 9 children. The probability values for the 
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last category (10 living children and more) is higher than 
the previous three categories. This may be because 10 in 
the last category is an aggregate probability for wives 
with 10 children or more. It is also true that 10 was a 
frequent response by those wanting large families. 
By contrast with their wives, husbands seem to show 
no systematic trend with regard to their preferences on the 
number of living children in relation to actual number of 
children (column 5). The high probability values in 
columns 2 and 5 might have occurred for two reasons: 
effective use of contraceptives and the rationalisation 
effect. It is clear from the tables that the probability 
of wives stating the number of living children as the 
desired number is higher than for their husbands, 
especially among the families with less than 8 living 
children. 
Columns 4 and 7 contain interesting information. 
These probabilities effectively set an upper limit for the 
proportion of couples with a given number of children who 
rationalise their actual number of children to be the 
desired number. 
The differences between the probability values for 
wives (column 4) and husbands (column 7) and the minimal 
estimates of the same figures (column 3 and 6) define the 
range in which contraceptive use may be perceived to affect 
fertility. 
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12.5 Interpretation of the meaning of the relationship 
between actual and desired family size 
In order to be able to describe the relationship 
between actual and desired family size as being logical and 
having significance, it was considered necessary to ask 
women about their plans for having further children. If 
it could be shown that they already had reached or exceeded 
their desired number of children, and did not wish to have 
more children then it would be possible to suggest that the 
relation was meaningful to respondents. 
Table 12.7 shows the proportion of women in the 
reproductive ages who did not want any additional children, 
whether this involved exceeding their desired number of 
children or not. Table 12.7 shows that 72% of women who 
did not want any more children had already a family which 
was equal to or exceeded their desired number. In 
contrast 28% of women who did not want to have more 
children had not achieved their desired number of children. 
A high proportion of these women already had 5 to 8 
children. 
How far can this curious result be explained? 
Firstly, one might suggest that women have accepted their 
husband's or society's view on "desired family size", yet 
are expressing a personal desire to have no more children. 
Secondly, one might suggest that the responses of the women 
whose responses seem contradictory reflect a need for a 
more effective family planning programme to bring 
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aspirations and attainment of goals in fertility control 
close together. 
Table 12.7 
Comparison between actual and desired number of children 
for wives in the reproductive ages (15-49), not wanting any 
additional children (percentages). 
Desired exceeds Desired equals or less 
actual number than actual number 
Total 28.0 72.0 
Source: Author's survey, 1988. 
12.6 Conclusions 
In order to have a better understanding of human 
behaviour, the relation between actual fertility experience 
and desired family size should be examined. The latter 
could be conceived of as influencing actual fertility 
experiences and vice versa. Namboodiri (1972) has argued 
that the determinants of actual behaviour and family size 
preference are interrelated, and that a study of single 
determinants would at best give an incomplete picture. 
Several results can be drawn from the author's survey 
and examination of the relationships between desired and 
actual family size. These include: - 
1. The average desired family size and number of male 
children preferred increased gradually for both 
husbands and wives in relation to increases in the 
number of living children. It was also found that the 
probability values increased (but not systematically) 
for both husbands and wives who stated the number of 
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living children as their desired number in relation to 
increases in the number of surviving children 
(especially among those who already had large 
families). 
2. The proportion of women who indicated that desired 
family size equals the number of living children did 
not exceed 17%, of whom about 70% were women in the 
reproductive age cohorts. Most of these already had 
4-8 children. Rationalisation effects became more 
obvious in cases where the respondents reported the 
desired family size as equal to the number of 
surviving children. For couples who stated a 
preference to have fewer children it would seem fair 
to suggest that their views reflect positive choices 
rather than after the event rationalisations. It was 
found that rationalisation effects decreased when the 
proportion of women who achieved or exceeded the 
desired number of children had used efficient 
contraceptives. 
3. About 40% of wives and 19% of husbands who already had 
8 children reported that their actual family size 
exceeded their desired size. Also, 12% of wives and 
5% of husbands who already had 5 children reported 
that their desired family size was less than 5 
children. This result reveals the necesity for family 
planning programmes. 
4. About 20% of wives in the reproductive ages had never 
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used, and said they would never use, contraceptives. 
The majority of these women attributed this action to 
religious reasons and to the adverse effect of 
contraceptives. 
5. The proportion of women who did not want additional 
children increased with increases in the number of 
living children (up to a peak level of 7 children, 
before starting to decline again). This reflects the 
fact that couples who have a large number of children 
become careless about having further children in their 
families. 
6. The findings of this study reveals a complex mutual 
inter-relationship between desired and actual family 
size. Each one affects the other. 
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CHAPTER 13 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
13.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, numerous topics at various 
levels of analysis were explored in order to increase the 
readers knowledge of West Bank couples attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviour towards aspects of fertility and desired 
family size. The purposes of this chapter are twofold: 
first, this chapter commences with a review of the main 
objectives of this study and a summary of the main findings 
as found from the data analysis. Second, it seeks to draw 
out the implications of the study and to present some 
suggestions and recommendations for future research. 
13.2 Importance of the study 
The principle objective of this study was to present 
the results of the author's survey of attitudes and 
preferences of West Bank couples towards fertility. Within 
the framework of this general objective, this study has 
aimed to examine the following topics: - 
1. The way in which demographic changes have taken place 
in Palestine in general, and the West Bank in 
particular, in relation to the changing political 
situation. 
2. The effect on fertility behaviour and attitudes of 
contrasting household characteristics in the West 
Bank, in terms of the effect of geographical factors 
such as the influence of rural, urban and refugee camp 
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environments. 
3. The way in which social and cultural factors have 
influenced marriage patterns, childbearing behaviour 
and gender preferences. 
4. The consistency of desired family size data in 
relation to different socio-economic, cultural and 
demographic variables and the implications for 
contraceptive usage. 
5. To compare and contrast desired family size with 
actual fertility in order to determine the degree of 
influence each has on the other. 
In seeking these various objectives, the importance 
of the study stems from the following points: 
1. It is the first of its kind in the West Bank. 
2. In its contribution to demographic knowledge, the 
study is considered to be an extension of work done in 
some other developing countries, although these other 
studies have been carried out in different political, 
cultural and socio-economic environments. As a 
result, this study paves the way for future research 
on fertility attitudes in developing countries. 
3. Due to its nature, the study will help fill some of 
the gaps in the literature on childbearing behaviour. 
4. The research survey serves as a crucial information 
base on which any family planning programme in the 
West Bank could be based. Similarly, the broader 
planning implications of the research should not go 
420 
unnoticed. 
13.3 Contribution and research implication. 
The present study is thought to make a significant 
contribution to the understanding of the influence of 
couples' attitudes and preferences on fertility behaviour. 
The findings clearly attest that in the context of the West 
Bank, culture and society play a significant role in 
shaping fertility behaviour. The data presented in this 
study and the differences between different sub areas 
indicated that couples preferences and behaviour are, to a 
large extent, culture-bound. 
This study is regarded as a continuation of existing 
studies of fertility preferences in other Arab and 
developing countries. It has sought in this context to 
extend the knowledge of human fertility behaviour and 
attitudes towards having children. The findings suggest 
that West Bank couples' behaviour and attitudes are to a 
large extent influenced by the specific cultural and 
political factors which affect their situation rather than 
behaving in a fashion compatible with economistic 
demographic models. In many ways socio-political forces 
have placed the West Bank in a unique situation relative 
to other Arab countries. The Israeli occupation affects 
most aspects of Palestinian life in the West Bank, 
including family structure, mutual dependence between 
individuals and their families and the revival of 
traditional customs and values in order to maintain the 
cohesion and solidarity of the Palestinian family. 
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Therefore, it is not surprising to find differences between 
West Bank society and other Arab societies with regard to 
fertility preferences. The differences can be attributed 
to the fact that most changes in Arab countries are caused 
by socio-economic developments initiated by their 
governments and the local authorities. In the West Bank, 
in the absence of any government plan, political factors 
are the forces mainly responsible for such changes. 
The results of this study are thought to have some 
implications for the future of West Bank society. Family 
planning programmes could benefit from this study through 
applying the knowledge which has been gained of couples' 
preferences, attitudes and decision making processes 
relative to contraceptive use. It is believed that the 
findings might help family planning units and public 
decision makers to understand better the nature of couples' 
fertility preferences, attitudes, beliefs, needs and 
desires. Therefore, use of the survey results could help 
planners to know better how to deal with couples, through a 
better assessment and understanding of their personal 
preferences and motivations with regard to family formation 
and childbearing. 
The findings of this study suggest that the 
efficiency and essential success of family planning 
programmes would depend mainly on achieving changes in 
cultural attitudes and beliefs towards women's roles and 
positions in West Bank society. This can be achieved 
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through increasing female education and employment 
opportunities. In time this will lead, on the one hand, to 
a reduction in the effect of gender preferences and on the 
other hand, would help restore a balance in the relations 
between husbands and wives in family decision making. This 
would ultimately reduce fertility levels. 
At the present time, family planning programmes could 
contribute to reducing fertility by increasing a couple's 
awareness of fertility regulation methods, by improving the 
availability of efficient contraceptives, and by reducing 
their cost. The use of contraceptives is more acceptable 
among young and educated couples since the idea of family 
planning through increasing the birth interval is much more 
acceptable to them than the idea of family limitation 
through the setting of an absolute upper limit on family 
size. 
Finally, the findings of this study suggest that a 
change in fertility preferences and attitudes towards 
reproductive behaviour is occurring, but only slowly. 
13.4 Future research and recommendations. 
In conclusion, there are some suggestions which the 
researcher feels he should make about future research 
directions: 
1. As a result of the lack of data, a comprehensive census 
in the occupied territories is essential and should be 
carried out under neutral organisations, such as the 
United Nations, in order to reduce bias in the data 
resulting from the political motives of the enumerators 
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or respondents. 
2. Differences in attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of 
couples between different culture groups has created 
the need for extensive cross cultural research. 
Therefore, research should be launched in a range of 
countries with different socio-economic and political 
environments in order to achieve a better understanding 
of the effects of culture on couples attitudes to 
childbearing and their beliefs and preferences on the 
subject on one hand, and actual childbearing behaviour 
on the other. 
3. Research is needed to explore and analyse the impact of 
the political situation on fertility behaviour. 
Therefore, a comparative study between Palestinians who 
have lived under Israeli occupation and those who have 
lived in other Arab countries would be of great 
importance. 
4. Future research is essential to measure and investigate 
the attitudes of unmarried youths (male and female) 
towards fertility preferences, contraceptive use and 
childbearing behaviour. 
5. Future research is needed on the nature of married 
couples' personal relations and their impact on 
fertility attitudes and behaviour. This research may 
include the influence of family structure on fertility 
attitudes and behaviour. 
6. Research on socio-economic relationships between 
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parents and their children may help in providing a 
partial explanation of fertility behaviour. 
7. A follow up survey is of great importance to explore 
the gap between desired and actual family size in order 
to understand the changes which have occurred in 
couples attitudes and perceptions over a period of 
time. 
8. In traditional societies which are characterised by 
male dominance, fertility research should include 
husbands as well as their wives. It would also be 
relevant sometimes to investigate the opinions of a 
couples parents and children since their perspectives 
are very important in the family building process. 
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APPENDICES 
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Dear Sirs: 
To Whom It May Concern 
This letter introduces Mr. Faisal Zanoun . Mr. Zanoun 
is studying for the 
degree of Ph. D. in Demography at the university of Glasgow. 
As part of his Ph. D. research he will be studying documents, consulting 
libraries, and undertaking an interview study using aquestionnaire. 
I hope therefore that you will provide him with all the info rmation'needed 
inorder to enable him to complete his studies and research. 
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APPENDIX 2 
HUSBAND'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear Sir, 
This questionnaire is part of a doctoral degree being 
undertaken at the University of Glasgow. Personal 
interviews are needed with husbands. Each interview will 
cover the following: 
1. Household characteristics (general information) 
2. House characteristics 
3. Economic characteristics and relationships 
4. Interpersonal relationships and decision making 
5. Desired family size and gender preference 
You will find that in many questions you are given a 
set of alternative answers to choose from, whereas in 
others you are asked to furnish your own answers. The 
information you provide will be used only for academic 
purposes and will be treated in the strictest confidence. 
Your co-operation would be deeply appreciated. It would 
also enhance the advancement of knowledge in the subject. 
Researcher 
Faisal Zanoun 
Glasgow University. 
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General characteristics of household 
No. Relation Age Place of Educational Work Religion 
to head birth level status 
of achieved 
household 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11+ 
House characteristics 
1. The house you are living in is (choose one alternative 
only) : 
- a) Owned 
- b) Rented 
- C) Belongs to your father's family 
- d) Tied to work 
- e) From UNRWA 
- f) Other (specify) 
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2. If the house is rented, how much is the monthly rent? 
- a) Less than 25 J. D. 
- b) Between 25-49 J. D. 
- c) Between 50-74 J. D. 
- d) Between 75-99 J. D. 
- e) More than 100 J. D. 
3. Number of bedrooms and living rooms in the house? 
4. Do you share your house with some relatives? 
- a) Yes 
- b) No 
5. If the answer is no, then where is your house located? 
(Choose one alternative answer): 
- a) Close to your relatives 
- b) Near to your relatives 
- c) Near to your wife's family 
- d) In the same town as your relatives 
- e) Other (specify) 
6. Which of the following items do you possess? 
Yes No 
- a) Private car 
- b) Refrigerator 
- c) Washing machine 
- d) Black and white T. V. 
- e) Colour T. V. 
- f) Video 
- g) Telephone 
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Household economic characteristics and relationships 
1. Employment status: 
- a) Employed - b) Unemployed 
2. If the answer is (a), then what is the nature of your 
work? 
- a) Government employee 
- b) Construction 
- c) Industry (manufacturing) 
- d) Services 
- e) Labourer 
- f) Farmer 
- g) Self employed 
3. What is your main job? 
4. Location of your work: 
- a) In the same home town where you live 
- b) In Israel 
- c) In a different city or town 
- d) Abroad 
5. Do you hold any other job in addition to the one 
outlined in question 3? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
6. If you are currently unemployed, why? 
- a) Physically incapable 
- b) No jobs available 
- c) Not enthusiastic about work 
- d) Retired 
- e) Other (specify) 
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7. What is your family's monthly income in Jordanian 
dinars? 
8. Does your family receive any type of financial aid? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
9. If yes, what is the source of this aid? 
- a) Retirement wages 
- b) Social security benefit 
- c) Working children 
- d) Charitable organisations 
- e) Other (specify) 
10. Does your family face any financial difficulty in 
meeting the needs of its children (if applicable)? 
a) Yes b) No 
11. If yes, to what extent? 
- a) Always 
- b) Sometimes 
- c) Occasionally 
- d) Other (specify) 
12. How much of your total monthly income is allocated to 
expenditure on children? 
- a) Less than one third 
- b) Nearly half 
- C) Two thirds 
- d) All 
- e) No children 
13. Do any of your children work? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
5 
14. If yes, with whom does he/she work? 
- a) With the family without wages 
- b) With the family with wages 
- c) With people other than the family 
15. How much does each of the following contribute towards 
family income? 
Source Percentage 
- Husband's work 
- Wife's work 
- Married children 
- Unmarried children 
- From land 
- From property 
- From investment 
- Pension and social security 
- Other (specify) 
Social relationships and decision making 
1. Your age at first marriage? 
2. At the beginning of your marital life, did you live 
with your parents? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
3. If yes, for how long? 
- a) Less than 6 months 
- b) Between 6-12 months 
- C) Between 1-5 years 
- d) More than 5 years 
- e) Still living with them 
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4. If your answer to question 2 is no, why? 
- a) Need for independence 
- b) Fear of parents meddling 
- C) The house is small and inadequate 
- d) Fear of financial committment to parents 
- e) Other (specify) 
5. If and when you have a daughter reaching marriagable 
age, to whom would you prefer her to marry? 
- a) To a relative 
- b) To a non-relative 
- c) Up to her to decide 
- d) Other (Specify) 
6. If and when you have a son reaching marriagable age, to 
whom would you prefer him to marry? 
- a) To a relative 
- b) To a non-relative 
- c) Up to him to decide 
- d) Other (specify) 
7. Have you discussed with your wife the desired number of 
children. 
- a) Yes - b) No 
8. If the answer is yes, when did the discussion take 
place? 
- a) At the very beginning of your married life 
- b) After having the first child 
- c) After having more than one child 
- d) Once the children became a burden to the family 
- e) Other (specify) 
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9. If your wife is using, or wishes to use contraceptives, 
what is your attitude to such a practice? 
- a) In favour 
- b) Opposed 
- c) Neutral 
- d) Do not care 
Desired family size and gender preference 
1. Do you or did you prefer to have more male children 
than female? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
2. Do you or did you prefer your first child to be male? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
3. How many children do you prefer to have in your whole 
life? 
a) Sons b) Daughters c) Total 
4. Your wife prefers to have: 
- a) More children than your desire 
- b) Same number of children 
- c) Less children than your desire 
5. In your opinion, what is the ideal family size? 
a) Sons b) Daughters c) Total 
6. If you would like more children, how soon after your 
last baby would you like to have him/her? 
7. Following up on question 6, what is the gender 
preference preferred for a baby? 
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8. Were you in favour of having your last baby? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
9. If you do not want additional children, is it because? 
- a) You have enough children 
- b) Health reasons 
- C) Economic reasons 
- d) Social reasons 
- e) Need to concentrate on the care of present 
children 
- f) Others (specify) 
10. If you have a married daughter, or when your daughter 
gets married, would you advise her to have: 
- a) Less children than you desired 
- b) The same number 
- c) More children than you desire 
- d) Others (specify) 
11. If you have a married son, or when your son gets 
married, would you advise him to have: 
a) Less children than you desired 
b) The same number 
c) More children than you desire 
d) Others (specify) 
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APPENDIX 3 
WIFE'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear Madam, 
This questionnaire is part of a doctoral degree being 
undertaken at the University of Glasgow. Personal 
interviews are needed with wives. Each interview will 
cover the following: 
1. Employment status 
2. Marriage: attitudes 
3. Childbearing behaviour 
4. Decision making 
5. Fertility attitudes and desired family size 
6. Contraceptive methods 
You will find that in many questions you are given a 
set of alternative answers to choose from, whereas in 
others you are asked to furnish your own answers. The 
information you provide will be used only for academic 
purposes and will be treated in the strictest confidence. 
Your cooperation would be deeply appreciated and would also 
enhance the advancement of knowledge on the subject. 
Researcher 
Faisal Zanoun 
Glasgow University 
1 
Employment status 
1. Are you working for a salary? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
2. If yes, where do you work? 
- a) In the same area where you live 
- b) Outside your home town 
- c) At home (i. e. sewing) 
3. What is the nature of your work? 
4. Type of business ownership 
- a) Government sector 
- b) Private sector 
- c) Self employed 
- d) Others (specify) 
5. While you are at work, who looks after your children? 
- a) Yourself 
- b) Your husband 
- C) Your husband's family 
- d) Your family 
- e) Neighbours 
- f) Depend on themselves 
- g) Nursery school 
- h) There are no children 
6. What is your attitude towards womens' work? 
- a) In favour 
- b) Opposed 
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7. If you are in favour of women employed outside their 
homes, in what type of work would you prefer them to 
engage themselves in? 
- a) Education 
- b) Agriculture 
- c) Free enterprise 
- d) Self employed 
- e) Others (specify) 
8. If you are against women's employment, is it because 
of: 
- a) Religious reasons (e. g. mixing) 
- b) Cultural reasons (e. g. women's role should be 
confined to the home) 
- C) Social reasons (e. g. women's work increase the 
corruption in the society) 
- d) Marital reasons (e. g. women's work causes 
conflict with her husband) 
- e) Others (specify) 
Marriage attitudes 
1. What was your age at first marriage? years 
2. Are you related to your husband in any way? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
3. If yes, what kind of relation? 
- a) Close relative (from the extended family) 
- b) Member of the extended family 
- C) Relative but not from the extended family 
(mother's relatives) pa 
3 
4. What is the age difference between you and your 
husband? 
- a) Less than 3 years 
- b) Between 3-5 years 
- c) Between 6-8 years 
- d) More than 9 years 
5. How did you get to know your husband? 
- a) Through education (schools, universities) 
- b) At work 
- c) Through relatives 
- d) Did not know him before 
6. If and when you have a daughter reaching marriagable 
age, to whom would you prefer her to marry? 
- a) To a relative 
- b) To a non relative 
- c) Up to her to decide 
- d) Others (specify) 
7. If and when you have a son reaching marriagable age, to 
whom would you prefer him to marry? 
- a) To a relative 
- b) To a non relative 
- c) Up to him to decide 
- d) Others (specify) 
4 
8. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements, using a scale 
ranging from 1 to 4 with 1 being "strongly agree" and 4 
"strongly disagree". 
STATEMENT 1234 
a) Favour early female marriage 
(before 18 years of age) 
b) Male higher education is better 
than marriage 
c) Sons should marry before 
entering emplyment 
d) The wife should be older than her 
husband 
e) Favour exchange marriages 
f) Marriage between relatives 
negatively affect children's 
health --------------- 
g) Kinship marriages reduce wifes 
freedom 
Childbearing behaviour 
1. In your opinion, what is the main motive behind 
childbearing? 
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2. In comparison with your mother, how many children would 
you like to have? 
- a) Less than what your mother had 
- b) More than what your mother had 
- C) The same as your mother 
- d) You have no desire for children 
3. If you already have or would like the first child to be 
male, what name would you rather give him? 
- a) The same as his grandfather 
- b) Modern name 
- c) Religious name 
- d) Political name 
- e) Others (specify) 
4. If you have three children or more and would like to 
have additional ones, is it because? 
- a) Most of your living children are females 
- b) The children are God given 
- C) Children strengthen society 
- d) Political situation 
- e) Your husband wants more children 
- f) Others (specify) 
5. In your opinion to what extent do children support 
their parents nowadays? 
- a) Less than the past generation 
- b) More than the past generation 
- c) The same 
- d) Do not know 
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6. If your answer to question 5 is (a), is it because? 
- a) The rise in living costs 
- b) Them being away from the family 
- c) Their wives influence 
- d) Lack of concern about social norms 
- e) Others (specify) 
7. This question to be answered by wives who have 
completed their childbearing period. If you could go 
back to the beginning of your married life, would you 
like to have: 
- a) More children than you currently have 
- b) Less children than you currently have 
- c) The same 
- d) Do not know 
8. Below you will find a number of statements. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree with each using 
scale ranging 1-4 with 1 being "strongly agree" and 4 
"strongly disagree". 
STATEMENT 1234 
a) A man lives through his children 
b) The real death occurs when a 
father dies without having sons 
c) Having more children in a family 
makes the wife more secure 
d) Having many children strengthens 
a couples relationship 
e) Male children provide more support 
to their parents than females 
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f) The cost of children incurred on 
the part of the family is less than 
the benefit they bring 
g) Frequent pregnancies have negative 
effects on wife's health 
h) Having many children prevents a 
man from marrying another wife 
i) Religion prohibits the limiting 
number of children a family should 
have 
Decision making 
1. Who decides the size of your family? 
- a) Husband 
- b) Wife 
- c) Husband and wife together 
- d) Your husbands parents 
- e) Others (specify) 
2. Do you or did you have any plan about the size of 
family you should have? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
3. If the answer is yes, when is/was that? 
- a) At the beginning of married life 
- b) After having the first child 
- c) After having a number of children 
- d) After the children became a burder to the family 
- e) All the time 
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4. If you are using or would like to use contraceptives, 
what is the response of your husband to such practice? 
- a) Agreement 
- b) Disagreement 
- c) Indifferent 
- d) The decision is solely your own 
Fertility attitudes and desired number and gender of 
children 
1. How long have you been married? years. 
2. How many children have you had, including those who 
have died? 
a) Male b) Female c) Total 
3. How many living children do you have? 
a) Male b) Female c) Total 
4. How many children are currently living with you? 
a) Male b) Female c) Total 
5. How many of your own children are living away from the 
home? 
a) Male b) Female c) Total 
6. Below you will find a number of statements. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with each using a scale ranging from 1 to 4, with 1 
being "strongly agree" and 4 being "strongly disagree". 
STATEMENT 1234 
a) Childbearing is the wife's main 
function 
b) Women should have as many children 
as they can 
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6. 
7. 
c) The quality of children is better 
than the quantity 
d) Limiting family size helps solve 
many family problems 
e) The luckiest families are those 
with more male children 
f) Under occupation, females cause 
more concern to their parents 
g) Female employment outside their 
home is in contradiction to 
society's values and norms 
h) The family with female children 
is regarded as barren 
Do you prefer to have more male children than females. 
- a) Yes - b) No 
If the answer is yes, why? 
- a) Because sons carry the family name while 
daughters carry the name of their husband's 
family. 
- b) Because sons help the family more. 
- c) Because male children inherit family property. 
- d) Because of the family's obsession with their 
daughters and their reputation after their 
marriage. 
- e) Unmarried daughters constitute a threat to their 
parents. 
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- f) Family reputation could be more at risk with 
female children. 
- g) Others (specify) 
8. Do you or did you prefer the first child to be male? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
9. What is the minimum level of education you would accept 
for your daughter? 
- a) Preparatory 
- b) Secondary 
- c) College 
- d) University 
- e) Higher education 
10. What is the minimum level of education you would accept 
for your son? 
- a) Preparatory 
- b) Secondary 
- c) College 
- d) University 
- e) Higher education 
11. If a family had more female than male children, how 
would you advise them? 
- a) Continue childbearing 
- b) Accept the situation as it is 
- c) No difference between males and females 
12. How many children would you or did you prefer to have 
during your lifetime? 
a) Male b) Female c) Total 
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13. Do you think that your husband prefers to have? 
- a) More children than you desire 
- b) The same number of children 
- c) Less than you desire 
14. Would you like to have another child? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
15. If yes, how soon after the last baby? years. 
16. What gender would you like your baby to be? 
17. Did you want the last baby you had? (if applicable) 
- a) Yes - b) No 
18. If the answer is no, is it because? 
- a) You have enough children 
- b) Economic reasons 
- C) Health reasons 
- d) Social reasons 
- e) The need to concentrate on the welfare of 
present children 
- f) Others (specify) 
19. If and when you have a daughter reaching marriagable 
age, would you prefer her to have: 
- a) Less children than you desire 
- b) More children than you desire 
- c) The same number of children 
- d) Up to her to decide 
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20. If and when you have a son reaching marriagable age, 
would you prefer him to have: 
- a) Less children that you desire 
- b) More children than you desire 
- c) The same number of children 
- d) Up to him to decide 
Contraceptive methods 
1. Who decides the use of contraceptives in the family (if 
applicable)? 
- a) Your husband 
- b) You yourself 
- c) You and your husband 
- d) The doctor 
- e) Others (specify) 
2. Are you in favour of family size determination? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
3. If yes, is it because of: 
- a) Economic reasons 
- b) Health reasons 
- c) Lack of accommodation 
- d) Reasons related to parents own ambitions 
- e) Having enough children (achieving desire) 
- f) Others (specify) 
4. Adding to question 3, what is the main purpose for your 
family size determination? 
- a) Increase the birth interval 
- b) Stop having children 
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5. What type of contraceptives did you use, or are using, 
if any? 
6. Are you currently using contraceptives? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
7. When did you start using contraceptives (if 
applicable)? 
- a) After having the first child 
- b) After reaching the desired number of children 
- c) Before achieving the desired number of children 
- d) After exceeding the desired number of children 
8. To be answered by those who used to use, or are using, 
contraceptives. Did you face any difficulty in using 
such a method? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
9. If yes, from whom? (Give relation, not name) 
10. Did you face any health difficulty when you used 
contraceptives (if applicable)? 
- a) Yes - b) No 
11. If you are planning to use contraceptives, do you 
expect opposition from? 
- a) Husband 
- b) Husband's family 
- c) Your parents 
- d) Do not expect any opposition 
- e) Others (specify) 
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12. If you are not using and do not plan to use 
contraceptives, is it because of? 
- a) Religious reasons 
- b) Their adverse side effect 
- c) Being expensive 
- d) Husbands opposition 
- e) You want to have as many children as possible 
- f) Others (specify) 
_.. L 
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